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Abstract
This dissertation brings together multiple discourses, including surveillance studies,
autonomist Marxism and posthumanism, as the groundwork for a novel discussion of
contemporary visual art— in particular surveillance art, that is, art that addresses and
problematizes the omnipresent digital monitoring now part of everyday life. Because in
this dissertation contemporary art is defined as necessarily political, aesthetic (in the
Kantian sense) and responsive to conditions of current history and society, I use Marxist
theory to identify the particular features of contemporary capitalism that this art is
responding to. I first characterize post-Fordist capitalism, focusing on the increasing
reliance on extracting network value from what Maurizio Lazzarato called immaterial
labour. I discuss Marx’s theories of formal and real subsumption vis-a-vis their impacts
on production, technology and subjectivity, and conclude that we need a new term that
adequately emphasizes the novel imbrication of technology and subjectivity. In particular,
I claim that surveillance capitalism, rising from military technologies and research,
characterizes capitalist valorization under hypersubsumption. I then look at the impact of
surveillance on labour and subjectivity, with a particular focus on unwaged immaterial
activities. Do these activities count as work? To answer that, I propose looking at a
combination of Marx’s concept of unproductive labour with a modified type of constant
capital. I conclude that the effects of hypersubsumption on labour, consumption and
production have produced a new type of capitalist subjectivity: coerced posthumanism,
which I contrast with Marx’s authentic species-being. In order glimpse a post-capitalist
species-being, I articulate a theory of contemporary art by bringing together Jacques
Rancière’s dissensus with Peter Osborne’s notion of contemporary art; both theorists
show how contemporary art is necessarily political— what’s more, it is oriented towards
an open future. I then apply their ideas to particular artists who have responded to
capitalist surveillance by creating ‘artveillance’ (art about surveillance). I evaluate the
political effectiveness of three categories of artveillance as experiments in post-capitalist
sensoriums.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This dissertation brings multiple disciplines and areas of research together to present a
new theory of contemporary art. The areas I use include surveillance studies, autonomist
Marxism and posthumanism. I use autonomist Marxism, a strand of Italian Marxism that
focuses on the revolutionary power of the worker, to identify the defining features of
capitalism today. Autonomists would say we are in a period of post-industrial capitalism,
or what they’d called post-Fordism. I claim that today, capitalism’s increasing reliance on
surveillance, which rose from military technologies and research, characterizes capitalist
value-making under a period I dub “hypersubsumption.” I focus on the transformations in
capitalism that have occurred with the advent of networked technologies, algorithims and
digital platforms, which have enabled corporations to profit from what theorist Maurizio
Lazzarato calls ‘immaterial labour.’ I look at the impact of surveillance on unpaid
immaterial labour and subjectivity. I ask: do these activities count as work? I conclude
that under hypersubsumption, unwaged immaterial labour is work done for free— or for
certain privileges and pleasures— produces a category of labour I call “coerced
posthumanism,” which I contrast with Marx’s idea of authentic human species-being. I
propose that capitalism has created its own version of species-being, which provides the
enticement to continue working for free on digital platforms, or to have data voluntarily
monitored and harvested. Finally, I generate a theory of contemporary art by bringing
together philosopher Jacques Rancière’s concept of opposing communities of sense with
art theorist Peter Osborne’s notion of contemporary art; for them, art is necessarily
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political. I then compare three categories of contemporary art about surveillance with my
theory of contemporary art.
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1.

« Introduction »

In 2021, while I was in the process of writing this dissertation, a news story was brought
to my attention that was somehow extremely believable and shocking at the same time:
the Bologna Museum in Italy had installed an artificial intelligence (AI) based camera
system to track and process how visitors interacted with the artworks.1 The museum
worked with the Italian National Agency for New Technologies [ENEA], a government
organization that promotes and creates new technologies, to outfit itself with 14 cameras
that monitor interaction between visitors and works of art. The project, known by ENEA
as ShareArt, collects data on museum goers’ facial expressions, as well as the duration of
time they look at a work of art, the distance they are looking from, and even the path they
take to get there. ENEA claims that its AI can even determine visitors’ age, gender, race
and socio-economic class. The project’s designers would have us believe that this
beneficent AI is merely trying to help cultural institutions stay competitive in today’s
highly technological world of smart devices and data mining. It is hailed as obviously and
imminently useful to cultural institutions worldwide— we need to know what makes
people appreciate art, they say. Curators can use information about visitor paths and
viewing duration in laying out exhibitions for maximum interest and ease of access. Of
course, museums need to be intimately aware of their visitors’ behaviors.
As the author of this article mentions, the cameras and AI systems in ShareArt can
also be used for purposes beyond their design as benign curatorial tools: “ShareArt can
also be used to improve the safety of museums, ENEA claims. Just one suggested
technique would be to verify that attendees are using masks correctly and applying social
distancing rules.”2 Nowhere in this article is it mentioned that people have been consulted

Manuel Charr, “Museum Uses Artificial Intelligence to Watch Visitors,” Museum Next, August
10, 2021, https://www.museumnext.com/article/museum-uses-artificial-intelligence-to-watchvisitors/.
1
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Charr, n.p.
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on or agree to be monitored; presumably, entering the museum and enjoying its contents
is taken as tacit consent; it is not uncommon for large museums to have security cameras,
after all.
This article had a powerful effect on me because it congealed all the themes of
this dissertation into a single event. Here an art museum brazenly embraces the nonconsensual surveillance and data gathering of their patrons in order to become more
streamlined and competitive—more “interesting”—thereby garnering more visitors. The
museum is working with a government sponsored R&D company that is providing this
technology, including an opaque AI with a presumably proprietary algorithm whose
function seems to be social sorting. This is not only the commodification of art but the
commodification of attention through mass surveillance technologies, which could easily
slide into sorting ‘desirable’ museum visitors from less desirable ones. I do not know
whether any artworks critical of surveillance hang in this museum, it would be ironic if
they did.
My dissertation explores the relationship between artveillance—a term Andrea
Mubi Brighenti introduced in a 2009 article to refer to artworks, installations and
performances that deal directly with themes of surveillance3— and contemporary
capitalism4. It relates the emergence of such art to transformations in the mode of
production from a Fordist to a post-Fordist phase, and the associated rise of ‘surveillance
capitalism’5 as a primary value-generating vehicle. Using Marx’s frameworks of formal
and real subsumption6, it argues that contemporary capitalism is entering a new stage of
‘hypersubsumption.’ In what follows, I will explore the characteristics integral to
3 Andrea

Mubi Brighenti, “Artveillance: At the Crossroads of Art and Surveillance,” Surveillance
and Society Vol. 7 No. 2 (2010): 137-148.
Following David Harvey, “capitalism” here means “any social formation in which processes of
capital circulation and accumulation are hegemonic and dominant in providing and shaping the
material, social and intellectual bases for social life.” (David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions
and the End of Capitalism (London: Profile Books Ltd., 2014.)
4

Shoshanna Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the
New Frontier of Power, (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2019).
5

“Results of the Direct Production Process,” Marx and Engels Collected Works Vol. 34,
1861-1864, trans. Ben Fowkes, (Lawrence & Wishart, 2010): 95-104. Electronic book.
6
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hypersubsumption with respect to changes in production, consumption and subjectivity.
The first three chapters provide a structured overview of these changes that leads up to
the final two sections, which articulate a theory of contemporary art that is then brought
to bear on various instances of surveillance art.
Questions I examine include: what are the effects of post-Fordist capitalism on
technology and governance, and what theoretical models can be used to account for these
effects? How do these changes relate to technological developments that have expanded
vision beyond the merely human faculty of seeing? How has the ubiquity of surveillance
and digital media deviated from Foucault’s traditional notion of biopower to incorporate
the primacy of dataveillance? What is the relationship between surveillance, capitalism
and immaterial labour? How do the military origins of commercial surveillance
technology affect its consumer applications? How is human subjectivity affected by
changes to forms of capitalist domination? What lessons can we learn from aesthetic
experiments and techniques that seek to subvert or change these structures? What types of
artworks, if any, serve as effective counter-politics to hegemonic capitalist regimes?

1.1. « Overview of Capitalism »
The project begins with an historical account of the transformation from industrial to
Fordist and post-Fordist capitalism, framed within the transition from formal to real
subsumption. According to Marx, formal subsumption is the first step in the process by
which capitalism takes over a mode of production, where the productive forces are taken
as they are and merely subordinated to capitalist production. Under this form, capitalism
is still restricted materially and logistically. Real subsumption, however, is capitalism
itself creating technologies of production that are sufficient for capitalist value extraction.
Real subsumption is a fundamentally technological change that facilitates the ultimate
expansion of capital to productive and social forces. The only barrier to capital becomes
capital itself.

3

Hypersubsumption, a term I introduce in the this chapter to refer to contemporary
capitalism, emphasizes capitalism’s reliance on technology, which has reached a fever
pitch with the advent of digital technology and the rise of immaterial labour, waged and
unwaged, as the primary means of creating surplus value, which this dissertation,
following Matteo Pasquinelli, refer to as "network value.”7 Hypersubsumption follows
on the heels of real subsumption, which has already taken the means of production and
changed them to suit capitalist needs. This process is intensified even further with
hypersubsumption, under which new technology provides the means for these novel
creations of subjectivities and then mobilizes this non-waged creation of subjectivity into
value through surveillance. Throughout its first three chapters, this dissertation articulates
the defining features of hypersubsumption.
Hypersubsumption marks capital’s transition from a system of Foucaultian
biopower8 to Gilles Deleuze’s free-floating, networked “society of control”9, or what
Donna Haraway called, in her landmark “Cyborg Manifesto,” the ‘informatics of
domination’10: a feedback relationship between cybernetics, labour and capitalism. The
first chapter is concerned with the mechanisms of control under hypersubsumption,
particularly with the emergence of the cybernetic control of future possibilities through
digital technology. Cybernetics is the study of observing information about a particular
action and using that as input for a new series of actions designed to produce or disrupt a
specific behavior— this is called a feedback loop. First order cybernetics was pioneered

Matteo Pasquinelli, “Google’s PageRank Algorithm: A Diagram of the Cognitive Capitalism
and the Rentier of the Common Intellect,” Deep Search: The Politics of Search Beyond Google,
eds. Konrad Becker and Felix Stalder (London: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 8.
7

Biopower is the name Michel Foucault gives to a term he coined in The History of Sexuality Vol.
1 (New York: Random House, 1978) to refer, on page 140, to the modern state’s use of "an
explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the
control of populations.”
8

Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control." October 59 (January 01, 1992): 3-7.
https://cidadeinseguranca.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/deleuze_control.pdf/.
9

10

Donna Haraway, Manifestly Haraway, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 28.
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by mathematician Norbert Weiner11 after the devastation of WWII, and referred to control
mechanisms for machinic behavior. Following the famous series of Macy Conferences on
Cybernetics of the 1940s and 1950s, Warren McCulloch created second order
cybernetics, addressing behavioral feedback loops in the human mind.12 Cybernetic
control through digital means is the total subsumption of the “general intellect”13 into
capitalist value production, or as communization theorist Jacques Camatte eloquently
puts it, with the introduction of cybernetics into production, “[c]apital becomes the
master of all the activity that the proletarian performs in the factory. Capital incorporates
the human brain, appropriates it to itself, with the development of cybernetics; with
computing, it creates its own language, on which human language must model itself etc.
Now it is not only the proletarians—those who produce surplus-value—who are
subsumed under capital, but all men, the greater part of whom is proletarianized.”14
To further explore the impact of cybernetic control on capitalism, the first chapter
then takes a closer look at digital incarnations of “immaterial labour” and their
relationship to the production of subjectivity. Immaterial labour, which will be a vital
term to the remainder of the dissertation, was introduced by autonomist theorist Maurizio
Lazzarato in refer to labour that produces the cultural and informational content of a
commodity.15 We find that digital labour relies on surveillance technology in order to
create surplus value. Because cultural and social content is produced through unwaged
immaterial labour during so-called “free time,” the valuable data that it creates as a byNorbert Weiner, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine,
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1948).
11

For an overview of this history, see Stuart A. Umpleby, “A Short History of Cybernetics in the
United States,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften, 19, vol. 4 (2008):
28-40.
12

Marx introduces the general intellect in his famous “Fragment on Machines” from the
Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus, (London, England: Penguin Books, 1973), to describe the
condition under which human intellect, creativity and knowledge have been objectified and
turned into direct forces of production.
13

Jacques Camatte, Capital and Community, trans. David Brown, (London: Unpopular Books,
1988), 72.
14

Maurizio Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labour,” Radical Thought In Italy: A Potential Politics, eds.
Michael Hardt and Paolo Viano, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 133.
15
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product must be identified and then collected, which requires an infrastructure of massive
surveillance and tracking apparatuses: smart devices, customer purchase algorithms, ads
on emails and websites—the list of interfaces that use surveillance is extensive.
The first chapter then emphasizes the relationship between unwaged immaterial
production and the creation of subjectivity, arguing that the self-production of
subjectivity by users interacting with digital platforms is the primary mechanism for
producing the network value that is integral to capitalist surplus value production under
hypersubsumption. As Lazzarato himself notes in his treatise on immaterial labour, “[t]he
production of subjectivity ceases to be only an instrument of social control (for the
reproduction of mercantile relationships) and becomes directly productive, because the
goal of our postindustrial society is to construct the consumer/communicator—and to
construct it as ‘active.’”16 The desire to become a digitally legible individual has become
a driving force of both consumption and production, which are now superpositioned into
a directly productive marshaling of subjectivity into valorization.
It is no coincidence that both surveillance and cybernetics have their origins in the
military. In fact, the driving force of most technological developments or singularities has
been aggressive or predatory, and this is easy to see in today’s armed forces, where
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones are literally, and aptly, called “Predator” or
“Reaper.” As theorists ranging from Paul Virilio17 to Antoine Bousquet18 argue, with the
direct pipeline from military R&D to consumer use, militarization is now encroaching on
cultural production and the time and place of warfare itself is expanding. In my
discussion I refer to the relationship between surveillant data gathering and militarized
techniques of “seeing,” taken together as “scopic violence.” Hypersubsumption follows
on the heels of real subsumption, which has already taken the means of production and
changed them to suit capitalist needs. This process is intensified even further, in the sense
Maurizio Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labor,” Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, eds.
Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), n.p.
16

17

Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics, trans. Mark Polizzotti, (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2006)

18 Antoine

Bousquet, The Eye of War: Military Perception from the Telescope to the Drone,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018).
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that new technology provides the means for these novel creations of subjectivities and
then mobilizes this non-waged creation of subjectivity into value through surveillance. I
argue that that the militarized origins of these vital technologies are thus forever imbued
in them through scopic violence, such that this violence, in the form of visualization and
extraction, is actually also a fundamental feature of hypersubsumption.

1.2. « Chapter Two: Surveillance »
The second chapter focuses exclusively on surveillance, starting with an overview of the
current field of surveillance studies to show the connections those scholars already make
between surveillance, violence and capitalism. I am particularly interested here in the
creation of what Antoine Bousquet calls “the martial eye,”19 or the militarization of
seeing itself, which transforms the sense beyond mere sight to a predatory synesthesia
linked to the controlling techniques of modern statecraft as espoused by the likes of
James C. Scott.20 Surveillance develops from the military to consumer and government
uses, and has now become a series of technologies that sort and extract not only valuable
data but also desirable or undesirable persons, be they unwanted citizens or unwilling
consumers. The dual functions of surveillance as extractive of the value created by
subjectivity and as repressive technology of state and non-governmental organizational
violence is fundamental to capitalist hypersubsumption, and the two functions work in
tandem. The martial gaze constitutes contemporary digital surveillance, which in turn is
integral to contemporary capitalism.
Central to the discussion of digitized surveillance is Shoshanna Zuboff’s idea of
“surveillance capitalism.”21 She argues that ubiquitous surveillance has fundamentally
19

Bousquet, Eye, 10-11.

James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
20

Shoshanna Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the
New Frontier of Power (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2019).
21
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mutated capitalist value production into one reliant on cybernetic control through
totalized surveillance. This chapter looks at the consequences of pervasive surveillance
on society and production, and asserts that surveillance’s omnipresent violent gaze puts
us all into a state of constant war, as expanded on by theorists like Éric Alliez and
Maurizio Lazzarato in their comprehensive treatise, Wars and Capital:
The two world wars are responsible for realizing, for the first time, “total”
subordination (or “real subsumption”) of society and its “productive forces” to the
war economy through the organization and planning of production, labor and
technology, science and consumption, at a hitherto unheard-of scale. Implicating
the entire population in “production” was accompanied by the constitution of
processes of mass subjectivation through the management of communications
techniques and opinion creation.22
Scopic violence, surveillance capitalism and subjectivity creation are all enmeshed under
hypersubsumption. Furthermore, as the expansion of militarized vision has supplanted
human sight, a capitalist sensorium takes over the human one.
From here, chapter two will show how military production and the scopic field
relate, and the transformation from traditional modes of governance to dataveillance, and
reflects on the effects of cybernetic technology and algorithms on governance and
citizenship. In particular, I will discuss Marx’s concept of the general intellect and the
manner in which cybernetics, surveillance and logistics transformed the face of
production and instituted the primacy of immaterial labour. Chapter two looks the rise of
ubiquitous surveillance and its effects on changes in biopower, which has put the globe
into a state of constant warfare, where “there is absolutely no difference between the
tracking and capturing of information about a NASDAQ transaction, the tracking and
capturing of a terrorist’s movements, or the tracking and capturing of consumer trends.”23
This chapter posits that surveillance technologies integral to capitalism have never (and
have no desire to) shed their loyalties to militarization, globalization and imperialism; on

Éric Alliez and Maurizio Lazzarato, Wars and Capital, trans. Ames Hodges (London:
Semiotext(e), 2018), 21.
22

David Panagia, “The Algorithm Dispositif: Risk and Automation in the Age of #datapolitik,”
The Routledge Companion to Media and Risk, (England: Routledge, 2020), n.p..
23
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the contrary, these same techniques of violence are a key aspect of surveillance
capitalism.

1.3. « Chapter Three: Coerced Posthumanism and Speciesbeing »
If the first two chapters looked at the impacts of hypersubsumption on capitalist value
production, this chapter focuses on the impacts of the former on labour, and the novel
relationship between labour and subjectivity created through immaterial labour, which
produces the all-important network value. I begin by looking at Silvia Federici’s Caliban
and the Witch, in which she traces the development of workers from serfs to proletarians
in conjunction with the changes in production that transformed feudalism into primitive
accumulation and industrial capitalism. Federici argues that the transition to capitalist
production is marked by an increasing concretization of the human body into a
mechanized paradigm, being seen as a machine for working, and that this coincides with
the rise of misogyny and violence against women.24
This chapter does not focus so much on the latter phenomenon, but rather uses
Federici’s narrative about capitalist development as a framework to for my own mapping
of capitalist development as it increasingly relies on immaterial labour. I focus in
particular on the cultural and affective production aspect of immaterial labour performed
by users when they are not at their official jobs. Because the activities that constitute this
type of immaterial labour are performed through digital interfaces and
telecommunications devices, they are the ones most closely associated with popular
visions of “posthumanism”. The chapter therefore gives an overview of the field of
posthumanism, from "The Cyborg Manifesto” to Rosi Braidotti’s myriad texts on critical
posthumanism25, and posthumanism’s relationship to contemporary technological
Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation
(Berkeley: Autonomedia, 2004).
24

See for example Rosi Braidotti. “Posthuman Critical Theory,” Journal of Posthuman Studies 1,
no. 1 (2017): 9-25 or Rosi Braidotti. “A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities,”
Theory, Culture and Society 36, no. 6 (2019): 31-61.
25

9

development. I conclude, along with theorists like new materialist Ray Brassier,26 that the
dominant discourses about posthumanism rely problematically on categories of
subjectivity created by neoliberal capitalism. It examines Marx’s categories of
“unproductive” and “productive” labour, labour from “Capitalist Production as the
Production of Surplus Value,"27 “constant” and “variable” capital from Chapter 8 in
Capital Vol. 128, measuring these categories against activities mobilized to produce
network value. Through a discussion as to whether unwaged immaterial labour should be
considered labour proper, we arrive at the unique influence that coercion has on today’s
unwaged immaterial labourers; In particular, this chapter posits that hypersubsumption,
which relies on unwaged immaterial labour to produce network value, eschews traditional
forms of overt repressive violence in favor of coercion in order to entice users to
participate in value-creating activities. Users are coerced into interfacing with surveillant
and extractive digital platforms through the urge to create and maintain subjectivities that
are legible to contemporary capitalism. Users must maintain this interface in order to reap
the many benefits of legibility— including citizenship (through being sorted as desirable
by a function of surveillance), convenient consumption, and most importantly, access to a
world of other like subjectivities that make up their own pseudo-society. I call these
labouring subjectivities “coerced posthumans.”
Coerced posthumanism is what provides the labour for Mario Tronti's global
social factory29 referred to in chapter one. By introducing the social aspect of coerced
posthumanism, chapter three is able to discuss the former against Marx’s concept of

26

Ray Brassier, “The Human” (unpublished manuscript, n.d. ), 2.

Marx, “Results of the Direct Production Process,” Marx and Engels Collected Works, n.p.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02b.htm/.
27

Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York:
Penguin Publishing Group, 1992), 316.
28

29

Mario Tronti, Workers and Capital, trans. David Broder, (London: Verso Books, 2019), n.p..
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“species-being” from the 1844 Manuscripts30, in order to show how capitalist sociality is
a debased form of species-being; that is, hypersubsumption. Hypersubsumption
dominates the technological interfaces that allow unwaged immaterial labourers to create
and maintain their social networks and digital subjectivities, limiting the latter to the
imperatives of capitalist production. This brings chapter three back to the other question
of species-being: human senses and the sensible. Under hypersubsumption, the human
senses are impoverished, and should in fact be thought of as posthuman senses. This
assertion paves the way for the next two chapters to present ideas about how
contemporary aesthetics can challenge the capitalist dominion over the sensible by
creating new communities of sense.

1.4. « Chapter Four: Theories of Aesthetics and
Contemporary Art »
Chapters four and five work together to create an account of contemporary art that is then
mobilized to appraise specific artistic responses to contemporary surveillance. Chapter
four approaches the question of contemporary art through art theorist Peter Osborne’s
dialectical materialism, providing a summary of his version of art history through which
he arrives at the conclusion that contemporary art is postconceptual art.31 In a nutshell,
Osborne proposes that truly “contemporary” art is art that is able to return the material
and conceptual aspects of a work of art, without overdetermining the work through either.
Prior to the contemporary age, both of these aspects had been jettisoned in earlier periods
of art history in favor of one or the other. This trait is specific to contemporary art that
comes after Romanticism, artistic modernism and postmodernism. Contemporary art can
30 As

will be discussed at length in Chapter Three, species-being is a concept Marx introduces in
one of his earlier works, the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin
Milligan (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 2009); this work, which predates Capital, introduces the
four kinds of alienation of human beings under capitalism, and posits species-being as a nonalienated form of man.
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retain concern with both the material and the conceptual facets of art precisely because
contemporary art is the art of the present. The art of the present is art that can critique the
present, and thus must confront within its very ontology the situation of globalized
neoliberal capitalism. The dissertation will provide a detailed explanation of Osborne’s
complex argument about what constitutes contemporary art in chapter four.
Where Osborne champions a return of the conceptual dimension of art (along with
the material dimension) through a dialectical movement of overcoming the negation of
both dimensions, French philosopher of art Jacques Rancière favors the re-emergence of
the aesthetic dimension of art in the traditional sense, wherein “aesthetic" refers to the
sensible. Because I intend to synthesize the approaches of the two thinkers to provide my
own interpretation of contemporary art, before proceeding to elaborate on Osborne’s
theories, we look first at Jacques Rancière’s theory of “dissensus” and regimes of the
sensible. Dissensus refers to “a perturbation of the normal relation between sense and
sense. The normal relation, in Platonic terms, is the domination of the better over the
worse.”32 The “normal relation” is the hegemonic community of sense that dominates
legible forms of visibility in society. For Rancière, the present is the domain of the
aesthetic regime of the senses, the realm of the politics of aesthetics: “the politics of
aesthetics, which means the way in which the aesthetic experience—as a refiguration of
the forms of visibility and intelligibility of artistic practice and reception—intervenes in
the distribution of the sensible.”33 The hegemonic community of sense is the one that
legislates which communities are visible and which are not, by normalizing a certain
relationship between the senses; this means that contemporary art disturbs this dominant
distribution of the sensible, making visible other communities of sense.
We return to Osborne’s theory of art by focusing on the temporal aspect of his
thesis— namely, what makes contemporary art the art of the present. It is revealed that
contemporary art is art that glances into the future, into speculative post-capitalist

Jacques Rancière, “The Aesthetic Dimension: Aesthetics, Politics, Knowledge,” Critical
Inquiry 36 (Autumn 2009): 3.
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utopias. Both Osborne and Rancière are concerned with art that overcomes dominant
regimes, in one way or another. This chapter concludes with a synthesis of their ideas in
the context of the sensible and contemporary art. That way, the final chapter is able to
assess specific works of art according to a criteria that explicitly relates to the
surveillance and scopic violence of hypersubsumption.

1.5. « Chapter Five: Surveillance Art »
Art makes manifest the competing ways that war and surveillance are discussed and
valued in mass culture through interpretations of how such technologies are made
sensible and experienced. Chapter five explores artistic responses to surveillance,
particularly in the form of art that addresses drones. Following Andrea Mubi Brighenti, I
refer to these works as “artveillance,” or art that is operating in “the domain of the
reciprocal influences and exchanges between art and surveillance. The recognition of
such a domain of enquiry has two major implications: on the one hand, more obviously, it
invites us to consider art as ‘technological’, in the sense that art is always tied to a
technology of production and a technology of mediation (and re-mediation).”34 While
Brighenti uses the term to consider the relationship between art and technology as a
general historical and social phenomena, I situate artveillance in relation to
hypersubsumption, described in chapter one as the contemporary condition of capitalist
production and consumption, in which artveillance’s primary technological mediator,
image-based surveillance, plays a major role.
The works in this chapter are divided into three categories: sousveillance,
camouflage and counter-production. Artists like James Bridle, pioneer of “The New
Aesthetic” movement, fall under sousveillance, which literally means seeing from below
—an obvious antidote to surveillance’s “god’s eye” vision. Camouflage art attempts to
hide from surveillance. The chapter’s vanguard of camouflage art is Adam Harvey,
famous even in popular culture for his dramatic makeups that hide wearers from facial
34 Andrea

Mubi Brighenti, “Artveillance: At the Crossroad of Art and Surveillance,” Surveillance
& Society 7, no. 2 (2009): 137.
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recognition by disturbing the familiar plays of light and dark the algorithms are trained to
recognize as facial planes. Harvey is also an anti-surveillance fashion designer, creating
hoodies, athleisure and even burqas that hide from cameras by creating unreadable heat
signatures. Harvey, along with conceptual mask-maker and art theorist Zach Blas,
represents a different set of ideas about how to hide from the martial eye, and we will
investigate how each artist relates to surveillance’s various human taxonomies.
The final and richest category, counter-production, was created to describe the
work of experimental geographer Trevor Paglen. According to Gary Kafer, experimental
geography “rearticulates the documentation of material space along alternative perceptual
systems, while also gesturing to a spatial understanding of knowledge production.”35
Kafer refers to Paglen’s Limit Telephotography, a series of photographs of top-secret U.S.
military bases taken by Paglen from sometimes as far as 65 miles away. Paglen
collaborated with astronomers to apply techniques of celestial photography to his
terrestrial endeavors. The images are pictures of military installations in name only—
instead showing the epistemological and material boundaries of documentary
photography and its production. The other Paglen work discussed in this chapter is his
Untitled drone series— a set of photographs of military drones afloat in the sky. Paglen
captures the surveillant flyers as tiny specs, sometimes indistinguishable against
enormous skyscapes rich with dominant hues of gold, red, blue and white. The drone
series examines the looming role of the eponymous machines in the human imagination,
set off through art-historical references to American photography of grandiose landscapes
that ignited frontier spirits to colonize and expand empire. Both of Paglen’s projects are
not so much about the photographs themselves as they are about the limits of knowledge,
cultural production and explorations of alternative sensual schemas. Because of this, I
posit that he is a flawed example of chapter four’s synthesized definition of contemporary
art. One thing that Paglen and Rancière share is that neither labour under the illusion that

Gary Kafer, “Political Agency in Trevor Paglen’s Limit Telephotography,” Contemporaneity,
Vol 5, No 1 “Agency in Motion” (2016): 55.
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artworks create anything other than the potential for something modes of social or
political engagement.

1.6. « Further Considerations »
This dissertation is by no means exhaustive in its treatments of the various areas of
thought it seeks to mobilize, nor do the thinkers it puts together necessarily agree—in
fact, some positions are vehemently opposed. Communisation theories like those of
Théorie Communiste (TC) clash with strains of Italian autonomist Marxism over the selforganization of the working class and the primacy of the mass worker as a revolutionary
force against capitalism. However, this disagreement does not affect the strands of
communisation and autonomist theory I have tied together within this project; I primarily
call on Jacques Camatte’s capitalist ontology of valorization in relation to autonomist
theories of immaterial labour and Hardt and Negri’s social worker. Because I am using
these thinkers to describe the situation of contemporary capitalist domination, rather than
trying to articulate a theory of class struggle or revolutionary action, the opposing sides
are not in active conflict.
It is also necessary to acknowledge the impact of feminist Marxist theories that
posit the effect reproductive domestic activity and labour have on traditional divisions
between communisation and autonomist workerism. Theorist Marina Vishmidt, whose
work on speculative aesthetics will be discussed later in this dissertation, points out how
the addition of reproductive labourers into the terrain of workers’ struggles dovetails with
the need for gender abolition in overcoming capitalist valuation as part of
communisation: “The discussion of ‘women’ as a category of subordinate worker and
social being in every class society, and its function within the capital relation in
particular, relates to overcoming gender as part of the value-form as an immediate
principle of communisation. The abolition of gender seems to me one way of producing
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unity through rupture, through inevitable division of interests and positions in the
reproductive apparatus and in the movement.”36
Feminist interventions, along with and intertwined with anti-racism and queer
studies, also complicate and deepen many issues within surveillance studies and antisurveillance art. Feminist anti-surveillance art has a long and vibrant history, which is no
surprise considering the interest of feminist theory in deconstructing the male gaze, a
concept already explicitly linked to cinema and technological gazing.37 Women are
particularly vulnerable to surveillance used as a patriarchal tool to control their bodies,
desires, etc. Contemporary feminist art creates imaged-based works that not only reveal
the ubiquity of surveillance, but also to tread the line between the obscene and the
unseen, participate in counter-surveillance, or, in the case of artist and filmmaker Martine
Syms, make overt the imbrication of sexism and racism within the surveillance economy.
The relationship between Blackness and surveillance in particular has merited extensive
scholarship; One of the most influential books on the topic is Associate Professor Simone
Browne’s Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness,38 which details how the long
history of racism against Black bodies and the policing of Black life is both a constitutive
practice of surveillance and a continuation of the Transatlantic slave trade.
Though this dissertation only discusses the influence of feminist theory, queer
theory or critical race theory (among others) on surveillance in passing, this is not
because these issues are not vitally important to surveillance studies or contemporary
artveillance. Their deliberate exclusion is for two reasons: one, there already exists a
wealth of literature by other authors who can focus on these topics in a way that does
them justice, whereas this dissertation never could do so due to the space constraints that
come from bringing together so many different areas of thought. Secondly, while Black
Marina Vishmidt and Neil Gray, “The Economy of Abolition/Abolition of the Economy: Neil
Gray in Exchange with Marina Vishmidt,” Variant 42 (Winter 2011): 10.
36
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people, undocumented immigrants, the poor, women and other people of color are the
overt targets of institutional surveillance, the white, middle-class cisgender men whose
artwork I focus on are extensions of surveillant technologies of domination. This
dissertation will discuss the domination of sight as it manifests in the machinic martial
eye of surveillance, integral to contemporary capitalism. Surveillance’s domination of the
sensible is part of the tactics used by the hegemonic community of sense for the
domination of the sensible. A key part of that domination is the normalization of white,
middle-class (largely heterosexual) men’s communities of sense. Studying works created
by this group is itself an attempt to answer one of the larger questions implied by this
dissertation: can technology rooted in capitalist domination be reprogrammed for anticapitalist purposes?
I cannot say that this question is ever answered with certainty. Rather, it continues
to plod along in the milieu of other questions that appear organically alongside and
because of it. The goal of this dissertation is to bring artistic experiments to bear on the
brutal situation of contemporary capitalism. As with the reception of art, I had no control
over what would happen during these encounters. Perhaps my own communities of sense
were put into turmoil. However, to get to those questions we will have to first make our
way through the history of capitalist domination vis-a-vis changes in technology, labour
and subjectivity.
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2.

2.

« Chapter One: Capitalist Development »

This dissertation uses Marx’s concept of the capitalist “subsumption” of labour to
establish a context in which to examine contemporary surveillance art. I therefore begin
by explaining what Marx meant by subsumption, and the two stages he describes in its
unfolding: “formal” and “real” subsumption. The chapter then traces how these concepts
can be concretely identified in the historical co-evolution of capitalism and technology
through early industrial, Fordist, and then post-Fordist phases, giving particular attention
to the role of cybernetic technologies in post-Fordism. I go on to review some important
theorizations of the social transformations that have accompanied capital’s post-Fordist
embrace of digitization, notably Giles Deleuze’s account of the “society of control” and
the propositions of Maurizio Lazzarato, Antonio Negri and others in the tradition of
autonomist Marxism39 about the “general intellect” and “immaterial labour.” Building on
such work (though also departing from some of its conclusions) I argue that what is
generally described as post-Fordism should be understood as the advent of a new stage of
capitalist subsumption beyond the “formal” and “real” phases Marx described—a
“hypersubsumption,” in which capitalist domination is organized via diffuse and
omnipresent networks of cybernetic control, and by the exploitation of not only waged
but also unwaged immaterial labour, all inherently dependent on surveillance technology
to facilitate the self-creation and self-exploitation of individual subjectivities.

39 Autonomist

Marxism, which focuses on the struggle of the proletariat as the driving force of
changes in capitalism, has become an enormous subset of Marxist discourse. Some primary texts
include Mario Tronti’s Workers and Capital trans. David Broder (New York: Verso, 2019), Franco
"Bifo" Berardi’s The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy, trans. Francesca Cadel and
Giuseppina Mecchia (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), Paolo Virno’s A Grammar of the
Multitude, trans. Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson (Los Angeles:
Semiotext(e), 2004), and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s masterful trilogy, which includes
Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), Multitude: War and Democracy in
the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin Random House, 2005) and Commonwealth (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011).
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2.1. « Formal and Real Subsumption »
According to Marxist scholar David Harvey, “technology can be defined as the use of
natural processes and things to make products for human purposes. At its base,
technology defines a specific relation to nature that is dynamic and contradictory.”40
Technology has always been integral to capitalism’s development, as an essential element
in a process that Marx, following Kant and Hegel, called “subsumption.”41 In German
idealist philosophy, subsumption refers to the subjugation of a particular under an
abstract universal.42 Marx initially used the term to describe the subjugation of use-value,
which is particular to a specific object, to the infinite abstraction of exchange-value in a
commodity, facilitated through money, and then extended this account to describe the
envelopment and transformation of labour.
According to Endnotes: “In the English translation of the German, ‘subsumption'
is often rendered as ‘domination’ rather than ‘subsumption.’ While this translation is
problematic in the sense that it obscures the logical/ontological significance of this
concept, it is appropriate to the extent that it identifies something of the violence implied
here.” The violence is that of capital, which consumes and digests labour (and perhaps
eventually the entirety of society) under its overarching imperative to self-valorize. At the
end of this process, not only the means of production but workers themselves are changed
in its image. Subsumption is not only domination, but involves the violent transformation
of a particular into a universal for a specific purpose by means of a final cause (the reason
for its being, not the methods by which it arrives there).
The question is what propels the goal of a piece of technology—is it its intent at
creation—the efficient cause, the way it is used, what it is made from or into? According
David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (London: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 92.
40

41

Endnotes, “The History of Subsumption,” Endnotes 2 (2010): n.p.

Due to Marx’s indebtedness to Hegel as an intellectual predecessor, this dissertation presents
the latter’s concept of subsumption from the Science of Logic, trans. George Di Giovanni,
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to Aristotle’s Metaphysics,43 there are four causes: efficient, final, formal and material.
The material cause of a statue, for example, is the bronze it is cast from, whereas the
formal cause is the statue’s mold. The artist, as creator, is the efficient cause. The final
cause is the underlying reason for its coming into being. In the analogy with technology,
the efficient cause of the introduction of ATMs was to perform the droll, time-consuming
money dispensing function in order to free bank tellers up for other tasks. The final cause,
however, is capitalism’s need for money—the abstract form of exchange value—to move
at ever faster speeds in order to conduct and facilitate the maximum number of
transactions. This can be best achieved with the human factor kept to a minimum. As the
very reason for the being of a thing, the final cause is actually ontologically a priori to
the thing. It predates and predetermines its existence logically and structurally, though not
temporally. Within the historical system of capitalism, the final cause of a thing, be it a
technique of production, a commodity or even a worker, is determined by the capitalist
imperative of creating surplus value. Thus, for capitalism to fulfill its final cause—selfvalorization—it enters into a developmental feedback loop with its environment: I call
this loop the process of subsumption.
For Marx, capitalist development goes through two phases: “formal” and “real”
subsumption. Formal subsumption is the initial relationship between advancing, though
not fully developed, capitalism and society. It corresponds to the production of absolute
surplus value, which is generated by extending the working day. What changes are the
relations between existing modes of production and capital, and laborer and capitalist. In
Marx’s words, “[t]he more completely these conditions of labour confront [the worker] as
the property of another, the more completely is the relation of capital and wage labour
present formally, hence the more complete the formal subsumption of labour under
capital. As yet there is no difference in the mode of production itself. The labour process
continues exactly as it did before—from the technological point of view—only as a
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labour process now subordinated to capital.”44 Formal subsumption increases its hold
through expanding alienation, by setting up a relationship of domination between the
capitalist and the laborer, where each remains formally free. This is the relationship
described in Capital, Vol. 145 wherein the capitalist and the laborer apparently meet in the
market to sell their wares as equally free owners. Under this form, capital is still
restricted by other social and political forces. Though the freedom of the laborer is, in
actuality, only the freedom to work or starve, there is still a semblance of individual
relationships between workers and capitalists.
In formal subsumption, capitalism has not yet taken over the means of production
themselves, which remain at the level of craft techniques, nor has it become the socially
typical mode of production. This subsumption is “formal” in that as far as the modes of
production are concerned, it only takes earlier methods and employs them to generate
“absolute” surplus value. Absolute surplus value relies on extending labour time. Because
the value of a commodity, per Marx’s theory of value, is determined by the socially
necessary labour time in it, its value is thus the socially necessary time it takes to make
the commodity minus the time, in the form of wages paid, that it takes the laborer to
reproduce themselves (i.e., a “living” wage or cost). Thus, in order to increase profit,
capital can merely extend the working day. Following this method, however, capital can
only increase profit so much, both due to material hinderances like the bodily needs of
the workers, and the limitations of craft production processes themselves. It does not
create its own technologies but instead relies on what already exists and acts on that.
Real subsumption, on the other hand, fundamentally changes the character of the
mode of production itself. This form of subsumption is intrinsically tied to technological
development. As machines come to increasingly replace and augment human labour,
“objectified labour materially confronts living labour as a ruling power and as an active
44
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subsumption of the latter under itself, not only by appropriating it, but in the real
production process itself; […] The development of the means of labour into machinery is
not an accidental moment of capital, but is rather the historical reshaping of the
traditional, inherited means of labour into a form adequate to capital. The accumulation
of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brain, is thus
absorbed into capital”46
In the phase of real subsumption, capital begins to develop the productive forces
of social labour for its own purposes. Only at this point does the application on a large
scale of science and of machinery to direct production become possible. Here, therefore,
there is a change not only in the formal relation but in the labour process itself. “On the
one hand the capitalist mode of production—which now first appears as a mode of
production sui generis [in its own right] — creates a change in the shape of material
production. On the other hand, this change in the material shape forms the basis for the
development of the capital-relation, whose adequate shape therefore only corresponds to
a particular level of development of the material forces of production. The worker’s
relation of dependence in production itself is thereby given a new shape.47
Under real subsumption, capital has been “set free” and there are no longer
relations between individual capitalists and labourers. Social relations call forth new
techniques of production and infect formerly immune industries. “Neither the individual’s
own consumption nor the immediate needs of a given circle of customers remain a barrier
to production; now the only barrier is the magnitude of the capital itself.”48 Real
subsumption relies on using fixed capital to create “relative,” rather than absolute surplus
value. What capital needs is to make production more efficient—effectively to cut out as
much of the process as possible. As Camatte writes: “Capital seeks to free itself from the
proletariat, subsuming it under its power, immeasurably developing the productivity of
46
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labour, which means the increase of the power of dead, past labour, resulting in the
vertiginous fall in the amount of living labour incorporated in the production process.”49
The presence of machines drives down the time it takes to make a commodity
exponentially, and therefore reduces price. Thus, under real subsumption, surplus value is
produced, which does not rely on the extension of the working day (unlike absolute
surplus value), but instead relies on quantity of commodities produced through the
intensification of the production process. This form of capital reduces the price of
individual commodities, but only in order to maximize aggregate profits.
The transition from formal to real subsumption means that capitalism is not only
facilitated through technology, but is now the very motor for creating new technologies.
As Marx tells us in The Grundrisse, advanced technologies of automation are capital’s
way of creating a form of production adequate to itself: “In machinery, objectified labour
materially confronts living labour as a ruling power and as an active subsumption of the
latter under itself, not only by appropriating it, but in the real production process itself…
The development of the means of labour into machinery is not an accidental moment of
capital, but is rather the historical reshaping of the traditional, inherited means of labour
into a form adequate to capital.”50
The distinction between formal and real capitalist subsumption represents a
fundamental shift from capital being an economic form to its being the dominant social
form. In real subsumption, the forces of production organize not merely the making of
commodities or the production of value but characterize and shape the entire movement
of society and the construction of subjectivities under its regime. Capitalism is, according
to Marx, fundamentally a social relation, and contemporary capitalism really has turned
the world into what Mario Tronti called a “social factory,” in which "the whole of society
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lives as a function of the factory and the factory extends its domination to the whole of
society.”51

2.2. « Tracing Capitalism »
Marx wrote about the passage from formal to real subsumption in the first volume of
Capital, published in 1867, and evidently regarded it as a movement visible in the
development of the steam-power driven factories of his own era. However, debates about
the historical timing of the transition continue to this day.52 Many Marxist historians see
“real subsumption” only truly arriving with the advent of Fordism, a method of
production that took hold as an evolution of Taylorist53 impositions on the industrial
factories of Europe and the United States in the early twentieth century in a process best
has been best described by the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci in his essay
“Americanism and Fordism”54 from The Prison Notebooks. According to Gramsci,
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Fordism is a uniquely American evolution of Taylorism that grew out of the semiautomated assembly-lines of automotive factories of Detroit in the twentieth century.
Fordism focused on the standardization of work and workers, and the integration of
consumption into the cycle of production. Fordism represented the unification of ruling
class interests and capitalist technological capability. Because workers could produce
more commodities in a workday thanks to the aid of machines, products could be sold
more cheaply, and eventually, with militant union organization, workers could be paid a
higher wage. Gramsci analyzes the rise of Fordism in America and contrasts it to fascism
in Italy. As opposed to traditional Taylorism, Fordism, with its rationalization of work
and its brutal treatment of workers as animals, also attempts to manage the moral life of
workers outside the factories (e.g., prohibition). It self-consciously proposes an ideology
in order to reproduce ideal workers for itself.
Fordism sought to resolve the contradictions internal to capitalism and aimed at a
“passive revolution.” That is, a dramatic social transformation instigated from the top
down, by the ruling class, of full capitalist modernization without bloodshed. However,
according to Gramsci, despite its disciplinary powers, Fordism has more “revolutionary
capacity” than capital’s previous phase of artisanal production because workers are more
disposed to be thoughtful during their work time—the repetitive nature of single tasks left
the mind time to wander. In addition, Gramsci argues that the collective nature of largescale factory work lends itself to collective organization (an idea bolstered by the strong
state of unions at the time). All of this helped heighten tensions between the classes and
thus intensify capital’s inherent contradictions.
The question for Gramsci was whether the emphasis on groups of factory workers
cooperating could be translated into a socialist workers’ collectivity. Fordism focused on
standardization of work and workers, and the integration of consumption into the cycle of
production. While the working conditions in industrial factories were generally brutal,
physically exhausting and mentally repetitive, there was still a strong possibility of
worker solidarity based simply on proximity. Just as capitalism should be thought of as a
holistic mode of being based on the circulation of value in the cycle of capitalism as a
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whole—not about each individual capitalist—the worker, though alienated by the menial
and isolating position of her labour, could take part in the production of the entire
commodity as a whole; each part of an automobile was made in the same factory and
each worker could have a relationship to it as a worker in that Ford factory. Additionally,
workers were able to clock off and come home from their workplaces. Despite Henry
Ford’s notorious initial attempts to police the private lives of his employees, a distinction
between work and leisure remained spatially preserved, if not ideologically. After all, the
workers in their off time would be obliged use their disposable income to consume
commodities produced by capital—a form of consumption that is essential to the
functioning of capitalism.
However, this by no means marked the end point of capital’s relentless drive to
the machinic remaking of labour, for Fordism was to be followed by “post-Fordism.”55
Post-Fordism is the term widely used to characterize a new phase of capitalism’s technosocial organization that emerged in the early 1970s, after the crushing defeats of student
and worker revolutions in 1968. Confronted by a slow but inexorable decline in the rates
of profit it had enjoyed in the decades following the Second World War, capitalist forces
sought to further intensify the extraction of surplus value, and mobilized the
technological developments of the time—specifically computers and digital networks—to
do just that. Post-Fordism marks the advent of a post-industrial, decentralized workplace,
with intensified workplace “flexibility,” alongside globalization, deregulation and
privatization. It includes the rise of the “gig worker” and the rise of “immaterial labour”
which we will discuss later in this chapter— that is, the increasing importance of both
Post-Fordism, which will be discussed in depth throughout this dissertation, describes a period
of capitalist development that emerged in the 1970s as capitalism became globalized,
incorporated more advanced telecommunications and cybernetic technologies, and worker
identity became more fractured and disparate. Some important works about post-Fordism are
Carlo Vercellone’s “From the Mass-Worker to Cognitive Labour: Historical and Theoretical
Considerations,” in Beyond Marx, eds. Marcel van der Linden and Karl Heinz Roth (Leiden:
Brill, 2013) and his article “From Formal Subsumption to General Intellect: Elements for a
Marxist Reading of the Thesis of Cognitive Capitalism,” Historical Materialism 15, no. 1 (2007):
13-36, David Harvey's Condition of Postmodernity (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1990),
and Maurizio Lazzarato’s work on immaterial labour.
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waged and unwaged cultural and intellectual work facilitated by telecommunications
technology.
Some characteristic features of post-Fordism are described in the collection
Digital Labour: The Internet as Playground and Factory.56 The authors are concerned
with the changes to labour in a market increasingly governed by cybernetic and internet
technologies, and with the affective, emotional and sociocultural responses that have
become commodified. They focus particularly on the advent of “playbor” or the “Google
model of labour,” which tries to make work pleasurable in order to blur the distinction
between work and home without the worker noticing that their hours have become more
and more extended. On the other side of the coin, when a person is “at home” producing
cultural content, their position as “not at work” facilitates an easier exploitation of the
cultural commodities they produce, precisely because being at home makes it more
difficult to see their activity as labour. Additionally, the book shows how the rise of
precarious or freelance, part-time, gig and other non-benefitted work is facilitated directly
through globalization, making factory and other material production cheaper. For
example, a mother is able to work from home freelancing for an internet company due to
the cheap availability of laptops made by immiserated workers at Foxconn. The rise of
social networking and digitally available news and advertising means the everyday
person is a constant consumer of products tailored to their desires by algorithms that
generate not only products but prices and related objects. I will argue that this postFordist phase of capitalist domination should be considered a new stage of capitalist
subsumption. However, to prepare for this argument I first review the work of a lineage
of theorists who have made broadly a similar propositions.

2.3. « Societies of Control and Immaterial Labour »
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Gilles Deleuze’s 1992 “Postscript on the Societies of Control”57 details what he refers to
as the shift from Foucault’s disciplinary societies of physical enclosure to a network of
free-floating control. Foucault located disciplinary societies in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, arguing that they reach their height at the outset of the twentieth.
They initiate the organization of vast spaces of enclosure. The individual never ceases
passing from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws: first, the
family; then the school (“you are no longer in your family”); then the barracks (“you are
no longer at school”); then the factory; from time to time the hospital; possibly the prison,
the pre-eminent instance of the enclosed environment.58 Foucault’s disciplinary society
exists under his model of biopolitical governance.59 The aforementioned spaces of
enclosure are spaces of social organization. In Louis Althusser’s terms, the above
individual would be interpellated as a subject in and through the hospital, school and
family. In perhaps the most famous and comprehensive treatise on the matter, Althusser’s
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”60 emphasized the need to think the
economic base of capitalism along with its superstructure precisely because it is the latter,
with its ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) that reproduces the worker in the image of
capitalism. Under this schema, institutions like churches and schools co-raise young
citizens under various ideologies to be good subjects of capitalism. In a section on
Christianity, Althusser uses the example of submission to God to illustrate how the
structure of all particular ideologies reveals the duel nature of the term “subject,” as well
as subjectification:
Let me summarize what we have discovered about ideology in general.
The duplicate mirror structure of ideology assures simultaneously:
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1.
the interpellation of ‘individuals’ as subjects;
2.
their subjection to the Subject;
3.
the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects’ recognition of
each other, and finally the subject’s recognition of himself;
4.
the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition
that the subjects recognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything will
be all right; Amen — ‘So be it’.61
Individuals become subjects. The polyvalent nature of the term “subject” means it can
refer to a thing or topic, a political subject, or being subjected to something. In the case of
ideology, once the individual becomes a subject, they are necessarily subjected (or selfsubject) to a greater Subject; in the example above, the Subject is God, but for all intents
and purposes, capitalism is the Subject par-excellence. Under ideology, workers are
reproduced as human capital in a mirror image of the production of capitalist technology
under real subsumption. Subsumption and subjectification have the same inflection of
domination at their core.
Control societies, by contrast, exert domination through cybernetic networks,
changing the composition of the surveillant gaze and how it operates on the populace.
Maša Galič, Tjerk Timan and Bert-Jaap Koops expound on Deleuze’s idea of modulation
as a distinction between Foucault’s biopolitical surveillance and surveillance under
control societies: “…modulations take place in ways that are often invisible for the
subjects or citizens…Deleuze states that modulations happen in invisible or opaque
networks that are imperceivable [sic] to individual citizens. As a result, surveillance also
moves away from being a present and often physical force on individuals, to become
more abstract and numerical.”62 We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/
individual pair but rather with masses, samples, data, markets or “banks.” They also point
out how under Foucault’s model of discipline, the focus is on institutions that attempt to
create long-term social stability. The control societies, however, ascend along with the
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expansion of private corporations as dominant social and political entities; corporations
are explicitly concerned with making profit, rather than controlling social structures. In
order to extract the maximum profit, these corporations must constantly surveil and
monitor workers, workplaces, the markets, etc. Thus, cybernetic control is a vital
mechanism for creating and maintaining control societies. Whereas a disciplinary society
is interested in creating docile, manageable bodies, a control society wants to create
consumers from whom it is able to extract profit. Instead of surveillance being used to
repress, punish or train bodies, it is now largely used for constructing and monitoring
consumption patterns. Some scholars elucidate the relationship between control societies,
surveillance and militarization even more explicitly; Anna Natale, Dolores Galindo and
Flavia Lemos have written that “[c]apitalism does not work through exclusion, on the
contrary; it needs contact, commitment, exchange, and commerce. There is no society of
control without worldwide market, and this control is possible if, maintained and recycled
with the use of the latest surveillance and defense technologies. In this market, great
corporations are responsible for the expansion of weaponry production and capitalize
themselves in military and civilian contexts[.]”63 Natale et. al. go on to trace the history
of the expansion of military research and strategies into the civilian and consumer
sectors, as well as the ongoing reliance on algorithmic surveillance by corporations. In a
control society, the relationship to power has become virtualized; one is always being
watched, or watching oneself, and always waiting to be seized, captured or preyed upon.
Perhaps it is money that expresses the distinction between the two societies best, since
discipline always referred back to minted money that locks gold in as numerical standard,
while control relates to floating rates of exchange, modulated according to a rate
established by a set of standard currencies. The old monetary mole is the animal of the
spaces of enclosure, but the serpent is that of the societies of control.64 For Deleuze, the
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serpent, with its rounded, shifting coils, is the new spirit of capitalism—a combination of
the mutation of machines with the evolution of society outside of the walls of the factory
and into the world, where circulation, or sidewinding, is king.
A similar line of thought about post-Fordist capitalism has been developed by
Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, Maurizio Lazzarato and other members of the school of
autonomist Marxism. Their analysis rests on a passage from Marx’s Grundrisse, “The
Fragment on Machines,” which autonomist theory has made famous:
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, selfacting mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material
transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation
in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the
power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital indicates to
what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production,
and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have
come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in
accordance with it. To what degree the powers of social production have been
produced, not only in the form of knowledge, but also as immediate organs of
social practice, of the real-life process.65
For Lazzarato and Negri the “Fragment on Machines” prefigures post-Fordist
capitalism’s harnessing of the world’s social and intellectual powers via cybernetic
technologies. What the fragment from The Grundrisse suggests, however, is not only that
machines would come to dominate whole sectors of production but that a relationship
between humans and machines would come to characterize and dominate production.
As Maurizio Lazzarato explains, the autonomists contend that in the era of
cybernetic technologies, capitalist valorization processes focuses on “immaterial
labour.”66 Immaterial labour, or the harnessing of the world’s social and intellectual
powers for generating value, is “the labour that produces the informational and cultural
Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nioclaus, (1839-41) (New York: Penguin Classics,
1993): 692.
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content of the commodity.”67 It is split into two types of content: the informational, which
“refers directly to the changes taking place in workers’ processes in big companies in the
industrial and tertiary sectors, where the skills involved are increasingly skills involving
cybernetics and computer control,”68 and the cultural: “the kinds of activities involved in
defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and,
more strategically, public opinion.”69 The two types of content of immaterial labour are
functions of the general intellect, constituted by the social and intellectual (a.k.a. creative)
powers of humanity.70
Immaterial labour thus includes many activities, such as taste-making, political
opining,71 and most recently, generating content on social media platforms, that have
historically not been counted as labour by orthodox Marxists, either because there is no
tangible commodity produced, and/or it is unwaged. But the autonomist contention is that
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The general intellect, as discussed in the introduction of this dissertation, refers to a productive
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it marks a profound shift in the way labour is subordinated to capital. As Lazzarato puts
it, “the worker's personality and subjectivity have to be made susceptible to organization
and command. This transformation of working-class labour into a labour of control, of
handling information, into a decision-making capacity that involves the investment of
subjectivity.”72
Of course, as many critics of Hardt and Negri have relentlessly pointed out,73
immaterial labour is not strictly immaterial, nor has immaterial production surpassed
material production, or diminished the role of very material infrastructures in circulating
so-called immaterial labour. However, Hardt and Negri acknowledge these points: “When
we claim that immaterial labour is tending towards the hegemonic position, we are not
saying that most of the workers in the world today are producing primarily immaterial
goods…[t]he labour involved in all immaterial production, we should emphasize, remains
material—it involves our bodies and brains as all labour does. What is immaterial is its
product.”74 The importance of immaterial labour as it has been explored by theorists like
Hardt, Negri and Lazzarato is that it characterizes a fundamental change in the way value
is produced, consumed and circulated under global capital, and how these changes have
fundamentally undermined the traditional categories of consumer and worker. The
widespread introduction of sophisticated machines not only blurs the traditional
distinction between workplace and home, creating a constant time for work and therefore
constant value production, but also removes the worker from a defined position in the
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chain, thereby removing the role of the human in production and destroying the identity
of the worker as worker.
An example of this process is the rise of so-called “prosumption.” In 1980, the
futurist Alvin Toffler coined the term “prosumer”75 a derivative of dotcom business lingo
indicating production by consumers. A prosumer, therefore, is a producer who also
consumes. The prosumer is intimately related to the rise of immaterial labour, as the
introduction of algorithmic Point of Sale (POS) and marketing systems have allowed
companies like Amazon to track what people buy and then use these past purchases to
predict what they might want in the future. However, companies like Amazon do not just
altruistically suggest what a person might want to buy based on a “neutral” examination
of their past tendencies. On the contrary, the opaque technology of search engines allows
companies to push certain sponsored products and even adopt variable pricing based on
individual customer profiles that extend far beyond merely what somebody buys. These
companies can manipulate purchasing patterns using geographical information obtained
from person’s IP address, what they have entered into a search bar, and even what they
have spoken aloud in the presence of the ubiquitous but invisible microphones on our
smart devices. As they say, Alexa is always listening. This is cybernetic consumption,
where a network of technological devices serving the interests of various companies react
to the choices made by a person and then feed them back predictions that seem based on
that person's desires but are actually shaping those desires. It is a constant feedback loop,
the coils of the serpent, a prison of prosumers without walls.
The prosumers or those who produce “immaterially” are not just high-tech or
service workers in the Global North, and what they produce is not limited to immaterial
data, information, affect or culture. Such a person may be a factory worker in a Mexican
maquiladora who works on the assembly line to make very material objects like sodas,
while simultaneously owning a smartphone and using their break to buy a new pair of
shoes through Amazon. Both of these actions participate in the circulation of capital, and
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both are vital to it; as was stated before, the infrastructures for immaterial production and
consumption are very real.
What is at stake here is the relationship between subjectivity, technology and
political control. According to Lazzarato, “[t]he capitalist needs to find an unmediated
way of establishing command over subjectivity itself; the prescription and definition of
tasks transforms into a prescription of subjectivities. The new slogan of Western societies
is that we should all ‘become subjects.’ Participative management is a technology of
power, a technology for creating and controlling the ‘subjective processes.’”76 Moreover,
future desire has reached a fever pitch through the integration of advanced digital
machines.
In one of their more recent books, Assembly, Hardt and Negri, write about
“extractive capitalism,” proposing that “[t]he center of gravity of the capitalist mode of
production is today becoming—this is our general definition—the extraction of the
commons, a process that entails both “the extraction of value produced in the
innumerable circuits of social life and…the extraction of value from the earth and the
various forms of natural wealth we share in common.”77 The commons thus includes both
Lazzarato’s immaterial labour and ecological systems. Extraction, the nominative form of
“to extract,” means literally to draw out or pull out from a fixed position.78 This
definition comes from its first uses in fifteenth century France, which itself came from
the Latin extrahere, from ex meaning out and trahere meaning to draw. An extract, in the
context of the written word, is a “digest or summary of something which has been written
at greater length.”79 For Hardt and Negri, while production of commodities is still a
central part of capitalism, it is now extended to wider parasitic extraction and harvesting,
either from the planetary metabolism or from the general intellect. In the latter case, this
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harvesting is taking place specifically through surveillance technologies. Extractive
capitalism is a useful term to build from, with a focus on the technological aspects of its
infrastructure and its impact on social life as a whole, as well as its role in the production
of subjectivity and control, and the feedback loop of subsumed subjectivity.
However, Hardt and Negri insist capitalism's reliance on the creativity and
adaptability of the contemporary worker will also be its downfall. According to them, in
order for capitalism to harness the social and intellectual powers of workers it must also
loosen the restrictive, nearly carceral managerial controls that Deleuze’s “Postscript”
referred to as characteristic of Foucauldian disciplinary societies. Workers must be left to
self-manage and self-motivate in order for their “natural” resources to be extracted. This
is a double-edged sword, because the workers could just start using their creativity and
time for themselves, reappropriating intellectual and ecological resources and
constructing “the common—a common organized against the capitalist appropriation of
social life, against private property and its markets[…]”80 But Assembly does not
adequately account for the role of inhuman mediations and interfaces that are the
infrastructures of each capitalist extraction. The fruits of common production must be
extracted via technology that has evolved through subsumption by capitalism; workers
and consumers do not have access to Amazon’s shopping algorithms, fish harvested en
masse do not get redistributed to the fishermen, and so on. What is usually “returned” in
the cycle is something integral to restarting the circuit of production-consumption: a
suggested product for purchase. It is also vital to look at the effects of this form of
production, particularly of immaterial labour, on those who are exploited at the same time
as they consume. In the next section, I will present a perspective on post-Fordism that,
while drawing on the insights of Deleuze, Hardt, Negri and Lazzarato, differs
significantly in their conclusions and returns us to the issue of subsumption.
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2.4. « Hypersubsumption »
How should we characterize our current capitalist phase in terms of subsumption, in a
way that accounts for the importance of technological developments that blur the
distinction between nature, machines and man, and also emphasizes the massive role
played by immaterial labour, waged and unwaged, in the edifice that makes up
contemporary capitalist domination? I contend that this situation can be termed
“hypersubsumption.” This term originates in the work of Nick Dyer-Whiteford, who has
used it to characterize a moment when capital “taps the psychophysical energies of
species-life at every point on its circuit: not just as variable capital (labour), but also as a
circulatory relay (consumerist consciousness, ‘mind share’), a precondition of production
(the general pool of biovalues and communicative competencies necessary for ‘general
intellect’), and even as constant capital (genetic raw materials).”81 He and his co-authors
have also used the term in relation to increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligences
overtaking human abilities at multiple points across the circuit of capital.
My formulation of hypersubsumption differs somewhat from Dyer-Whiteford’s
but agrees that it fundamentally involves posthuman forms of labour and hence relates to
species-life and species-being (Gattungswesen). “Species-being” is a term Marx defines
in the 1844 Manuscripts as the opposite of capitalist alienation: it is the human capacity
to transform its itself through socialized labour. Technology is implicitly fundamental to
species-being, since technological objects are integral to how human beings affect the
world around them. If we return to the definition of technology as a use of natural
processes/materials to make products for human purposes (a variant on species being), or
to augment or aid human life, then technological innovation appears as a fundamentally
human activity.82 It is through digital and telecommunications technology that capital’s
Nick Dyer-Whiteford, “The University in the Era of General Intellect,” in Utopian Pedagogy:
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valorization process unites the productive force we have been calling immaterial labour.
This process is, however, anathema to species-being, as it heralds the destruction of the
sociality of work. Hypersubsumption, therefore, occurs with the total domination and
inversion of humanity’s species-being through technology.
Much has been made in recent years of the disintegration of worker identity and
solidarity under post-Fordist capital by writers that choose, as I do, to focus on the
“immaterial” in order to identify and critique the unique characteristics of capitalism
today. The reasons for the loss of worker identity and the decline of unions are numerous
and include the impact of neoliberal austerity policies and their destruction of social
welfare programs which have traditionally supported the working class, as well as the rise
of privatization and “free market" ideologies. But this work frames this situation through
the condition of hypersubsumption via a novel relationship to technological automation
on both the factory floor and in the “private” space of the home, as well as interstitial
“social” spaces. It also accounts for the effects of technological innovations on
individuality/subjectivity (and the impact of shifts in the latter on formulations of
community and politics). It is emergent network technologies come to life, in tandem
with globalized capitalism, that allow a new process by which the social factory ascends.
The machines that have risen and have become, as Marx predicted, the organs of social
practice. Machines not only produce commodities, as well as other machines, they are
also the mechanisms by which informational and culture products of value are produced,
and this production is the production of subjectivity itself—the production of surplus
value through a cybernetic feedback loop between subjectivity, consumption and
production.
Contemporary capitalism is a system within which the self-exploitation of
workers is imperative to their production as workers and as global subjects. Therefore,
another defining feature of hypersubsumption is an individualism, albeit of a different
kind than the classic liberal conception. Under classical ideology the individual becomes
a subject, with all this entails. Subject-subjectification is a two-sided coin; though there is
domination and subservience to the state and other organizations, as well as to hegemonic
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cultural and social norms, the subject is also afforded the status of citizenship. Even if
this was not bestowed legally, at least one was brought into a community, which more
often than not had a political outlet or function. This model of subjecthood was alluded to
by Deleuze in his “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” when he mentions Foucault’s
model of spatial incarceration, which corresponds to the apex of biopolitics.
Hypersubsumption focuses on the status of society and capital when the
transformation into the social factory is complete. Negri was correct when, relatively
early in his career, he wrote: “In operating circulation, capital itself as sociality, as the
capacity to engulf within its own development, in an ever more determined manner, every
socially productive force. The subjectivity that this synthesis confers on capital represents
what capital itself has achieved through the process of subsumption, through the ever
more coherent and exhaustive acts of subjugation of society.”83 Despite all this, however,
he still believes in the identity of the laboring class as it is constituted in/through
opposition to capitalist production; moreover, he believes in the necessity for a new
working-class subjectivity to rise up in opposition to capitalism. But does not the loss of
an apparently coherent worker identity become the real loss of the possibility of
identifying (and therefore organizing) as workers, not because of the loss of traditional
forms of work but of traditional modes of the reproduction of laborers, and of the
category of production itself?
Under hypersubsumption, the barrier to a coherent worker identity is a
technologically mediated individualism that has moved us beyond biopolitical questions
of subjectivity and ideology. As Harvey puts it, under post-Fordist capitalism “workers
are isolated and individualized, alienated from each other by competition, alienated from
a sensual relation to nature (from both their own nature as passionate and sensuous
human beings and that of the external world). To the degree that intelligence is
increasingly incorporated into machines, so the unity between mental and manual aspects
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of laboring is broken.”84 The key aspect here is alienation and atomization, through the
breaking of the subject into discreet blocks of information consumed by capital, and the
experience of the datafied self as highly individualistic. The prosumer produces
themselves in the act of consuming themselves. This also means that the ideology of
hypersubsumption is post-Althusserian, in that ideology no longer relies on any apparatus
other than the freedom to take oneself to the marketplace.
This new individualism is inextricable from the destruction of classic worker
identity, due to the evolution of capital itself. As Ben Noys says: "the capitalist response
of decoupling the worker from work would also dispense with the affirmation of worker’s
identity as an essential ‘moment’ for capitalist reproduction.”85 Traditional Marxist
notions of “labour” are far from the only value-making activities. The identity of the
worker is no longer necessary for capitalism—in fact, it has become anathema to it.
Instead of a pool of workers reproduced by ideology and managed through biopolitics,
there is a pool of surplus value being collected from a mass made up of isolated nodes
that light up according to their digital footprints.
Whereas capitalism traditionally relied on the creation of surplus value, first
through the extension of the working day under formal subsumption and then on the
automation of valorization through real subsumption, fueled by heavy investment in
technological advances, it has now closed the gap between consumption and production,
and no longer needs simple ideological interpellation to reproduce either its labour-power
or its consumers. The condition of hypersubsumption is better described by the somber
words of Camatte, rather than the optimism of Hardt and Negri: “Overproduction is
determined by the fact that there is production for the sake of production, and not for the
consumption of whoever it may be. Production is production of surplus-value.
Commodities are only vectors of it and present no interest except inasmuch as they
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preserve this character in the total process of capital. But then, if one can speak of
consumption, it is consumption by capital itself.”86

2.5. « Problems of Periodization »
Does hypersubsumption represent a truly new era of capitalist development? Questions
about how to characterize current trends in capitalism are vital for opening spaces of
criticism in the tradition laid out in Max Horkheimer’s 1937 essay, “Traditional and
Critical Theory.”87 In this essay, Horkheimer proposes that philosophy, by engaging with
social and political questions, should become a critical discourse on society itself.
Though his was a sociological program meant to engage dialectically with history, what
is important is the focus on philosophy's ability to engage with the sensual material world
and the importance of doing so to enact real change, particularly in class relations. Taken
far enough, critique is a form of revolutionary political activity.
Questions about characterizing late capitalism come along with questions about
the nature of periodization. Theorists like David Harvey use Marx’s concept of alienation
from the 1844 Manuscripts88 to describe shifts in capitalism as dialectical developments
of historical materialism, or movements in history that are cyclical and relational. He is
extremely critical of periodization, writing that “it is perhaps comforting to explain away
the recent stresses within capital as if we are confronting the birth pangs of an entirely
new capitalist order in which knowledge and culture (and biopolitics, whatever that is)
are the primary products rather than things. While some of this is undoubtedly true, it
would be an error to imagine any radical break with the past and a double error to
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presume that the new forms escape the contradictions of compound growth.”89 For
Harvey, there is no development that does not spawn a contradiction, and no noncontradictory response to a contradiction. This is the dialectical movement of capitalist
development, which under this model mutates from and according to its existing shape in
a progression, rather than evolving into something entirely new with each development.90
Hardt and Negri, on the other hand, find it most fruitful to look at real and formal
subsumption as they create new periods in capital’s history that represent radical breaks
with previous modes of production. They rail against the perspective of dialectical
historical development, claiming “the proletarian subject is not simply the product of a
historical process, a ‘thing’ produced and dominated by capital, but also a mode of ethical
and political conduct, liberating itself from within capitalist relations to go beyond
capital.”91 This distinction is vital because Harvey, a die-hard dialectical materialist, sees
revolutionary political possibility in what he deems the inherent contradictions in all
avenues of life under capital, while Hardt and Negri’s perspective focuses on the
potentialities of workers in relation to fundamentally new modes of production that are
created.
Endnotes sums up the question of periodization succinctly, but without Negri’s
hyperbolic optimism: “The question is how to think rupture without either sliding into a
dogmatic and abstract schematism, or an equally dogmatic appeal to immediate historical

89

Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions, 238.

Other work critical of periodizing capitalist development includes Bob Jessop, “What Follows
Fordism? On the Periodization of Capitalism and Its Regulation,” in Phases of Capitalist
Development, eds. Robert Albritton, Makoto Itoh, Richard Westra and Alan Zuege (London:
Palgrave Macmillian, 2011), and Andreas Bieler, Ian Bruff and Adam David Morton, “Acorns and
fruit: From totalization to periodization in the critique of capitalism,” Capital & Class 34, no. 1
(2010): 25-37. For some famous historical examples of periodization, see Rudolf Hilferding,
Finance Capital: A Study in the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development, trans. Morris Watnik and
Sam Gordon (London: Routledge, 1981), Vladimir Lenin, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of
Capitalism,” in V.I. Lenin Collected Work Vol. 22, trans. Yuri Sdobnikov (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1964), and Ernest Mandel, Long Waves of Capitalist Development (London: Verso,
1995).
90

91

Hardt and Negri, Assembly, 73.

42

experience.”92 Unlike Hardt and Negri, who readily characterize large-scale shifts in
capitalism as radical breaks, Endnotes’ project is to “trace the discontinuities”93 present
within contemporary capitalism, which they frame as a capitalism in crisis with no
revolutionary workers’ parties of the past to respond. It is clear that having some way of
describing contemporary capitalism is vital for tracing new strategies and forms of
struggle. The question is whether periodization is real and necessary, or merely an
arbitrary marker imposed on history in order to create totalizing sentiments that do more
harm than good to revolutionary efforts. Yet the problem with a model of dialectical
development is its tendency to reduce every change to an eternal return, which may mean
missing real seismic shifts in the terrain of struggle. Does history necessarily have to
progress either by ruptures or as fundamentally smooth and changeless?
My proposal leans toward tracing capitalist development through phases of
subsumption, via the introduction of hypersubsumption focuses on both logical and
material questions of the effects of new technology on the social and political world. My
work looks at these developments through the arc of capitalism as an “ontology” whose
goal, as we have seen, is fundamentally a “return of the same.” It always returns to selfvalorization.94 The concern with drastic changes in formations of subjectivity as a result
of this was already prefigured in Marx's original discussion of formal and real
subsumption as an unease with the way capitalist expansion through the coopting and
eventual transformation of technology instantiates real material changes on surrounding
social world. Under hypersubsumption, capitalism returns the social body to work,
mediated through capitalist technology, as the only way to participate socially, and the
only way to be “embodied.” That is, alienation does not just appear naturalized but now
constitutes sociality, productivity and collectivity all in one. Fueled by capitalism’s new
modes of value creation, technological changes are cybernetic controls on the future and
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society is a control society, facilitated by unimaginably fast digital technologies that are
birthed completely within the grasp of capitalism and thus answer to its core mandate of
self-valorization. In Camatte’s words, “[t]he immediate process of production is the
indissoluble unity of the labour process and the valorization process…the production of
subjectivity as the content of valorization.”95
Hypersubsumption is capital ridding itself of labour through production itself,
capitalizing on unproductive labour and consumption by turning consumption into free
labour, funneled through fixed capital. The content of valorization is the production not
of subjectivity but of dominated individualism. Capitalism has achieved ultimate value
extraction through feeding on free activity (facilitated by this same technological
mediation). Most importantly, this phase of capitalist development has subsumed labour
under its ontology of self-valorization: each person, user or prosumer is a node of
capitalist production (not simply reproduction) onto themselves, internalizing the
capitalist maxims of competition, individuation and consumption. Capitalist production
has become fundamental to the production of subjectivities, where the phases of
consumption and production have merged. As Camatte says, following Marx’s sentiments
about machines and subsumption entails understanding the exploitation of workers by the
means of production—technologies.
The institutions of formal and then real subsumption themselves have created this
very milieu in which capitalism thrives; capitalism is able to extract value from the
common, for example, because its final cause of valorization has ontological priority
thanks to the environs created through earlier developments of capital. Capitalism, for
example, creates its own malleable workforce—the precariat96—perfect for the unstable
employment typical under immaterial economies. Capitalism has become capable of
creating value out of forms of life that it previously did not use. It not only works by
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forming a narrow, synoptic view of the world only as useful for capitalism and then
actually creating material changes to this world, but also by constantly creating the
subjectivities that it desires, and only those. We can see how the condition of
hypersubsumption changes the very character of labour, consumption and production. It
puts into question the status of subjectivity and identity, both collective and individual.
But it also challenges the very fundamental spatial and temporal freedoms supposedly
afforded to legible subjects under older forms of capitalism; the spaces of control are no
longer mere visible enclosures. In order to account for the relationship between capitalist
circuits of production and consumption under hypersubsumption and contemporary forms
of subjectivity and labour, as well as hypersubsumption's relationship to the larger themes
of extraction, globalization and governmentality, we now turn to a discussion of the state
of contemporary surveillance. Constant watching is necessary because there is no
designated “production time”—one is always potentially producing. It is thus through
surveillance, capture and sorting that contemporary capitalism achieves new heights of
valorization.
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« Chapter Two: Surveillance and Militarization »

A person walking down the streets of London, England, or any city in the United
Kingdom, will have their image quickly picked up by a familiar device, an off-white
rectangle situated somewhere above their head. This object is known as a closed-circuit
television camera or CCTV. The Data Installation and Supplies Network estimates that
there are approximately 1.5 million CCTV cameras currently operating in the UK.97
These ubiquitous machines are often operated by private companies and used by police
and state governments alike, ostensibly to prevent crimes, catch offenders, foil terrorist
plots, etc. The proliferation of contemporary devices that surveil their users in various
ways—including but not limited to CCTVs, smart phones, watches, televisions, “smart
home” devices (even smart water bottles that monitor how much water you drink and
then chastise you for not hydrating enough), laptop cameras, and fitness trackers—have
led to an immense increase in the volume of works known as surveillance studies. This
diverse field of inquiry looks at the technological, political and philosophical implications
of a society saturated with devices that watch our every move and, moreover, collect and
transmit this information to private companies and state governments.
This chapter will discuss the rise and development of surveillance technologies
starting with their origins in the military research, and their imbrication with nationalsecurity state politics. It will look at the changing attitudes towards uses of surveillance
technology as industrial capitalism shifts to the current model of neoliberal, globalized
capitalism characterized by what the previous chapter referred to as hypersubsumption,
and will trace the evolution of intimate monitoring into the use of surveillance to directly
create profit through the extraction of information—a.k.a., “surveillance capitalism.”98
Finally, it traces the entanglement of military technologies with aesthetic techniques to
"12 Facts about CCTV Surveillance in the UK - Data Installation & Supplies." Disnetwork.
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show how these two are synthesized into a “martial gaze,”99 which constitutes
contemporary surveillance. Contemporary surveillance would not be possible without its
military origins, and is also still beholden to them; the relationship between the military
and the image-production and data gathering that constitutes “surveillance capitalism” is
a cornerstone technique of hypersubsumption. The militarization of scopic regimes is
important not only because of the entanglement of the latter with surveillance capitalism
but because of the way the martial eye supplants the human eye, and the capitalist
sensorium overtakes the “human” one. This will be vital to the discussion of speciesbeing and capitalism in the following chapter.
Surveillance studies theorists is define surveillance as “any form of informationgathering meant to enable intervention.”100 Most surveillance studies readers prominently
feature Michel Foucault’s panopticon theory, from his 1975 treatise, Discipline and
Punish: The Birth of the Prison.101 Foucault’s focus on the prison designed by Jeremy
Bentham highlights the role of this institution in controlling and rendering docile the
individual body through the internalization of the surveillant gaze. “Panopticon,” which
literally translates to “all seeing,” refers to a circular prison with a guard tower at the
center. The guard has a 360-degree view and can see each prisoner’s cell, but the inmates
cannot see when the carceral eye is fixed on them; as a result, the prisoner behaves as
though they are always being watched, and thus becomes self-policing and selfdisciplining. Foucault’s study of the nineteenth-century prison model makes clear how
this model coincides with the height of industrialization and the transition to twentiethcentury modernity: a time when the factory walls were prisons of their own kind, soon to
be under the watchful eye of Taylorist productivism. As we saw in the previous chapter,
the individual worker had their quota to meet. The workday was measured in hours of
work, which in turn produced profitable commodities in the form of surplus value that
99 Antoine
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was the time for the reproduction of the worker, paid in wages, subtracted from the total
time the worker spent at work. As Maša Galič, Tjerk Timan and Bert-Jaap Koops
summarize, “[o]ne of the key ideas or effects of the prison-Panopticon (and similarly
designed Panopticons) was to create an extension of perception beyond visible locales
and the reduction of temporal relations to spatial relations, thus enhancing the possibility
of the disciplinary panoptic power. Surveillance is carried out from one single point, and
it is the inspector in his central lodge who possesses this extended power.”102 Surveillance
thus became a technology of power, epitomized by control of physical space and
individual bodies under the biopolitical regimes of states seeking to manage their
populations.
As we saw in the previous chapter, after the disciplinary society comes Gilles
Deleuze’s “control society,” a concept clearly meant to respond to Foucault’s concept of
power in a way that addressed the major changes in forms of power and control that arose
with the advent of new, network technologies:
Control societies continue the de-individualisation that Foucault sketched but
evolve into de-humanisation. What this means is that, whilst the infrastructures of
discipline in schools and hospitals are normative and shaping behaviour, they still
involve a recognition of individuals as human subjects via the representative norm
in particular settings; in contrast, in a control society, individuals are not targeted
directly as human subjects, but rather through representations. The system of
power lies less with foundational and formal institutions and more with ad hoc
and informal networks; it works via representations that communicate and decide
internally.103
Control societies work through diffuse networks of power, and mark the ascension of
corporations over institutions. Unlike states, corporations are not interested in
disciplining populations through normalization in order to create stability. Their aim is
profitability in the short term, and instead of regulating individual bodies through rigid
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orderings of physical space (like the prison), the individual itself becomes a malleable
system of variables to be manipulated for profits. As Galič et al. describe:
It is no longer actual persons and their bodies that matter or that need to be
subjected and disciplined, but rather the individuals’ representations. It is the
divided individual—consumers and their purchasing behaviour—who has become
important to monitor and control. Deleuze coins this the dividual. Where society
is becoming fragmented, so does the individual; the Panopticon blurs and the
individual is split up into pieces, with the power of consumerism demanding all
kinds of attention from citizen-consumers. In a Deleuzian society, the point is no
longer making bodies docile, but to mould consumers, whose data-bodies become
more important than their real bodies.104
Control is still a technology of power, and its ubiquitous instantiation in digital devices
objects becomes integral to the machinations of profit. Surveillance is vital to this system,
as the worker must be constantly monitored in order to maximize profit. However, no
longer is the space of the factory the key to profitability; rather, the flexible worker now
takes the factory with them and “works from home”—a polyvalent phrase that can refer
both to the freelancer or employee who literally do their work from home, usually on a
laptop, and to the more insidious “citizen-consumers” referenced in the quote above.
Control societies must always monitor their citizens because the actions of these citizens
plugged into various nodes of the network generate data, which is then turned into
profitable information that can be sold and traded on:
The data double, however, goes beyond representation of our physical selves—it
does not matter whether the double actually corresponds to the ‘real’ body…The
doubles flow through a host of scattered ‘centres of calculation’ (e.g. forensic
laboratories, statistical institutions, police stations, financial institutions and
corporate and military headquarters) in which they are re-assembled and
scrutinised for developing strategies of administration, commerce and control;
however, the whole system is based on the (capitalist) idea of ‘surplus value’ or, in
this case, ‘surplus information’. The chief idea is that from all the data that people
generate in daily behaviour (using credit cards, browsing the Internet, using
smartphone applications, working, travelling, walking on the street, etc.), profit
should be made.105
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As surveillance technologies become further enmeshed and normalized in everyday
sociality, they merge with ideological constructions, forms of subjectivity and
individuation, social participation and state security. Uniting all of these is the search for
surplus value.
Some scholars have even moved beyond Deleuze’s prescient portrayal of control
societies. Didier Bigo, for example, uses the notion of the “banopticon” to describe the
social sorting functions of surveillance, and the outgrowth of militarized securitization
into moldable consumers and desirable citizens:
The strategic function of the banopticon . . .is to profile a minority as
‘unwelcome’. Its three features are exceptional power within liberal societies
(states of emergency that become routine), profiling (excluding some groups,
categories of proactively excluded people, because of their potential future
behaviour) and the normalizing of non-excluded groups (to a belief in the free
movement of goods, capital, information and persons). The banopticon operates in
globalized spaces beyond the nation-state, so the effects of power and resistance
are no longer felt merely between state and society… The banopticon guards the
entrances to the parts of the world inside which DIY surveillance suffices to
maintain and reproduce ‘order’; primarily, it bars entry to all those who possess
none of the tools of DIY surveillance (of the credit card or Blackberry kind) and
who therefore cannot be relied on to practise such surveillance on their own.106
The “ban” of the banopticon refers to this technology’s emphasis on saying “no”—on not
allowing people and goods through state and national borders, and also purging certain
“undesirables” from ever entering the bounds of civil society. The banopticon can be read
as a synthesis of the panopticon and control society under the auspices of neoliberalism;
as with the panopticon, surveillance technologies are used to watch the denizens of a
region in order to impress ideological and social norms upon them and mold “good”
citizens. Those from within the populace who are deemed to be outside the norm (those
with different racial, ethnic, sexual or gender identities, for example—to name only a
few) are scrutinized more closely, and within this zone traditional prisons and other
repressive state institutions also still exist. However, while the panopticon polices those
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already deemed “bad” after they have transgressed some social norm, today’s surveillant
technology can use patterns of behavior to predict whether somebody will transgress in
the future. These cybernetic surveillant technologies thus ban people before the fact,
speculating that they will never be desirable citizens, and by operating on the future itself,
deny them the opportunities of fluid movement so prized and touted under globalized
capitalism. The specific operation of these technologies, along with their effects on future
temporalities, will be discussed at length later.
Due to the rise of corporate influence on state and social institutions, the
banopticon also has features of societies of free floating control. Docile, self-policing
bodies are made from citizen-consumers (or prosumers, or users…) who readily use what
Zygmunt Bauman, in the quote above, calls the tools of “DIY surveillance”—the smart
phone and credit card—to plug into the vast networks of information and fast moving
capital and participate in its exchange of goods, which have become normalized as social
goods granted to all normative citizens. As Bauman points out, the current state of
globalized capitalism has created a new world of globalized circulation of information,
goods and people and exists beyond national borders and even physical bodies (the data
double). In the above quotation, Bauman also notes an important conceptual distinction
within Bigos’ banopticon that was absent in the earlier models of surveillance societies,
precisely because the globalized world of information capitalism did not exist then. The
banopticon uses surveillance to police the movement of goods and people across borders
of a given nation in the form of overtly visible repressive technologies like policing,
border enforcement and terrorism taskforces. However, within those same borders the
banopticon also operates on the citizens and residents of that nation, in which the
residents themselves are using the tools of control societies to create individual portable
panopticons without even feeling like prisoners. The surveillant function of the
banopticon within this world is not to create normative bodies for a steady society—the
unwanted have already been filtered out by its externally watchful mechanisms. Its
function here is to use tools of ubiquitous tracking to pull good consumers into more
consumption, while using the same tools that track behavior in order to predict future
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purchasing patterns. Surveillant devices follow each person like miniature “kill boxes”107
they cannot live without, precisely because these objects grant them entry into a seamless
world of social and material goods. Conversely, these same surveillant devices track
negative, disruptive or merely low-spending patterns and identify undesirable consumers
who are then blacklisted from the nebulous goods of targeted marketing, online deals and
internet promotions.

3.1. « The Digitization of Surveillance »
The tracking and sorting functions of surveillance would not be possible without
developments in technology that combine algorithmic data gathering, cybernetic theory
and the ubiquity of computing. Ubiquity here refers not only to the vast swaths of
geography covered in some way by digital networks, but also to the growing interactivity
and specificity of devices that make it easier to watch, gather and sort through a growing
cache of information. Cybernetics, pioneered by Norbert Wiener during the Cold War, is
the science of using positive feedback loops to affect future behavior.108 Orit Halpern
explains that “[a]s the etymology of the word suggests, cybernetics is a science of control
or prediction of future action. In further adjoining control with communication, it is an
endeavor that hopes to tame these futures events through the sending of messages.”109
Cybernetics relies on the abstraction of behavior and those behaving into entities that can
be quantified so that a future outcome can be manipulated and controlled.
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Contemporary cybernetics relies on patterns discerned by algorithms capable of
processing huge amounts of data at once and turning that data into communicative
information. An algorithm can be provisionally defined as: “the ‘description of the
method by which a task is to be accomplished’ by means of sequences of steps or
instructions, sets of ordered steps that operate on data and computational structures. As
such, an algorithm is an abstraction, ‘having an autonomous existence independent of
what computer scientists like to refer to as ‘implementation details.’”110 Abstraction is a
key feature of both capitalism and cybernetics; cybernetics harnesses the abstract nature
of scientific models, while capitalism turns concrete labour into abstract “labour power”
through an appeal to so-called “socially necessary labour time.” The latter might actually
be looked at as a type of scientific model—a predictable, scientific workplace was in fact
what Taylorism, with its appeals to clocks, precision and increased worker surveillance,
was striving for. To sum up, there are obvious and important reciprocities between
capitalism’s reduction of social relations to the empty category of “money,” which
matters only in terms of the capitalist marketplace, and cybernetics’ translation of social
relations into digital “data.” As Orit Halpern describes of cybernetics and its forefathers:
“Rather than describe the world as it is, their interest was to predict what it would
become, and to do it in terms of homogeneity instead of difference. This is a worldview
composed of functionally similar entities—black boxes—described only by their
algorithmic actions in constant conversation with each other producing a range of
probabilistic scenarios.”111
Market research, for example, has adopted the system of cybernetic probability
calculation—originally a military project—and applied it to consumer’s behavior, not
only to predict what they will purchase but to steer their future buying habits through
cybernetic control mechanisms. To accomplish this, both commodities and consumers
have to be endowed with a high degree of visibility so that the behavioral feedback loops
Tiziana Terranova, “Red Stack Attack! Algorithms, Capital and the Automation of the
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are constructed from as much raw information as possible. Ubiquitous computing thus
works as a form of surveillance that tags and locates not only traditional martial
“enemies” in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) but also monitors users in order to
engage in valuable data mining. Visibility not only allows for the greatest accuracy in
manipulating patterns of consumptive behavior, it also creates an optimally frictionless
distribution network for the commodities each user is buying, and implements its
banoptic functions to ensure a friction-free world of consumers.

3.2. « Surveillance Capitalism »
Surveillance studies scholar Shoshanna Zuboff has proposed that the contemporary era is
characterized by “surveillance capitalism,” in which the logic of accumulation has been
entirely modified by surveillance technology into a new mutation of capitalism that is
primarily reliant on cybernetic techniques of control. This process of behavioral
modification is essentially a violent project that continues the logic of its military origins,
which are discussed below, but Zuboff primarily focuses on the relationship between
cybernetics, profit and information in a new subspecies of capitalism. I suggest, however,
that this subspecies, however, is actually integral to hypersubsumption as described in
the previous chapter, because it is the primary means through which immaterial labour is
valorized, and as such cannot be divided from other exploitative forms of value extraction
that link the Global North and South. These processes rely on the same scopic
technologies used in military contexts, where surveillance is a violent act rooted in
martial developments, thus extending “battle space”— a space of literal fighting— to
encompass the world-market. As Zuboff says:
My argument here is that we have not yet successfully defined “big data” because
we continue to view it as a technological object, effect or capability. The
inadequacy of this view forces us to return over and again to the same ground. In
this article I take a different approach. “Big data,” I argue, is not a technology or
an inevitable technology effect. It is not an autonomous process, as Schmidt and
others would have us think. It originates in the social, and it is there that we must
find it and know it. In this article I explore the proposition that “big data” is above
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all the foundational component in a deeply intentional and highly consequential
new logic of accumulation that I call surveillance capitalism.112
Zuboff points to this as a mutation in capitalism that is intentional and enduring,
consolidating power for a few, through a technological refinement of productive
capabilities: “Under this new regime, the precise moment at which our needs are met is
also the precise moment at which our lives are plundered for behavioral data, and all for
the sake of others’ gain. The result is a perverse amalgam of empowerment inextricably
layered with diminishment.”113 However, a recent trend has emerged among big tech
companies like Facebook of offering end-to-end encryption for Facebook and Instagram
messaging services.114 What are we to make of that development in light of the argument
about the vital role of surveillance in producing profits for large companies? After all,
end-to-end encryption guarantees that nobody can access your data without your
permission, not even law enforcement or the telecoms that facilitate your
communications. In some cases, like that of the popular app Signal, encryption software
deletes your messages after they are sent, so no record exists of previous exchanges.
The promise of encryption has wide appeal, but has in some cases turned out to be
too good to be true. Just recently, users deleted their period-tracking apps en masse after
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to overturn abortion protection provided by Roe v.
Wade and the subsequent fear that governments could use the data stored by these apps to
prove that they obtained illegal abortions.115 As a result, the period tracking app Stardust
gained popularity after promising users end-to-end encryption “so it would not be able to
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hand over any of your period tracking data to the government.”116 However, because
users log into Stardust with a phone number, rather than a third-party login service, the
company can and does sell the phone numbers to a third party analytics service so they
can capitalize on the wealth of behavioral data provided by users of the app. From there,
governments could simply subpoena the analytics companies for user phone numbers.
The app also tracks metadata about their users, like location and date tags, which Stardust
notes they can also be compelled to turn over to law enforcement. The Stardust app is
ultimately not end-to-end encrypted—if it was it would simply not be able to access user
data.
Even taking this instance into consideration, is Facebook’s goal of end-to-end
encryption by 2023 not indicative of a transformative, consumer-driven mandate for
privacy? Critics like Frank Bajak say no, claiming that this is part of a larger capitalist
push by Facebook “to expand lucrative new commercial services, continue monopolizing
the attention of users, develop new data sources to track people and frustrate regulators
who might be eyeing a breakup of the social-media behemoth.”117 Adding end-to-end
encryption, for example, would actually expand Facebook’s ability to provide ecommerce, by offering more secure payment services. This would help Facebook’s goal
of being an all-in-one provider hub for digital goods and services, and would also help
the company build even more complete user profiles based on the conglomeration of a
multiple-user data stream. The point is that surveillance capitalism is actually not the
adversary to personal privacy and freedom—rather, surveillance capitalism, though
hungry for big data, is motivated primarily by capitalism’s ultimate logic of valorization.
Exploiting meta data is simply one way to achieve this, and a key feature of
contemporary capitalism is precisely its flexibility and its ability to adapt and mutate to
changing social and material conditions. It achieves this largely because it already

116

Perez and Whittaker, n.p.

Frank Bajak, “How Facebook stands to profit from its ‘privacy’ push,” Associated Press,
March 8, 2019, https://apnews.com/article/north-america-ap-top-news-facebook-facebookprivacy-scandal--mark-zuckerberg-a510374d496d4fea8dd69abf4096fd6b/.
117

56

controls the means of production, which are fundamentally capitalist from the start.
Privacy is just another market to conquer.
According to Zuboff, contemporary capitalism that is characterized by the
extraction of “big data” has itself not been sufficiently theorized, precisely because data
mining has been considered a unique, isolated and purely technological phenomena,
without consideration of fidelity to capitalism’s logic: “While “big data” may be set to
other uses, those do not erase its origins in an extractive project founded on formal
indifference to the populations that comprise both its data sources and its ultimate
targets.”118 Under surveillance capitalism, targeting is the routine mode of finding
profitable information. Negri’s term “extractive capitalism” can sound somewhat passive,
as if the system waits for resources to arise before pouncing on the opportunity. But
Zuboff’s is a capitalism characterized by surveillance that is actively predatory. It relies
on the interactivity and the social worlds created by online networks and allows for
creative DIY spaces to emerge, but far from passively waiting, it actively creates these
spaces and then incessantly monitors them. As technology scholars Vincent Manzerolle
and Atle Mikkola Kjosen note in an article about commodities, logistics and targeting
(using apps as examples), “[t]he apps economy is not a collection of apps; rather, it is a
social relationship between people that is mediated by buttons, diagrams, and algorithms.
When money begins to attract commodities, money’s guardians become targets—prey
stalked by commodity capital.”119 In other words, the ubiquitous connectivity provided by
smart devices and social networking platforms exists precisely because these systems are
able to immediately and clearly perceive—or target—each user and respond to their
needs. This is referred to as “personalization” and is touted as an achievement by tech
giants. The “democratizing” potentialities of these technologies not only do not alleviate
their repressive deployment, but are in many cases promoted in order to distraction from
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the social disparities they create and prey upon. Surveillance is extraction through
targeting.
Mark Andrejevic, among others, points to this change in capitalism facilitated by
the rise of “big data” and is deeply concerned by the divide between the users and
producers of data and those with the technological capacities to sort through and thereby
profit from it. “If we take seriously the notion that online forms of interaction and
socializing can double as productive immaterial labour, we might describe the
infrastructures that support them as productive resources, access to which is determined
by those who own them.”120 The disparity between the owners of the means of digital
production and those who do the work exists as strongly as ever, precisely because socalled immaterial, unproductive or voluntary activity, performed for free, is in fact work.
The contracts are even there, in the form of privacy policies and user data policies that
users must submit to in order to gain access to the platforms they want. What users get is
the means of creating their individuality through digital commodification.
Zuboff makes explicit the relationship between algorithmic capitalism and
subjectification. She claims that“[s]ubjectivities are converted into objects that repurpose
the subjective for commodification. Individual users’ meanings are of no interest to
Google or other firms in this chain. In this way, the methods of production of ‘big data’
from small data and the ways in which ‘big data’ are valued reflect the formal
indifference that characterizes the firm’s relationship to its populations of ‘users.’
Populations are the sources from which data extraction proceeds and the ultimate targets
of the utilities such data produce.”121 The convertibility of subjectification and
commodification facilitated by digital technologies like social media are “stacked” or
superimposed upon each other in the name of the surplus value generated from mining
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big data, or what Zuboff elsewhere calls the “behavioral data surplus” generated through
innovations in surveillance combined with better customization of online platforms.122
“Behavioral surplus,” or the massive amount of consumer data generated by users
of online platforms and smart devices, is far from passive. On the contrary, the
information generated through the surveillant mechanisms of data capture and storage is
put into action by the owners of these platforms. The data itself goes to work, in a manner
of speaking. As David Panagia argues: “if information behaves, and if humans are
indistinct from machines in their emission of quanta of information (i.e., data), then
cynegetic tracking, capture, and prediction of future outcomes (i.e., risk) is possible…
through the operational logic of negative feedback, it’s not only the case that information
behaves but information behaves back from the future to control and guide
achievement.”123 The feedback loop of cybernetic control acts directly on the
subjectivities created through and by the work that constitutes this form of information
and thus creates the very subjectivities that further produce it, in the name of being better
citizen-consumers. The same technology that fuels the repressive sorting of the
banopticon, both materially and ideologically, operates a second time to refine users by
subtly banning non-normative consumptive behaviors. Predatory surveillance—capturing
data and then using it to guide future outcomes—is the hypersubsumption incarnated. It
facilitates the growth of the social factory as it extends across the world, crossing national
and geospatial boundaries alike.

3.3. « Surveillance and Social Sorting »
Surveillance technologies make possible what Oscar Gandy and later, David Lyon, call
“social sorting” or “panoptic sorting,” which according to the latter not only verifies
identities but also ascribes worth and assesses risks to individuals, thereby stratifying
Zuboff traces the “discovery” of behavioral data in the third chapter of The Age of
Surveillance Capitalism.
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people, through surveillance, into different social, political and economic classes.124
Oscar Gandy cannily and bleakly notes, “I see the panoptic sort as a kind of high- tech,
cybernetic triage through which individuals and groups of people are being sorted
according to their presumed economic or political value. The poor, especially poor people
of color, are increasingly being treated as broken material or damaged goods to be
discarded or sold at bargain prices to scavengers in the marketplace.”125 Gandy associates
this form of sorting with panopticism because of its imbrication with surveillance
technology, while Lyon merely calls it “social sorting.” Calling it social sorting reveals
the progression from Foucaultian panopticism, which relied on institutional technologies
of power like prisons and hospitals, to current forms of technology which encompass the
latter but also include more complex, diffuse devices like smartphones that have made
self-surveillance both portable and desirable. The prisoner in the panopticon internalizes
the watchful gaze of the guard only after being caught, tried and sentenced to a physical
prison, whose enclosure represents the individual prisoner’s body imprisoned and divided
from society for the scopic carcareal regime—the prison’s walls and their design are also
literally seminal in bringing forth this form of self-watching. Like those walls, the
rectangles of glass and metal that make up a subset of surveillant devices— smartphones
—are material technologies that maintain surveillant power.
Unlike the prisons, however, these devices are highly mobile—they are agents of
Deleuze’s free-floating control, not spatially bound to one plot of land or one enclosure.
That means that because users choose to carry these devices around (that “choice” will be
complicated in a moment), power and repression no longer operates through modern
spatial restrictions. Through the rise of capitalism in its hypersubsumptive phase, our
technological devices are mobile shackles controlling not space but time—maintaining
our attention in the present to read and control our futures through data. Social sorting has
a twofold function: it seeks to control the future of mobility of goods and people through
David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting (London: Routledge, 2003). It is no coincidence
that Lyon’s book and its observations come on the heels of extreme increases in surveillance that
happened post-9/11.
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borders as well as the purchasing patterns—which are also patterns of life—of the users
within borders, turning them into normative consumers.
The macrocosmos of contemporary surveillance operates within Zygmunt
Bauman’s framework of “liquid surveillance,” surveillant practices that shift in response
to a society dominated by contemporary capitalism:
[A]ll social forms melt faster than new ones can be cast. They cannot hold their
shape or solidify into frames of reference for human actions and life strategies
because of their short shelf-life […] surveillance, once seemingly solid and fixed,
has become much more flexible and mobile, seeping and spreading into many life
areas where once it had only marginal sway.126
Where once, in Marx and Engel’s Communist Manifesto, the “melting” metaphor referred
to the dissolving of illusions to reveal the real class struggle that forms the basis of
bourgeois society,127 Bauman now uses it to convey the ability of commercial
surveillance technology to confound distinctions such as that between public and private
spaces.
This formulation is reminiscent of Althusser’s Marxism, which eschewed the
distinction between the economic base, seen as determining everything in the last
instance, and the socio-cultural superstructure, which was discussed by some Marxists as
a secondary feature of the base. Where Althusser took the unilateral arrow of causation
and made it point both ways, Bauman’s liquid surveillance, with its inflection of
technological development alongside social life within capitalism, turns the arrow into a
never ending mobius strip, where each aspect informs, affects and transforms the others.
Contemporary surveillance is invited into the home and onto the body, by those whose
homes were deemed safe from the repressive arm of that same surveillance industrial
complex. The dichotomy between security-surveillance and consumption-selfsurveillance is integral to maintaining the profitability of the surveillance network. As
Bauman puts it,
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[the users] are simultaneously promoters of commodities and the commodities
they promote…The test they need to pass in order to be admitted to the social
prizes they covet demands them to recast themselves as commodities: that is, as
products capable of drawing attention, and attracting demand and customers…
members of the society of consumers are themselves consumer commodities, and
it is the quality of being a consumer commodity that makes them bona fide
members of that society… Making oneself a “sellable commodity” is a DIY job,
and individual duty. Let us note: “making oneself,” not just becoming, is the
challenge and the task.128
As we saw in the first chapter, amongst the most profitable commodities under postFordist capitalism are those produced by immaterial labour, allowing the harnessing of
the general intellect and society’s creative powers, while at the same time promoting this
as a necessary self-creation. No longer does capitalism have to pay wages to the worker
for their own reproduction—rather, the worker reproduces themselves as citizenconsumers through the act of surveilled consumption, which they have internalized as
necessary in order to count in society, to have a social life as opposed to social death.

3.4. « Surveillance, Logistics and Profit »
As Hardt and Negri describe, Marx’s own works made explicit the connection between
war and the expansion of capitalism: “Marx uses primitive accumulation to name the
violent processes that take place prior to the capitalist mode of production and are
necessary for it to begin, processes that create the two classes.”129 Violent dispossession
is integral to starting the mechanism of capitalism, and also integral to its continued
functioning; For Marx, primitive accumulation was a step in pre-capitalism that was
eventually overcome by full capitalist production. However, we can see primitive
accumulation continuing to play out in a vicious cycle of production and consumption
between the so-called First and Third Worlds under neoliberalism’s neo-colonialism,
which continues to take resources at will in order to feed globalization. As Hardt and
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Negri point out, “Contemporary Marxists emphasize instead that primitive accumulation
continues alongside capitalist accumulation throughout the world, constantly renewing its
violent mechanisms of enclosing the common, creating class divisions, and generating
global hierarchies.”130 Primitive accumulation, or its contemporary incarnation, which
David Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession131, is necessary for the formal
subsumption of society by capitalism, which is followed by its total subsumption. “This
is the meaning that should be given to the Marxian figures of the “real subsumption” of
labour under capital – which can be extended to the subsumption of society itself under
capital. This is not a matter only of the totalitarian extension of consumption and its
eventual alienating effects (as followers of the Frankfurt School maintained), but also the
incarnation of capitalist production in society, that is, in the languages of the market as in
the vital connections of society.”132
Hypersubsumption, therefore, includes within itself the ever-shifting processes of
accumulation, formal subsumption and real subsumption, which are all facilitated by the
violence of abstraction that is the essence of value under capitalism. This form of
abstraction, whose most extreme incarnation is the money form, is also the abstraction of
the self as subject in the world of consumption through DIY surveillance that was
discussed earlier, as well as the way the banopticon abstracts real people into desirable
and undesirable populations through literal acts of physical exclusion and national
borders.
While the governmental impulse to surveil its citizens is nothing new, the degree
and tactics of contemporary surveillance have led the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), among others, to coin the term “surveillance-industrial complex” to describe the
“distributed mass-surveillance that is [sic] now underway, which combine the longstanding police impulse to expand private-sector information sources with awesome new
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technological capabilities for vacuuming up, storing and keeping track of vast oceans of
information.”133 Under this regime, governments are privatizing security and surveillance
functions in order to circumvent privacy laws. They also use current laws to compel
companies to turn over their user data. The use of multiple private firms allows
surveillance to be diffuse and multifaceted, with all manner of different technology at its
disposal, while simultaneously, governments are creating more “watch” programs and
other surveillance networks under the auspices of security and freedom.
The private and the public sectors work together to create the surveillanceindustrial complex, and it is no accident that this term harkens back to the familiar idea of
the military-industrial complex. The increasing encroachment of war-time practices and
language in peacetime, as well as the feedback loop between military and civilian
technology and techniques, as well as private-sector business interests, is fundamental to
understanding the functioning of contemporary capitalism, as well as the need to frame it
in terms of hypersubsumption, with an emphasis on surveillance in particular.
The fundamental purpose of the surveillance-industrial complex is maintaining
hegemonic class and private property relations; its goal is to smoothly facilitate the
globalized movement of people, goods and information in a way that maximizes profits.
To do this, it relies on militarized techniques of repression, but also on military
technology, an increasingly militarized police force and the normalization of military
techniques in non-war spaces as well as the subjectivities such encroachments produce.
Central within this process is an organizational relationship in which technologies
with military origins have been taken up by the civilian sector: this is particularly
apparent in the field of logistics, or the organization of supply chains. Logistics arose and
was refined in the military as a way to get food and ammunition to soldiers on the front
lines. Under capitalism, logistics has become the vital administration of the swift
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movement of goods and services.134 As Jasper Bernes has written, “[l]ogistics, we might
say, is war by other means, war by means of trade. A war of supply chains that conquers
new territories by suffusing them with capillarial distributions, ensuring that commodities
flow with ease to the farthest extremities.”135 Logistics would of course be impossible
without the surveillant technologies of global positioning and tracking—the same
technologies operating within the military to identify and follow potential targets for
elimination. “It should be obvious by now that logistics is capital’s own project of
cognitive mapping. Hence, the prominence of “visibility” among the watchwords of the
logistics industry. To manage a supply chain means to render it transparent.”136 The
current iterations of logistics, which render everything transparent in order to facilitate
the smoothest possible horizontal movement, have not abandoned the system’s military
origins.

3.5. « Martial Vision: a History of the Surveillant Gaze »
Antoine Bousquet’s The Eye of War: Military Perception from the Telescope to the
Drone137 traces the rise of technologies to expand and augment visual perception and how
they eventually gave rise to the scopic techniques of surveillance seen today. Bousquet
focuses in particular on the military appropriation of drawing, painting, map and
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telescope making and eventually the photo and video camera and shows that the
militarization of aesthetic techniques has always been commonplace, and has actually
been integral to Western warfare since the Renaissance. His book traces the history of
visual perception as it has become imbricated with a “martial gaze”138 whose goal is to
turn seeing into annihilation, equating visibility with vulnerability. Bousquet’s book is
especially useful because it turns to the technologies of perception. The book develops
the term ‘martial gaze’ to grasp the military entanglements of the technical history of
vision, in its entanglement with the military and its relationship to perception. Bousquet
claims that human perception has been colonized and then supplanted by machinic vision
through increased focus on rationalization and mechanization, and looks at particular
technical objects and their milieu to illustrate the sociohistorical forces of the time.
Bousquet, in The Eye of War, devotes the penultimate chapter to the drone as the
epitome of machinic vision, which he claims has taken over the human sensorium and
supplanted human perception. The history of perception is a history of the rationalization
of vision, particularly in the industrial age. Certain aspects, such as sighting, targeting,
mapping and sensing, were brought to fore by specific technologies of vision.
Perspectival drawing, for example, which emerged during the Renaissance, was quickly
rationalized through the mathematization of vision into geometric equations. This was
then taken up by the military forces of the day, who saw its potential for visualizing the
enemy at a distance. Similarly, modern cartography, which utilized the already
mathematical aspects of vision, refined geospatial representations to convey vital
information. The military uses of mapping were obvious: information about enemy
movement and position. Mapping thus became a vital part of military strategy. Mapping
became a means of dominating space through scientific rationalization— the map as
instrumentalized tool. The map, because of its use for strategic and tactical purposes, is a
martial technology for supporting vision such that it can be manipulated for control and
conquering. Maps as late as the 18th century were unsystematic and did not represent 3D
considerations such as topography. Introduction of scientific cartography standardized
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maps based on geometric principles. These maps could be used during military
campaigns to visual strategies before actual orders were issued— testing future outcomes.
As 19th-century warfare expanded the boundaries of the battlefield beyond any single
commander’s eye, new maps were created for synoptic oversight.139 Mapping also led to
the rise of automated missile guidance, which turned mapping into a form of continuous
communication (the transmission of information to the user), culminating in destruction
— an active geospatial interface that has been operationalized for military purposes.
The rise of cybernetics in the twentieth century also saw the rise of ‘cognitive
cartography’ or an exchangeability between mapping cognitive systems and enhancing
cognition of maps. According to Bousquet, cartography has increasingly merged with the
science of human perception. In the computing age, the understanding of maps as static
has given way to mapping as a fluid, every changing, dynamic stream of information that
has to interact with the plasticity of human cognitive processes, which interface with
geospatial representations of streams of data. Mapping is now becoming integrated with
tracking movement thanks to a growing global network of sensors sending data to central
control centers in real time.
Under the martial gaze, machinic vision has taken over many of the functions of
sight that were formerly done by humans; what’s more, these machines have expanded
the very definition of ‘sight’ to include non-visual data through the use of sensors and
other non-scopic instruments like sonar and radar, which not only far exceed human
sensual capacity but in some cases grant access to realms of sense (like microwave
frequencies) that humans could never have achieved otherwise. The important point of
Bousquet’s book is the way the militarization of these perceptive techniques creates
machines with singular, rationalized goals and capacities; their ‘vision’ therefore is the
martial gaze, which has subjected the possibilities of vision to the whims of militarized
capitalism.
During the first and second World Wars, manned aircrafts were flown first on
recon missions that relied purely on human sight to spot enemy encampments, weapons
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etc.. This was then replaced by aerial photography, and the planes were equipped with
cameras. No longer did armies have to rely solely on faulty human vision— now it was
the job of the humans not to see the battlefield but to look at it through the camera in
order to capture it in a photo. These photos were then turned into useful intelligence
through the new human function of parsing the information obtained from these aerial
cameras. At the same time, bombs were becoming more sophisticated as well. Originally
launched from a stationary position at a stationary target, bombs were attached to planes
for mobile drops. Eventually targeting, with the help of global mapping and sophisticated
sensors, evolved into self-guiding missiles.
It’s vital to see the similarities between so-called battle space technologies and
civilian platforms that are supposedly user-centered and rely on pleasure and excitement.
“The technologies that on the battlefield of the future will make decisions between life
and death, when analyzed in terms of their techniques, may be the same technologies,
control architectures and mechanisms that can be used in different fields of our
culture.”140 Military uses of technologies of perception have instrumentalized all sorts of
vision. The rise of the digital and algorithmic sorting, as well as machinic ‘sensing’ or
modes of seeing and gathering data have revolutionized the way we think about vision
and who or what is being looked at. The production of commodities generated by
predatory surveillance is vision— the act of seeing itself, when it is surveillant, produces
value.

3.6. « Drones and Vision »
The martial gaze ultimately instrumentalizes the humans under its watch. “The regime of
global targeting has made perceptibility synonymous with vulnerability.”141 The U.S.
military drones, particularly the popular Reaper and Predator models, combine all the
forms of Bousquet’s machinic vision with the techniques of neoliberal globalization—
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the nowhere and anywhere war, a global increase in surveillance, ubiquitous semiautonomous technology. Drones also trace the material evolution of the increasingly warlike function of vision through military coopting and enhancing of technology. We can
see the technological history of vision and violence encapsulated in the figure of the
drone. Nowhere is the superposition of surveillance, warfare and digital technology more
stark than here. A drone by definition is simply an un-piloted air or space craft142, hence
the term UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle). The drone, a conjunction of artistic visual
techniques synthesized with military surveillance and sorting, should be seen as the
epitome of capitalist technology. Now the epitome of self-guided aircrafts, originally
drones were used in the U.S. purely for visual reconnaissance; it is only after 9/11 that
they were armed with Hellfire missiles and turned into lethal roving machines. Drones
use digital targeting, which singles out individuals based on behavioral patterns, not
traditional indicators of allegiance like uniform, nationality, etc. Targeting becomes more
like a global hunt and dispersal and camouflage techniques continue to arise. The GWOT
is a form of war that crosses boundaries and borders into and between populations,
sporadic violence which gives rise to increased securitization within a country.143 All
spaces become potential battlespaces, which leads to the difficulty of locating military
agency in an age of networks of commanders and operators, as well as the enmeshing of
humans with technology.
To summarize the process of drone warfare, I turn to Laura Wilcox:
In US practices of drone warfare, decisions about targeting are made on the basis
of a ‘disposition matrix’ based on human intelligence (HUMINT) and signal
intelligence (SIGINT) from different American agencies, including the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and the
National Security Agency (NSA) (Gettinger, 2015). This ‘disposition matrix’
consists of many files in a flexible database that can be searched using ‘big data’
techniques and advanced algorithms (Weber, 2015). This information contributes
to the ‘kill lists’ of known persons in ‘personality strikes’, but is also used to
142

Elizabeth Howell, “What is a Drone?” space.com, October 3, 2018.
https://www.space.com/29544-what-is-a-drone.html/.
143

Ibid., 191.

69

target persons exhibiting a ‘pattern of life’ associated with being a terrorist but for
whom intelligence officials may not have human intelligence. Rather, the subjects
of ‘signature strikes’ may ‘exist as digital profiles across a network of
technologies, algorithmic calculations, and spreadsheets’ (Shaw, 2013: 540).
‘Signature strikes’ are not aimed at targeting known individuals, but rather on
producing packages of information that become icons for killable bodies on the
basis of behavior analysis and a logic of preemption. The production of a killable
body stems from a process in which images and information analyzed by
algorithmic processes are individuated into ‘baseball card’-like files.144
As we can see, drone strikes operate through the same logic at work in data mining—
gathering massive stores of information for algorithmic processing in order to predict
how somebody will act in the future.
Laura Wilcox, following Grégoire Chamayou’s formulation that the rise of the
drone comes with the neoliberal state’s increasing militarization of its internal police
force and the turning surveillance tech against its own population in the name of security.
For him, the salient aspect of the drone is its all-seeing, God-like eye that gives its
operator infinite vision from a distance145, expands on the ways that the intersections of
race, class and gender affect the eye of the drone and those under its gaze: “[T]he ‘godtrick’ of Western scientific epistemologies: the illusion of being able to see everywhere
from a disembodied position of ‘nowhere’ as an integral component of histories of
militarism, capitalism, colonialism, and male supremacy. This ‘god-trick’ is seemingly
perfected in the weaponized drone, with its global surveillance capacities and purported
efficiency and accuracy in targeting weapons, and, as such, has been a frequent
inspiration for critical work on the use of drones in warfare.”146 Wilcox connects the
figure of the posthuman with the drone as a tool of necropolitics, whose all-seeing ‘eye’
deals asymmetric annihilation to those it watches. Like Bousquet’s vision-equals-death
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formulation, the key here is that the gaze of the drone might be all-seeing but its sight
does not affect every body equally, though it is always violent in one way or another:
Drone assemblages as a mode of necropolitical violence—the violence of
‘distinguishing whose life is to be managed and those who are subject to the right
of death’ (Allinson, 2015: 121; Mbembe, 2003)—is both a form of posthuman
embodiment and is itself corporealizing in terms of the racialized and gendered
bodies it produces as either killable or manageable. As such, an embodied reading
of drone warfare suggests the limits of the ‘god-trick’ of drone warfare both in
terms of its omniscient surveillance capacities as well as its global spread…in
other words, how algorithmic war has generative effects beyond its stated
purposes of rational target identification and destruction (Barkawi and Brighton,
2011; Holmqvist, 2013).147
The drone is a surveillant machine whose “generative effects” include the creation of
subjectivities within its mode of securitization. Wilcox’s model connects the banoptic
functions of the watchfulness of the drone, with its filtering function of good/bad citizenconsumers, and its effects as an ideological apparatus under hypersubsumed capitalism,
which creates the subjected subjectivities it needs to populate the globalized world of
value production.
The figure of the drone is most useful when it renders transparent the diverse
machinations, failures and assemblages at work in the global network of surveillance
capitalism; droning immediately brings to mind the conjunction of algorithms, kill
chains, human operators and targets that is not as obvious with many other surveillance
technologies. That is, it is obviously a conjunction of flesh, metal and labour, while
simultaneously engaging with the mythic properties commonly associated with many
technologies of the digital era and becoming cloaked in the resultant mystique. It is
subject to both discourses. It is a unique combination of militarized violence through
surveillance, the use of algorithmic sorting in cybernetic decision making, and the
immaterial, through the boring technological work that its operators do on a daily basis.
The drone, as an example or harbinger of visualness, is a technological apparatus that
does not only respond to the GWOT— it perpetuates and refines it as it flies over the
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globe, freeing ever more battlespace, expanding war and its potentialities.148 Framed this
way, it should be easy to see how the active powers of drones— and by extension the
entire apparatus of militarized surveillance— mirrors the actions of hypersubsumed
capitalism. Hypersubsumption is the point where capitalism both responds to and creates
the subjectivities and technologies it acts upon.
The drone's martial gaze renders the battle space technologically transparent by its
ability to “see” with sonar, in the dark, and even through the earth. It is important to
conceptualize drone vision as the extension of sight beyond its traditional optic focus. We
can follow Orit Halpern in proposing “visualness” as the quality that has supplanted
vision within the contemporary relations of power and control:
Visualizations, according to current definition, make new relationships appear and
produce new objects and spaces for action and speculation. While the language of
vision perseveres, it is important not to assume a direct correlation between vision
as a sense and visualization as an object and practice…For Deleuze visuality is
closely linked to visibilités, or what in English I will label “visibilities.” Deleuze
defines this term as “visualness,” implying that vision cannot only be understood
in a physiological sense but must also be understood as a quality or operation. For
Deleuze visibilities are sites of production constituting an assemblage of
relationships, enunciations, epistemologies, and properties that render agents into
objects of intervention for power. Visibilities are historically stipulated
apparatuses for producing evidence about bodies, subjects, and now, perhaps, new
modalities of population.149
Ironically, it is this heightened transparency and the power relations created by it
that steeps this space in a fog of war, which blurs and destroys the boundaries of
traditional geospatial conflicts. In particular, the distinction between civilian and
combatant is broken in drone warfare precisely because of the drone’s reliance on
cybernetic behavioral models to detect “patterns of life” for targeting, as opposed to
traditional individual positive identification. Visualness not only assesses and acts upon
existing space but also circumscribes and defines the space and the possibilities for those
148 According
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living within it. The distinction between the cybernetic behavioral analysis used for drone
warfare and for online marketing, for instance, is that online marketing is concerned with
using the behavioral data surplus to steer future patterns of consumption, whereas the use
of this information under droning decides future possibilities of life itself—whether a
person will be targeted, thereby circumscribing their potentialities for motion in space—
or whether a person will be killed, taking control of their future temporality through
annihilation. As Greg Elmer and Andy Opel put it: “We are looking to expand the
common definition of optics to include not only ‘seeing’ but also being ‘sighted‘ :’that is,
discovered, localized, identified in order to be hit or struck’ (Weber 2005: 8).”150
This global regime of violent capitalist surveillance has created a duality of
subjects who are at once passive targets of the roving military eye and active operators
within the performance of its watchful gaze. We must wonder, was the sovereign subject
just a surface-level effect of the self-establishing essence of the technology of its time,
which has now been displaced as technology becomes increasingly autonomous and
human perception changes and becomes subordinate to it?

3.7. « Hypersubsumption and Total War »
It is important to understand the military-surveillance complex because is not simply an
example of violent productive forces under hypersubsumption; rather, since surveillance
is integral to contemporary capitalism, and this surveillance can only be facilitated
through technological advances initially made by military researchers, surveillance is
necessarily militarized itself, even when removed from its state to its civilian or consumer
function. The definition of hypersubsumption should then be expanded to include a state
of contemporary capitalism both productive of and produced by militarized surveillance,
where valorization has taken on the characteristics of war and the martial gaze. Éric
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Alliez and Maurizio Lazzarato’s Wars and Capital151 claims that liberalism (and by
extension capitalism) has, from its inception, been a philosophy of “total war”: “So-called
total war abolishes any distinction between civil war (internal) and major war (exterior),
major and minor war (colonial), military war and non-military war (economic,
propaganda, subjective), between combatants and non-combatants, between war and
peace…This appropriation and integration, without which we could not think of war as
state, and total war as state of a new governmentality”152 Under late capitalism, social
divisions have become even starker, while capitalist production expands beyond easily
discernible objects and forms a stranglehold on society and culture through what seems to
be voluntary servitude. This hypersubsumption of society under capitalism relies on
militarized technology, the weaponization of vision, and the expansion of war into
everyday affairs.
In Wars and Capital, Alliez and Lazzarato say ““[t]he statement ‘It’s like being in
a war’ should be immediately corrected: it is a war. The reversibility of war and economy
is at the very basis of capitalism…the economy pursues the objectives of war through
other means (blocking credit, embargo on raw materials, devaluation of foreign
currency).”153 To put a finer point on it, Alliez and Lazzarato later continue: “Integrated
Global Capitalism is the axiomatic of the war machine of Capital that was able to submit
the military deterritorialization of the State to the superior deterritorialization of Capital.
The machine of production is no longer distinguishable from the war machine integrating
civilian and military, peace and war, in the single process of a continuum of isomorphic
power in all its forms of valuation.”154 In less Deleuzian terms, they are saying that
capitalism not only integrates governance and military forces, but absorbs their useful
characteristics and turns them into necessary parts of its value-making operation.
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Threats are now seen as emerging from within populations, hence the same
techniques of control, repression and counterintelligence seen in the GWOT are being
used at “home” in countries traditionally far from neocolonial warzones. Theorists like
Paul Virilio claim that contemporary capitalism is fundamentally characterized by a warlike nature that it turns on its own populace— populations already fully subsumed by
capitalist production— in order to make a profit. He calls this process endocolonization.155 Ben Noys summarizes Virilio's expansive analysis: “[Virilio] proposes
that the proletarian body is ‘produced’ through semi-colonization by the military class,
which seizes goods and value to support their own indolent and parasitic existence.”156
Endo-colonization turns everybody into the mere human capital described previously as
the state of millennials in Harris’ work. As with external colonialism, the population
become mere vessels for the expansion of capitalism through the devaluation of that
population’s labour and the devastation of the native economy, except here the native
economy is the “home” economy. It is easy to see this at work in the 2008 financial
collapse, in which thousands lost their homes while a select few made millions during
state-sponsored bank bailouts. Noys continues: “Virilio presciently captured the sense of
new forms of asymmetric warfare and the ‘hostage-holding’ function of military control
in contemporary mediatized societies. In this situation traditional forms of popular
resistance and what Virilio calls ‘ecological struggles’, the ‘the simple freedom to come
and go, as well as the freedom to remain, to stay put’ (Virilio 1990: 91), become put into
question.”157 As we will see in the next chapter, this process of controlling coming and
going, a form of social sorting, can only be achieved through large-scale surveillance.
The salient points here are the particular ways that military tactics and
technologies literally change the populace specifically for the purpose of creating further,
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more profitable commodities and a more efficiently consuming population.158 To achieve
this, it is necessary to import more and more techniques of violence and to erase the
illusion of the distinction between “us and them” that is so important to the GWOT
rhetoric and to the discourse of the Global North versus Global South more generally.
This distinction was seen at work in the discussion of the banopticon, which posited a
nationalized barrier to entry facilitated by repressive surveillance technology and an
internal world of DIY self-surveillance that one gained access to only by being allowed
past the first set of barriers. The banopticon proposes that these two worlds have been
folded into the same surveillance apparatus. The effect of militarization as it intertwines
with contemporary capitalism for the purposes of creating greater surplus value should
make us question whether these two “worlds” are really separate at all: in a state of total
war, are we all fundamentally subject to/subjects of the same violence?
Alliez and Lazarrato make clear the effects of total war on subjectivity and
citizenship: “So-called total war abolishes any distinction between civil war (internal)
and major war (exterior), major and minor war (colonial), military war and non-military
war (economic, propaganda, subjective), between combatants and non-combatants,
between war and peace.”159 The traditional definition of war, popularized by military
theorist Carl Von Clausewitz, as “the continuation of politics by other means,”160 is seen
by Alliez and Lazzarato as transitionary and state-based, while total war is a new
In a chapter titled “The new military urbanism,” Stephen Graham traces the incursion of
military technologies and strategies into cities. He argues that Due to globalization and increased
urbanism, states are attempting to ‘respond to increased threats’ through military rationalization
and technology, which marks a change in traditional governmentality. The rise of techniques of
militarization in urban spaces uses material and social architectures to turn cities into fortified
spaces and normalize military solutions/tactics for civilian issues. As Graham states, the
introduction of widespread technologically-facilitated state surveillance is fundamental to the rise
of the militarization of society: “the attempted extension of essentially military ideas of tracking,
identification and targeting into the quotidian spaces and circulations of everyday life.” The focus
is on attempting to identify and control future threats based on targeting behavioral patterns,
which leads governments to surveil their own citizens (Stephen Graham, “The New Military
Urbanism,” in The Surveillance-Industrial Complex: A Political Economy of Surveillance, eds.
Kirstie Ball and Laureen Snider, (London: Routledge, 2013).
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governmentality. In fact, they advocate an inversion of the formula, arguing that politics
is war by other means: “‘Total’ war should be understood as a war that mobilizes all
productive (labour, science, technology, organization, production), social, and subjective
forces of a nation for the first time.”161 We can say that total war imports certain
techniques from the GWOT—most notably, the idea of war at a distance, which keeps
those in the Global North safe from the violent conflict zones in places like Iraq; war at a
distance is accomplished through the development of drones that was just discussed: first
as machines of visual reconnaissance, then, with the addition of explosive projectiles, as
machines capable of targeting and execution. However, as the eye of war turned its gaze
onto the internal populace, pure physical violence gave way to a more low-intensity
warfare characterized by pervasive surveillance and the integration of military
surveillance technologies with consumerism. The machines of post-Fordist capitalism put
the globe into a state of total war. Under the regime of total war, everybody is a target to
watch in the name of extracting behavioral patterns in order to maximize the creation of
value. The annihilation of physical terrorist bodies in the name of securitization of the
United States facilitates the expansion of surveillant military techniques within the
country’s own borders, upon its own citizens, while ‘war at a distance’ keeps the violence
seeming far enough away as not to imbricate the two in a united critique of advanced
capitalism. The physical violence done to bodies and objects ‘over there’ also fulfills the
first function of the banopticon, which is to prevent ‘undesirables’ from penetrating the
social and civil spheres controlled by those who own the means of digital production in
order to have a smoother reproduction of consumer subjectivities.
Total war relies on a state of absolute exposure by means of the surveillanceindustrial complex. It is the absolute transparency of society attained by the god-like
vision of capitalism and its instrument, the state, in order to maximize profits through
social sorting, repressive violence and extractive accumulation. So we can provisionally
answer the question of what becomes of the citizens of a state under endo-colonization:
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they become targets, living under the same predatory gaze as the insurgent targets in the
GWOT. Hypersubsumption, therefore, is a state of total war.
The military origins of surveillance technology and cybernetics have important
consequences. This wartime research engine produced what historian of science Peter
Galison has defined as a new “ontology of the enemy, not the alien and animal opponent,
not the distantiated space on the map of an airtime raid, but the “cold-blooded, machinelike opponent.”162 This move eliminated the enemy as a visibly different being and
produced an imagined closed world of networked communications between informatic
entities. As Halpern explains, this emergent assemblage would be codified later under the
Cold War ideal of “C3I: command, control, communication, and information ontology of
the enemy, machine-like, maps, etc..”163 The logic of the abstraction of the “enemy” is an
extension of the profiteering logic at the heart of capitalism, with money as the
apotheosis of abstraction, while commodities are abstracted from the labour that created
them and ultimately fetishized under a “free market.” This allows for the exploitation of
labourers even when they are doing work that does not overtly seem like work (i.e. the
immaterial or the unproductive, the “free” activity that produces mineable consumer data,
such as online shopping, social media, etc.).

3.8. « Conclusion »
As we have seen, the goal of contemporary capitalism’s hypersubsumption of
society is to turn everything into a productive force for its own use—the creation of the
global social factory. Vital to that goal is the abstraction and reconfiguration
accomplished by contemporary telecommunications systems and cybernetics, which
allow the use of cybernetic control techniques and outcomes upon the whole of
globalized labour. Because almost all post-WWII technological developments, but
especially cybernetics, come from military research, they combine the opposing functions
of current digital networks—the repressive and violent with the joyous and satisfying—
Peter Galison, “The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision,”
Critical Inquiry 21, no. 1 (1994): 231.
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into a single stony gaze that acts upon everybody simultaneously, though not necessarily
equally. Abstraction is at the heart of the alienation of capitalism, and it is capitalism and
its accumulative ambitions that drove the development of cybernetic technologies to be
the ultimate abstraction machines, turning humans into schemas of data visualization and
vague clusters of information. As Marx warned in the Fragment on Machines, machines
have emerged that are sophisticated enough to instrumentalize their human operators.
In the next chapter we will look at the effects of hypersubsumption on the users
and labourers that create valuable data and other products of immaterial labour. In
particular, we will discuss the debate over whether unpaid cultural activity should be
considered labour or not. Integral to this discussion will be a consideration of Marx’s
concept of species-being. In this chapter, we saw how capitalism in the stage of
hypersubsumption mutated the means of production to be effective tools of surveillance
capitalism. We also saw how surveillance capitalism descended from military technology,
and in a sense, it never left these origins, as targeting, cybernetic control and precision are
all important values of surveillance capitalism. Taken together these values make up one
of the most violent effects of surveillance capitalism—the “martial gaze.” The martial
gaze is therefore a capitalist bastardization of the human sensorium of vision. Instead of
vision, it is “visualness.” In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx discusses what he calls the
emancipation of human senses from capitalist colonization;164 this is possible only when
the sense organs become generic, human organs (as opposed to crude, non-human organs)
—they can only do this by becoming non-egotistically social through refusal of private
property: “The senses and enjoyment of other men have become my own appropriation.
Besides these direct organs, therefore, social organs develop in the form of society; thus,
for instance, activity in direct association with others, etc., has become an organ for
expressing my own life, and a mode of appropriating human life.”165 Instead of being
appropriated by an object, which is what happens in the alienating process of commodity
creation, the truly social human is able to enjoy life fully. This enjoyment comes through
164
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what Marx calls affirming the objective world—aka non-capitalist labour. By labouring
and creating an object, “man is affirmed in the objective world not only in the act of
thinking, but with all his senses.”166 The next chapter will explore the devastating effects
of contemporary capitalist production on subjectivity, labour, and the human sensorium,
illuminating the duplicitous kind of alienation unique to contemporary society, and its
effects on human species-being.
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4.

4.

« Chapter Three: Labour and Posthumanism »

In the previous chapter, we focused on the relationship between the visual data gathering
technologies deployed in regimes of ubiquitous surveillance, their martial, violent
origins, and the means and techniques of production specific to capitalism in a state of
hypersubsumption. The focus of this chapter is on the unique kind of labour and
labourers that toil within contemporary capitalism. In particular, it focuses on
characterizing network value, or the kind of value that is mined and extracted through
seemingly unproductive processes. First, I discuss Silvia Federici’s Caliban and the
Witch, which traces the development of the serf into the proletarian vis-a-vis a
mechanized paradigm, using her discussion of the transition from feudalism to primitive
accumulation and industrial capitalism as a model and stepping stone for my own
mapping of capitalism and its reliance on immaterial labour that takes “cyborg” forms.
Second, the chapter offers a summary of the field of posthumanism and its relationships
to contemporary technologies. I argue that current threads of posthumanism use too
narrow an idea of technology and labour, relying fundamentally on capitalist
categorizations of the human. Third, the chapter discusses Marx’s distinctions between
productive and unproductive labour, and constant and variable capital, calling into
question whether these distinctions still stand today, and if not, what formulations of
labour are adequate to account for the contemporary creation of surplus value. Fourth is a
discussion of unwaged immaterial labour, and an attempt to bring into focus the type of
subject who does such work, by what means, and with what motivation. This brings me
to a discussion of the special role of coercion in unwaged immaterial labour, and its
effects on subjectivity, which leads to the introduction of the term “coerced
posthumanism” to refer to the condition of myriad unwaged immaterial labourers in
contemporary society. Lastly, in order to clarify the parameters of what is meant by
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coerced post-humanism, I contrast it with what Marx calls Gattungswesen or “speciesbeing.”

4.1. « Radical Transformations »
Silvia Federici’s 2004 book, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive
Accumulation,167 traces the passage of capitalism from feudalism to capitalism and
compares it with the transition from Fordism to the post-Fordist capitalism of today. In
her account of the early moments of capitalism, Federici brings to the fore a history that
stresses the development of the proletarian body through a rationalist, mechanical
paradigm, with particular focus on the role European and American witch hunts played in
disempowering women so that they became mere vessels for the (unpaid) reproduction of
labour. By connecting the end of feudalism with the Black Death that decimated Europe’s
population, Federici shows how the plague was vital in the empowerment of the serf
class, as it gave them access to land; due to the dramatic drop in population, the
workforce had the power to demand higher wages and better working conditions.
Federici uses this transition to emphasize the class struggle already under way during
feudalism, to which the nobility, the state, and the church responded by banding together
to suppress peasant power through laws that governed workers’ behavior, criminalizing
prostitution and any sexuality that did not lead to procreation, and most importantly,
expropriating peasants from their land while simultaneously enclosing the commons. The
latter was vital for the independent life of the peasantry, as it gave them unfettered access
to food, fuel and pastures, and was a place for them—women in particular—to come
together for revelry and self-governance. According to Federici, the enclosure of the
commons coincided with the rise of misogyny and a “trade off” whereby women became
the new “common property”—men could treat them as they wanted, with little to no
punishment for violent crime, and women were divested of political power and property
ownership. At the same time, wage labour was on the rise, which further alienated
167
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workers. Already dispossessed from the land, now they were becoming expropriated from
the products of their labour—two of the four types of alienation Marx discusses in the
1844 Manuscripts.168
The rise of wage labour proceeded in concert with a state and church program to
manage workers’ physical and spiritual time, even outside the workplace, in order to
mold them into the best possible workers for capitalism—or as Federici puts it, to turn
them from workers into labour-power, “[the] pure abstraction of capitalism.”169 What is
most salient here is Federici’s formulation of the machine as the prototype for both
labour-power and the social management of labour, or in other words, the turning of the
rhythms of the body into predictable activities that could be regulated and monitored, for
“the body is the condition of the existence of labour-power.”170 The rise of the machine in
industry happened alongside the increasing instrumentalization of the body. Federici
claims that in order for workers to become abstract labour-power, the body needed to
become more machinic, which first necessitated a dehumanization:
…from the point of view of the abstraction process that the individual underwent
in the transition to capitalism, we can see that the development of the ‘human
machine’ was the main technological leap, the main step in the development of the
productive forces that took place in the period of primitive accumulation. We can
see, in other words, that the human body and not the steam engine, and not even
the clock, was the first machine developed by capitalism.171
We can see Federici’s argument in light of the transition from formal to real
subsumption in capitalism, which was discussed in the first chapter; capitalist production
could begin in earnest after sufficient resources were extracted during the period of
primitive accumulation, and its rise (formal subsumption) corresponds to the creation of
the “human machine,” through dehumanization, into abstract labour-power. Real
Karl Marx, Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin Milligan, (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1959), 31. The other two forms of alienation are alienation from oneself and
from the human “species-being,” which will be discussed more later.
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subsumption, as we saw, happened during industrialization. This chapter will use both
Federici’s argument and its structure to trace a similar development of individuals in
relation to contemporary labour and capitalism, also relating to both primitive
accumulation and something akin to dehumanization, which I will call coerced
posthumanism. I will use the framework of the discussion of the expropriation of land
from the peasantry, the dehumanization and subsequent mechanization of the body as
abstract labour-power, and the oscillation between primitive accumulation and formal
subsumption to create an parallel structure on the “other side” of history: namely, in the
period of hypersubsumption, having passed through real subsumption, capitalism makes a
series of moves against workers that are analogous to their early dehumanization and
refashioning as proletariat; if Federici’s schema moves through sovereign modes of
power to biopower, then today we must look at the state of the individual as it is
transformed by the shift from control societies to droning/surveillance capitalism. The
direction of this transformation was famously first mapped by Donna Haraway in her
landmark 1985 essay, "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and SocialistFeminism in the Late Twentieth Century,” is arguably the urtext of posthumanism (which
is ironic because Haraway explicitly disavows origins and paternity). In it, Haraway
argues for the emergence of a new kind of subject position based on the nexus between
what she calls the “informatics of domination” (akin to “societies of control”) and the
relation between cybernetics, labour and capital. This new subject is a political position
that harnesses the power of the liminal, the indeterminable, the hybrid and the
illegitimate:
A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature
of social reality as well as a creature of fiction…creatures simultaneously animal
and machine, who populate worlds ambiguously natural and crafted. Modern
medicine is also full of cyborgs, of couplings between organism and machine…
Modern production seems like a dream of cyborg colonization work, a dream that
makes the nightmare of Taylorism seem idyllic. And modern war is a cyborg orgy,
coded by C3I, command-control-communication-intelligence, an $84 billion item
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in 1984’s US defence [sic] budget. I am making an argument for the cyborg as a
fiction mapping our social and bodily reality.172
Haraway would agree with Federici that under capitalism, labour itself is dehumanizing
—it makes cyborgs of us all. Haraway underscores the role of technology in the figure of
the cyborg.. For all intents and purposes, she is pointing to what was discussed earlier as
the ‘social factory’ of hypersubsumption under capitalism, the engine of technological
progress, which it forces along in service of creating value. Haraway’s essay is one the
most celebrated anticipations of a posthuman capitalism—a topic to which we now turn.

4.2. « Threads of Posthumanism »
In the popular imagination, “posthumanism” conjures images of Terminators, advanced
artificial intelligences, killer robots who have defied their master’s directives, and human
beings with technologically-enhanced limbs, either of metal or some cross-species graft
onto the body. This is not an entirely incorrect conception; as it stands, posthumanism
encompasses all of that and more, and also complicates and deepens these images. It is a
rather murky umbrella term for a series of discourses loosely related through an interest
in technology, the body, and a suspicion of anthropocentrism and humanism.173
Recognizing the difficulty of defining posthumanism as a single coherent
conceptual framework, Matthew Gladden begins by distinguishing between two broad
types of posthumanism: analytic and synthetic. Analytic posthumanism “understands
posthumanity as a socio-technological reality that already exists in the contemporary
world and which needs to be analyzed,” while synthetic posthumanism “understands

Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist- Feminism in the
Late Twentieth Century," in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New
York: Routledge, 1991), 149-50.
172

Some of the prevailing posthumanist literature includes: Chéla Sandoval, “Re-entering
Cyberspace: Sciences of Resistance,” Dispositio 19, no. 46 (1994): 75-93; Shannon Lemoine,
“Critical Studies: Science Language Culture,” Syllabus, Stanford University; Cary Wolfe, What is
Posthumanism, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Andy Miah,
“Posthumanism: A Critical History,” in Medical Enhancements & Posthumanity, ed. Bert Gordijn
(New York: Routledge, 2007).
173

85

posthumanity as a collection of hypothetical future entities whose development can be
either intentionally realized or intentionally prevented, depending on whether or not
human society chooses to research and deploy certain transformative technologies.”174
Under synthetic posthumanism, Gladden includes science fiction, what he calls
“philosophical” posthumanism, and popular posthumanism. Under the analytic heading
he places critical and cultural posthumanism, feminist new materialism and antihumanism. Analytic posthumanism roughly focuses on the present and on understanding
socio-technical realities, rather than the future, as the conditions which form
posthumanism are unclear (since by nature it is unpredictable, mutating, etc.). The
synthetic branch, on the other hand,
…define[s] ‘posthumanity’ as a set of hypothetical future entities (such as fullbody cyborgs or artificial general intelligences) whose capacities differ from—and
typically surpass—those of natural biological human beings and whose creation
can either be intentionally brought about or intentionally blocked, depending on
whether humanity decides to develop and implement certain transformative
technologies…they conduct an exploration of power structures or trends of the
current day only insofar as these offer some insight into how future processes of
posthumanization might be directed.175
Though these categories often bleed into each other and their representative thinkers do
not make hard and fast distinctions between the topics they are interested in, taken
together, they encompass the main ideas in posthuman theory that I am interested in here.
Critical and cultural posthumanism, alongside feminist new materialism and antihumanism, often operate in tandem or in conversation with each other. Critical
posthumanism is a methodology that deconstructs humanism into non-nihilistic, lifeaffirming possibilities (thus its future-orientedness), which often come from overlooked,
unacknowledged subjects who have traditionally been structurally excluded from the
sociopolitical matrix.
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Cultural posthuman is similar to its critical counterpart, in that it also departs from
humanism and focuses on presently-existing systems. It sees posthumanism as “a state
that already exists within our contemporary world. It argues that the nature of
posthumanity can be diagnosed by applying the tools of cultural studies to analyze
elements of contemporary culture, including works of literature, film, television, music,
painting, sculpture, architecture, fashion, computer games, tabletop roleplaying games,
and religious and political speech.”176 Haraway’s cyborg is an example of both critical
and cultural posthumanism, as it is a methodology for deconstructing present binaries
using the aforementioned cultural analysis. Critical posthumanism questions the
relationship between the human, the posthuman and the non-human (and sometimes the
inhuman177) as figures of thought, as well as posthumanism as a whole as an analysis of
contemporary social conditions.
Italian theorist Rosi Braidotti is a widely recognized critical posthumanist,178
whose work often utilizes Deleuzian concepts to deconstruct and subsequently shatter
social binaries (most notably, gender) in order to laud the possibilities of new forms of
collective existence. I turn to her work not only because it offers many examples of the
logics of posthumanism as a form of politics, but also because the theorist Ray Brassier
responds to Braidotti in his critiques of posthumanism, which I will be looking at as well.
In a nod to new materialism, Braidotti also stresses the importance of human
176
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in Lyotard’s work.
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relationships with non-human entities, including the rest of the living world, in order to
slough off the anthropocentrism that plagues the “universal man” of post-Enlightenment
thought. Braidotti’s work often uses the figure of the female as a model for the
posthuman; she weaponizes normative notions of the female as the complement or other
to the male and uses this discourse to criticize the limits of humanism, which she sees as
inscribed on the body and liberated through technological experimentation. The figure of
the female—which is not limited to those identifying as women, but is rather a social
position that is currently occupied by minoritarian figures and also holds the potential to
be occupied by others in the future179—has the power to deconstruct the very binaries of
its origin: “Non-linearity, non-fixity and non-unitary subjectivity are the priority, and they
are situated in close proximity to woman, the native, the dispossessed, the abused, the
excluded, the “other” of the high-tech clean and efficient bodies that contemporary
culture sponsors.”180 Braidotti’s point highlights the Western world’s reliance and even
parasitism on “other” bodies which feeds contemporary culture’s investment in sanitized
bodies—the “poor, low tech and unclean” are the necessary other side to the “First
World” as they provide raw material for extraction in the constant cycle of primitive
accumulation and formal subsumption.181
Braidotti’s work, which displays the common thread between different types of
mainstream posthumanisms, has been scathingly criticized by Ray Brassier, who
describes it a plagued with an overall ontological xenophobia: “All-inclusive posthumanism supplants exclusionary humanism as the politically “progressive” optic
consonant with the liberal ideal of inclusiveness that has become the humanities’ critical
Braidotti uses Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-woman” from A Thousand Plateaus
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) to further explore the confrontation between
ontology and power.
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lodestone. Emancipation is no longer of the human; it is from the human as exclusionary
category.”182 According to Brassier, posthumanism first re-naturalizes the human on the
continuum of biological capacities with other living organisms. Then, in many threads of
posthumanism, technology is identified as a meta-capacity that allows humans to redefine
themselves: to act on and change their own capacities. Because many strands of
posthumanism place a premium on creativity as a road to liberation, they often become
entangled with techno-utopianism in one form or another, believing that technology
offers new means to tap into creative potential. Brassier turns to Braidotti’s posthuman
theory for examples of the many issues that crop up with these formulations of
posthumanism, which are awash with the tropes of hybridity, entanglement and
assemblage that are ubiquitous in posthumanist writing.
If critical posthumanism’s insistence on the creative and liberatory potential of the
dispossessed seems familiar, it is because it aligns well with the way autonomist Marxism
insists on the collective creativity of the working class as the revolutionary power that has
the potential to topple capitalism, an idea especially important to Hardt and Negri.
Posthumanism does not focus on class warfare, however. Braidotti claims that
posthumanism resists just being another proponent of the acceleration of capitalism by
creating “transversal subjects” based on Deleuze’s concept of a “missing people.”183 As
Brassier points out, Braidotti in particular, following Deleuze, calls the dispossessed of
capitalism “the missing people,” and goes on to point out that “it is telling that the
categories in terms of which she nominates the ‘missing’—i.e., indigenous, feminist,
queer, otherwise abled, et al.—are identifications of the excluded already acknowledged
by capitalist neoliberalism, rather than indices of the unpresentable capable of destroying
its logic of incorporation (i.e. subsumption under value). What is ‘missing’ for Braidotti
is simply whatever is not yet included.”184 Instead of the necessary focus on analyzing
capitalism in order to abolish the warring social forms it creates in order to survive and
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thrive, posthumanism relies on this “creative affirmation,” but “because it is wholly
immanent to the logic of capital, the counter-actualization of virtual potencies required by
Braidotti’s hope is effectively the cultivation of empowerment within existing social
relations.”185 In other words, this form of posthumanism not only relies on the social
categories created by capitalism, but it also reifies and affirms them, externalizing various
social collectivities and thereby rendering them static and capable of exploitation and
extraction by capitalism. This model of posthumanism will be referred to later as part of
coerced posthumanism, which depends on the valorized labour of self-abstraction,
masked as sociality. We shall also discuss how Marx’s concept of species-being is the
latter’s necessary antithesis.

4.3. « Value Today: Productive and Unproductive Labour »
To understand the processes of coerced posthumanism under hypersubsumption, and the
ways in which it exceeds the technological domination of the workplace under real
subsumption, we need to examine Marx’s categories of “productive” and “unproductive”
labour. According to Marx, labour under capitalism can either be productive or
unproductive. In the age of immaterial labour and the social factory, understanding
traditional distinctions between productive and unproductive labour is crucial, because
they play a role in theoretical understandings of both labour and the social factory. Does
immaterial labour obey the labour theory of value? Is it productive or unproductive
labour? Is some or all of it not labour at all? According to Marx, productive labour is
abstract labour-power that directly creates surplus value. In addition, it is only productive
waged labour that produces capital. While productive labour is necessarily a prime object
of study in Capital, unproductive labour is given far less treatment, because Marx sees it
as ancillary (though necessary) to bourgeois capitalist production.
Unproductive labour is labour which is exchanged directly with revenue (wages,
profit, rent or interest) or labour which does not produce value. This category of
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unproductive labour includes the labour of (re) producing the proletariat,
supervisory activities and circulation activities.186
The labour theory of value, which underpins traditional Marxist accounts of the creation
of capitalist value, states that the value of a commodity is determined by the socially
necessary labour time it takes to produce it. The value being referred to, however, is the
value that is realized in circulation, by sale in the market.
Circulation labour includes sales and purchasing, accounting, advertising, legal
services, etc. According to Marx, circulation labour is unproductive of value because it
merely records or facilitates transactions that are exchanges of equivalent values—the
exchanges of commodities for money—which themselves produce no surplus value but
only change equal values into other forms. Reproductive labour, or the work that assists
the labourer in reproducing themselves, often domestic labour, is considered
unproductive, though the labourer cannot reproduce themselves (and thus retain their
unique status as commodity and labour-power) without this unproductive labour. The
unproductive labour of reproduction thus produces labour-power itself. Supervisory
labour entails management of the labour of production workers, and cannot be considered
socially necessary labour as it is only necessary under capitalism because of class
antagonisms between capitalists and workers over working conditions. These distinctions
were made by Marx to refer to conditions found primarily under industrial capitalism and
factory labour (not to mention the large quantities of supervisory labour and circulation
labour that must have been at work in other parts of the globe, where imperialist
tendencies made sure that primitive accumulation never ended).
Now we must ask how to characterize contemporary forms of labour in light of
the creation of value and surplus value, and whether Marx’s categories can be applied
today. As was discussed earlier, Marx himself predicted the capitalist mobilization of the
general intellect—general social knowledge becoming a direct force of production—
facilitated through sophisticated technology. As the general intellect is formed under
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capitalism, it transforms the processes of social life itself, and social production—not
merely economic activity—is transformed according to capitalist production. As we have
seen, this happens after the real subsumption of capitalism, after technological advances
are driven by, not merely co-opted for, the production of surplus value. The condition
which I have been calling hypersubsumption, the stage of contemporary capitalist
domination that brings together immaterial labour and the social factory vis-a-vis the
development of network technology (in a parasitic relationship with extractive
accumulation in certain parts of the globe) is the real world culmination of Marx’s
prophetic writings.
I argue that “network value,” as theorized by Matteo Pasquinelli,187 can be
analyzed by examining Marx’s concepts of productive and unproductive labour and
constant and variable capital, under a contemporary lens. In doing so, we will see that
that network value is the product of posthuman labour, characterized by a particular type
of coercion. I argue that the posthuman itself, rather than being a critical category or
subject position, refers instead to a form of labour—namely, the labour that emerges
under hypersubsumption and produces network value.
Pasquinelli uses the term “network value” to characterize the value generated
through the gathering of collective knowledge and behavior via dataveillance: “If a
commodity is described traditionally by use-value and exchange-value, network-value is
a further layer attached to the previous ones to describe its ‘social’ relations. This term is
ambiguous, as it might simply point to a ‘value of networks’ (as in Benkler’s muchcelebrated ‘wealth of networks’. To be more precise, a new notion of network surplusvalue should be advanced and articulated here. Indeed, PageRank produces what Deleuze
and Guattari have described as a “machinic surplus-value,”188referring to the surplusvalue accumulated through the cybernetic domain.”189 The concept of network surplus
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value folds machinic surplus value (surplus value gathered from the cybernetic realm)
into cognitive capitalism, which is the favored way of describing profit created through
the general intellect, including not only dataveillance but also the expansion of creative
intellectual labour facilitated by digital technologies and an intensification of cultural
labour.
How should we characterize the activities performed online by billions every day
— including shopping, gaming, social media, email and more? In order to do so, we need
to examine the relationship between human labour and algorithmic AI, which facilitates
many of these activities, the types of production native to these forms of activity and their
relationship to capitalism, and finally, the relationship of these activities to class
composition vis-à-vis access to the means of production. As I have noted before, forms of
subsumption are fundamentally imbricated with technological development for the
purposes of capital. Subsumption is what allows capitalism to actualize its goal of selfvalorization through the creation of surplus value, for it is only with real subsumption
that labour power itself comes fully under the capitalist mode of production. As Marx
wrote: “…this inherent tendency of the capital relation does not become adequately
realized—it does not become indispensable, and that also means technologically
indispensable—until the specific capitalist mode of production and hence the real
subsumption of labour under capital has developed.”190 The complete subsumption of
labour under capitalism means that all labour becomes abstract labour-power. As we have
seen, there is an inherent contradiction between labour and capitalism—namely, that
capitalism’s ultimate goal is to get rid of variable capital, i.e., labour. However, value
cannot be made without labour, so capitalism must always try to subsume further kinds of
work under its umbrella, all the while attempting to extend labour time as much as
possible.
According Marx’s account, in order to make commodities that then go into
circulation and realize surplus value for the capitalist, labourers must interact with the
means of production—namely, machinery and raw materials. In Capital: Vol. 1, Marx
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distinguishes between two kinds of capital: variable and constant. Variable capital refers
to the wages paid to labour-power, or the value invested in labour-power, or labour-power
itself, while constant capital is the means of production, meaning machinery and raw
materials used during the production process. Variable capital both creates new value and
preserves the value of constant capital. Constant capital contributes to value in another
way—the value of machinery and materials is preserved and transferred to new products
only by its interaction with living labour: “While productive labour is changing the
means of production into constituent elements of a new product, their value undergoes a
metempsychosis. It deserts the consumed body, to occupy the newly created one.”191
Because constant capital is itself a product of labour, it transfers its value to new products
as its use value is expended; thus, it is not able to create new value as such. Constant
capital is embodied in the means of production. I will come back to the significance of
embodiment vis-a-vis constant capital later.
Labour preserves the value of constant capital in the labouring process. According
to Marx, this ability to preserve value is another unique quality of living labour-power—
along with the dual character of being both commodity and producer of commodities.
The labour of repairing machines (as an example of the main form of constant capital we
are concerned with here) is considered part of the original value of the machine, and
depreciation of value due to wear and tear is a natural part of its use. Labour-power
produces surplus value by creating exchange value over and above the amount it takes to
reproduce itself (represented by, but not necessarily actually equal to, wages paid).
Similarly, labour-power preserves the value in constant capital by using it (its use value is
the purpose of its value) to create new products. All of this created value is given by
labour-power to the capitalist, as Marx ruthlessly points out: “The property therefore
which labour-power in action, living labour, possesses of preserving value, at the same
time that it adds it, is a gift of Nature which costs the labourer nothing, but which is very
advantageous to the capitalist inasmuch as it preserves the existing value of his capital.
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So long as trade is good, the capitalist is too much absorbed in money-grubbing to take
notice of this gratuitous gift of labour.”192
To recap, Marx differentiates between productive and unproductive labour. The
former refers to labour that directly produces value, while the latter—including
circulatory labour, the reproduction of labour and the overseeing of labour (e.g.,
managerial duties)—supports this process but does not itself produce value. Labourpower produces value directly through its work producing commodities, which is
achieved through labour using raw materials and machinery—a.k.a. the means of
production—in the labour-process. Marx distinguishes between the investments capital
makes into labour and into the means of production; while both are forms of capital,
waged labour is variable capital while machinery and raw materials are constant capital.
At first glance it can appear that Marx contrasts constant and variable capital
because, as the name suggests, constant capital lasts—of course raw materials are used up
in the production process but machinery stands and continues to be useful through
multiple shifts and even many generations of workers. But upon further inspection, it is
made clear that like variable capital, machinery does not last forever; its life is just very
long (machines rusting, etc.). Furthermore, routine machine maintenance should be seen
as an analogue to the necessary reproduction of labour power. However, under Marx’s
account the reproduction of labour is considered unproductive labour and does not create
value as such, whereas the maintenance of constant capital is proactively considered in its
value, and is thus part of what is “preserved” through labour. Traditionally, variable
capital is waged labour, and wages are used by the labourer as part of their reproduction
(to buy food, shelter, leisure, etc.). This is all a normal part of Marx’s account of labourpower as a special kind of commodity, and refers only to the abstract labour that the
worker does in their capacity as a waged employee. But what about the unwaged labour
done by most people in society today? What does that type of labour create, sustain or
reproduce?
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4.4. « Social Labour and Net-work »
According to Marx’s scathing critique of the so-called “free labour market,” a worker is
“free” to sell their labour to a particular capitalist, or not. He makes explicit the
consequences of not selling one’s labour—not participating in “free exchange”—which is
lack of wages, and therefore lack of subsistence for oneself and one’s family. In other
words, during the industrial revolution the choices were very simple: work or die.
However, as drone and technology theorist Mark Andrejevic puts it: “More work needs to
be done to define what might be meant by exploitation in unwaged labour contexts to
bolster the critique of exploitation in the digital economy and to address the way in which
it is so often dismissed (for failing to acknowledge the benefits and pleasures received by
those engaged in various forms of free labour).”193 In other words, the simple exchange
between proletariat and capitalist is no longer adequate to describe the kind of complex
interplays of today’s globalized techno-capitalism with its material and immaterial
instantiations.
Andrejevic’s work also allows us to explicitly consider exploitation/coercion,
surveillance, digital labour, network value and pleasure together, and is worth quoting at
length:
The extraction of the value of information gathered about users relies on the same
logic of resource enclosure and the consequent asymmetry of power relations that
structure the “freely” agreed upon surrender of control over personal
information…The goal of comprehensive surveillance is to discover those levers
that allow marketers to channel consumer behavior according to commercial
imperatives—to relegate the consumer to the role of feedback mechanism in an
accelerating cycle of production and consumption…The capture of personal
information turns our own activity against ourselves. Marx describes this as
estrangement or alienation…It is the sign of a certain kind of material luxury to be
able to be exploited online—to have the leisure time and resources to engage in
the activities that are monitored and tracked.194
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While workplace surveillance initially began as a way to track productivity, with the
advent of digital labour it has morphed into its own mode of production. The surveillance
and capture of personal information, as Andrejevic puts it, is the interface between user
generated data and market value; in other words, it is algorithmic surveillance and its
subsequent sorting that turns mere data into valuable information to be acted upon. What
is vital here is that the structure of the mining of freely-given personal information in
exchange for or as a form of luxury follows the coercive logic of the free market, despite
not taking place strictly at the marketplace.
This distinction between the space of “the marketplace” and the domestic sphere,
the sphere of personal enjoyment or leisure time, is vital to exploitation and alienation.
Just as classical Marxism and the political economy it critiqued did not count
reproductive labour as value-producing labour (though Marx at least acknowledged it
was part of the circuit of labour as unproductive labour), so does contemporary capitalism
exploit the difficulty of describing the kinds of digital activity and personal data creation
that are being surveilled and mined. One of the most useful techniques for claiming that
this type of activity is not labour is achieved through a twisted appropriation of Marx’s
critiques of capitalism; labour and leisure time are separated, and since labour is
alienating, it is not pleasurable or willingly engaged in, except as a contract. Therefore,
the production of network value, which is so imbricated with pleasure and personal
identity, must not be work. After all, it is called “personal information” is so termed
because a person directly produces it through their activity, which could be construed as
the exact opposite of alienation. However, this distinction is entirely misleading, because
as Panos Kompatsiaris writes: “The ‘pleasure in work’ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010),
or work as the site where one is most capable of realizing ideas and desires (Smith 2013,
37), coincides with creative modes of capital accumulation (Vishmidt 2013). Life
becomes work and work becomes life, although neither in Marx’s sense nor in the sense
of the early avant-gardes, who hoped for the dissolution of art into life…it is capitalism
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that has colonized the very fabric of human desire and emotion.”195 Andrejevic, though a
proponent of the distinction between waged immaterial labour and other activities that
engage with the network, agrees that “[t]he fact of exploitation need not prevent workers
from taking a certain pleasure in their craft or in the success of a collaborative effort well
done. Nor is it the case that accounts of exploitation necessarily denigrate the activities or
the meanings they may have for those who participate in them rather than the social
relations that underwrite expropriation and alienation. The point of a critique of
exploitation is neither to disparage the pleasures of workers nor the value of the tasks
being undertaken.”196 In other words, just because something is enjoyable or pleasurable
does not mean it is not work.
We have already seen how “work becomes life” within the social factory,
culminating in the movement from real subsumption to hypersubsumption, or the full
imbrication of capitalism with all forms of life in addition to all parts of the productionexchange-consumption cycle. We have also seen how that cycle has become disrupted,
disjointed, and otherwise malleable in its order with the advent of control societies and
their diffuse forms of power, as opposed to the institutional controls most prevalent under
regimes of biopower.
We have also discussed how the nature of production and forms of productive
labour change under hypersubsumption. Now we have to look at the effects on workers as
well. While immaterial labour relates to the general intellect as a direct force of
production, the emergence of network value also means valuation occurs outside of
traditional labour time. The unwaged labour of creating network value seems to have a lot
in common with both reproductive labour and unproductive labour, but does not neatly fit
into either category. Unlike productive labour, which utilizes abstract labour power, is
waged, and directly creates surplus value, the work that goes into “networking” does not
directly create value. It is also not done in direct relation to other capitalist means of
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production or labour—it does not oversee or administrate other labour, and does not have
an identifiable locale in a workplace hierarchy. On the other hand, unlike reproductive
labour, network labour does not strictly or necessarily reproduce the worker. Rather, the
work that one does browsing social media, buying online goods, answering emails, and
interacting with smart devices (to name a few things that create network value) seems to
create a kind of social value for individuals that do these activities.
While the existence of this social value seems to neatly correspond with Hardt
and Negri’s social factory, I believe their “socialized” or “diffuse” worker concept is
inadequate to characterize the kind of humanity that interacts with these contemporary
modes of value and production. Hardt and Negri define the socialized worker as
“characterised by a hybrid of material and immaterial labouring activities linked together
in social and productive networks by highly developed labouring co-operation.”197 The
socialized worker refers to the subject of waged immaterial labour, whose products and
means/modes of production necessarily ripple out beyond the factory walls and create the
invisible social factory.
Early attempts to qualify the type of work and exploitation of post-Fordist
capitalism include Alvin Toffler’s “prosumer,” or producer-user-consumer, and its
subsequent partner the “produsage,” coined by Axel Bruns to describe the material
conditions that accompany the prosumer. These concepts are important because they
recognize immaterial labour’s structural changes not only in work but in subjectivity.
Hardt and Negri discuss the “socialized worker,” who later morphs into a member of the
“multitude” they reference in the title of their book, and whose struggle is not “limited to
waged labour but must refer to human creative capacities in all their generality.”198 They
do away with the definition of the proletariat as anybody who does work in exchange for
a wage, which is too restrictive to describe the constant composition and decomposition
of contemporary class struggles, as well as the ability of people to participate in more
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than one struggle. However, “multitude” is still inadequate to describe the exchange(s)
going on between users of telecoms and the owners of those systems. For one, users are
not interacting with the owners themselves, like a capitalist and a worker meeting at the
marketplace, nor is this quite like Marx’s description of commodity fetishism, wherein
commodities meet each other in the marketplace, inanimate objects standing in place of
human social relations, given unnatural life via reification. Rather, users are interacting
with the means of production themselves, as the means and the products are one and the
same on the users’ end (e.g., Instagram, where the platform itself is the both the means of
taking, editing and distributing images, and the site at which images are viewed by
others, thereby growing an individual’s Instagram profile), and the process of extraction
and valuation takes a much less linear path than before. Crucially, the “multitude” also
does not account for the primary method by which the value of immaterial labour is
extracted, which is through the integration of diffuse surveillance.
Here we can return to Shosanna Zuboff’s work on surveillance capitalism. She
writes: “It is inaccurate to think of Google’s users as its customers: there is no economic
exchange, no price, and no profit. Nor do users function in the role of workers. When a
capitalist hires workers and provides them with wages and means of production, the
products that they produce belong to the capitalist to sell at a profit. Not so here. Users
are not paid for their labour, nor do they operate the means of production.”199 Using the
Google search engine is just one example of the extraction of network value, but the
premises apply more generally. Though they may have jobs that provide them with
traditional waged labour, users—in this case shorthand for anybody who utilizes
networked digital platforms—are not only not paid for the time they spend on platforms,
but they also do not create products per se. Generally speaking, what users generate is
data—particularly behavioral data—simply by being online, using apps, smart devices,
social media and other platforms. Crucially important to remember is that this is also not
just data about individuals, but also collective, cooperative data, which traces the social
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relations between users. This data is what is captured, or mined, by algorithms and then
processed into an exchangeable good.
Thinkers like Zuboff characterize this shift in the productive circuit as a both a
change of focus from production to consumption and from mass consumption to
individually tailored, or targeted, needs. She also explicitly connects this form of
valuation with exploitation and alienation: “Under this new regime, the precise moment
at which our needs are met is also the precise moment at which our lives are plundered
for behavioral data, and all for the sake of others’ gain. The result is a perverse amalgam
of empowerment inextricably layered with diminishment.”200 Yet to think of users as
consumers that have merely shifted the production cycle from production-consumption to
consumption-predictive behavioral analytics-production misses the relationship between
users and labour and the profound effects of network value on both.
In a separate article, Zuboff makes more explicit the relationship between what
she calls surveillance capitalism, or the process that creates value from the extraction of
user-generated big data, and its appeal as a tool of individuation and subjectivity (and
therefore pleasure):
The extractive processes that make big data possible typically occur in the
absence of dialogue or consent, despite the fact that they signal both facts and
subjectivities of individual lives. These subjectivities travel a hidden path to
aggregation and decontextualization, despite the fact that they are produced as
intimate and immediate, tied to individual projects and contexts (Nissembaum,
2011). Indeed, it is the status of such data as signals of subjectivities that makes
them most valuable for advertisers. For Google and other “big data” aggregators,
however, the data are merely bits. Subjectivities are converted into objects that
repurpose the subjective for commodification.201
In other words, users only interact with the surface functions of various digital
instruments and platforms. Their experience is one of pleasure and social participation,
albeit after they have agreed to very stringent user agreements, which give the user the
choice to either consent to the terms of the agreements, or lose access to the platforms. It
200
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is within these service agreements that “consent” is obtained to harvest the data users
slough off in their engagement. Data-mining and refining occurs at a level other than
participation because one necessarily needs access to the technological infrastructure—
a.k.a. the means of production—in order to capture and sort through this data, making it
actionable as value. This capture is possible because of the surveillant nature of these
platforms, prompting many to offer solutions based on privacy and individual
renumeration for one’s data. However, the call for solutions rooted in thinking of data as
private property and calling for companies to pay individuals for it are based in liberal
ideas of privacy, property and money that ultimately perpetuate the logics of abstraction
and are therefore integral to capitalist violence. Unlike in the industrial factory,
exploitation and abstraction are less easily felt by most users precisely because rather
than giving something away (their labour, for example), they are in fact gaining a form of
capitalist sociality:
Big Other is institutionalized in the automatic undetectable functions of a global
infrastructure that is also regarded by most people as essential for basic social
participation. The tools on offer by Google and other surveillance capitalist firms
respond to the needs of beleaguered second modernity individuals—like the apple
in the garden, once tasted they are impossible to live without. When Facebook
crashed in some US cities for a few hours during the summer of 2014, many
Americans called their local emergency services at 911 (LA Times, 2014).
Google’s tools are not the objects of a value exchange. They do not establish
constructive producer-consumer reciprocities. Instead they are the ‘hooks’ that
lure users into extractive operations and turn ordinary life into the daily renewal
of a 21st-century Faustian pact. This social dependency is at the heart of the
surveillance project. Powerfully felt needs for effective life vie against the
inclination to resist the surveillance project.202
In the above quotation, Zuboff characterizes the tools of technological infrastructure as
“hooks” that lure users into their own exploitation. In the same breath, however, she
acknowledges the form of social participation that has emerged under this infrastructure
as a form of life essential to most people in today’s world. I agree that networked
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infrastructures do not "establish constructive producer-consumer reciprocities,” because
reciprocity has turned into unilateral extraction of a new resource: data.
This returns us to the gaps in “the multitude;” while Hardt and Negri and theorists
of prosumers and produsage are very successful in emphasizing the entanglement of
labour and life that happens when creativity and intellect become forces of production,
they still focus their analyses on productive and waged work. Hardt and Negri focus on
struggle, but do not do justice to the vital other side of the coin at work in creating
network value: pleasure. While all forms of capitalist market relations rely on coercion
and exploitation, under contemporary capitalism there is a new element of pleasure/desire
added to the coercion that was largely unnecessary before (see chapter two’s discussion
of Althusser and IRAs/SRAs). Tiziana Terranova, in “Free Labour: Producing Culture for
the Digital Economy,” captures the coercive, pleasurable and unwaged elements of
multiple facets of the creation of network value through her explanation of “free labour,”
which is “both voluntarily given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited.”203 Both Terranova
and Lazzarato, in his original formulation of immaterial labour, acknowledge that the
concept extends past traditional waged work and has become a potentiality of the
subjectivity of every postindustrial subject as a whole. For Lazzarato, the creation of
affects and cultural products is a key part of immaterial labour, even when it is unwaged,
which would seem to include the type of activities done by most people online.
There are some theorists who object to the classification of online leisure
activities as labour. For example, Mark Andrejevic argues that precisely because this type
of activity is not done under threat of force, it is voluntary, and thus cannot be
exploitative—a key characteristic of labour under capitalism. However, as Terranova later
notes, “while [labourers] may not be forcefully compelled to join these networks, the
threat of social isolation and communicative seclusion may be compulsion enough to get
them ‘working.’ This is in addition to the biopolitical influence of normalized action and
behaviour that compels individuals into joining these networks because that is where their
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peers are. Thus, while this labour is not compelled through the use of physical force,
there are other powerful forms of compulsion that motivate the produser into action.”204
Terranova’s route is to describe the type of activities being done to produce culture during
“free time” as a form of free, or unwaged labour. She rightly emphasizes the finer
distinctions that must be made between violent and non-violent, sometimes unconscious
forms of coercion. To review, Terranova and Lazzarato consider cultural production to be
an unwaged form of the immaterial labour discussed at length in earlier chapters, while
Hardt and Negri consider the socialized worker, or member of the multitude, as they
relate to the changes the establishment of the social factory (through real subsumption)
has wrought in class composition and subjectivity.
What would happen if we considered the people using these tools and
participating in new forms of “effective life” under the co-operating categories of
unproductive labour and constant capital? Do we need to consider unwaged labour—
specifically the type that is done through network technologies—as sustaining a form of
constant capital? If so, does that make the person (not the generic worker) doing unwaged
work in their so-called “free time” a type of machine? This returns us to the role of
coercion, pleasure and categories of labour.

4.5. « Coerced Posthumanism »
In order to discover how network value and immaterial labour are related to coercive
posthumanism and capitalist hypersubsumption, we need to look at the roles of pleasure,
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visibility and interpellation in these new forms of work.205 In an article on social
networks and MySpace (the early-2000s precursor to Facebook that has long since fallen
out of fashion), Mark Cote and Jennifer Pybus attempt to categorize immaterial labour in
the digital age, or what Terranova refers to as “free labour.” Their focus on social
networking creates a simplified but effective picture of the desires, social systems and
subjectivities involved in activities that generate network value. A site like MySpace
made very clear the importance of creating a visible, narratable self-subject that can
interact with and be acknowledged by others on the site. Cote and Pybus claim that “The
‘producibility’ of the subjects in relation to broadcast media can be contrasted with the
‘productivity’ of immaterial labour 2.0 in social networks like MySpace.”206 Following
the Frankfurt School, whose subjects were produced through capitalist ideology, the
subjects of late capitalism are voraciously self-productive. This means that users of digital
networks are not simply either consuming media, producing content that can be mined for
value, or refining the technologies that make up the infrastructure of various platforms—
though they do all of these things too; rather, as Jason Read notes in The Micro-Politics of
The requirement of capitalist society that the proletariat selling their labour on the free market
is very similar to Locke’s concept of “tacit consent,” an integral part of law and order government
based on the ownership of private property. In his “Second Treatise of Civil Government” he
explains tacit consent thusly: “Every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of
the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged
to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it.” (John
Locke, Two Treatises on Government (London: Printed for R. Butler, etc., 1821), published
digitally by Bartleby.com in 2010, www.bartleby.com/169/.) For Locke, tacit consent is given
negatively through a lack of action—i.e., not explicitly refusing to be part of a political structure.
If one is not happy being part of a government, one can simply leave. It is, however, extremely
obvious how difficult and problematic this would be in the current geopolitical climate, where
nearly every piece of land is owned by some government, not to mention the financial privilege
necessary to move freely from country to country, and the racialized control of migration. The
mention of Locke and the role of coercion in the process he describes provides an important
analogy between the individual’s usage of network technology and globalized capitalism, and
whether (and in what way) we consent to using these. Locke focuses on stability, protection and
social access as reasons one would live in a governed society and submit to the subsequent
obligations. He does not discuss the role of pleasure in coercion and society, nor the stakes of
social participation on a superstructural level. When applying his thinking to our contemporary
society, it is clear that while one is technically free to exit the social arena of citizenship or labour,
the consequences for doing so are so dire that the choice not to participate cannot be called a
choice in good faith.
205

Mark Cote and Jennifer Pybus, “Learning to Immaterial Labour 2.0: MySpace and Social
Networks,” ephemera: theory & politics in organization 7, no. 1 (2007): 90.
206

105

Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present, “[m]utation of the instrument does not
simply alter what can be produced, or how, but it falls back on the process, transforming
the producer himself or herself. The production of things is also always an autopoiesis, a
production of the one producing—a production of subjectivity. As Marx writes with
respect to the labourer, ‘through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes
it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature.’”207
As Hegel made clear, recognizing and being recognized are the fundamental
characteristics of subjectivity; in other words, Marx’s insistence that subjectivity is
fundamentally a social phenomenon follows on the heels of his intellectual ancestor,
Hegel. While surveillance is unidirectional, and precludes mutual recognition, the
omnidirectional nature of interactions on digital platforms necessitate recognition and
therefore create subjectivities. In fact, without these platforms, people would not have
access to a large swath of intersubjective relations. However, we also must remember that
the surveillance being performed on users is fundamentally exploitative, and therefore the
subjectivities being produced are necessarily impoverished or exploited as well. This is
subjectivity under hypersubsumption: the creation of the subjective exclusively through
capitalist technologies. Waged immaterial and material labour creates workers, but
unwaged immaterial labour creates posthumans.
Workers creating their own subjectivities and bolstering market efficacy through
consumption is the epitome of hypersubsumption. While under real subsumption,
technological systems have fully become instruments of capitalist production and in turn
produce other instruments of capitalist production without any constant intervention on
the part of the capitalist, hypersubsumption takes this logic into the production of
individuation by controlling temporality and thereby subsuming future potentialities and
the horizon of social life. While previously it was appropriate to speak of “inside” and
“outside” capitalism and then to declare that there was no outside, the spatial analogy has
given way to a temporal one, with control networks acting on the virtual level (in the
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Deleuzian sense). By transforming living labour into constant capital, hypersubsumption
attempts to achieve capitalism’s dream of eliminating labour while increasing surplus
value.
For Marx, to be human is both to work and to create one’s self as social being
through work—the ultimate expression of human species-being is work as expression of
potentiality. Under hypersubsumption, work does not affirm the human as species-being,
but rather affirms the human by continually creating and renewing itself via technological
reality. It is this labour of creation and renewal through capitalist platforms that I would
characterize as posthuman labour. In addition, rather than this being labour done by the
posthuman merely as the appropriate expression of labour for the posthuman figure,
posthumanism itself is defined by labour; there is no posthuman outside of the coerced,
exploitative labour described here.
Under previous forms of capitalism, alienated workers laboured for others,
without direct ownership of the means of production, while capitalism attempted to guide
their subjectivities by indirectly controlling leisure activities, and eventually, under
biopower, the moral and psychological aspects of life. With the advent of
hypersubsumption, alienated workers no longer work on objects outside themselves that
then become commodities that take on the social life proper. Instead, the sociality created
through alienation during “leisure time” is taken as a marker of successful individuation
and pleasure. The posthuman is therefore a labour-relation, and the possibilities for
posthumanism depend on existence within capitalism, where posthumanism labour is full
social and erotic participation.
The posthuman is a renewable source of “free labour,” which means that seizing
the means of production under hypersubsumption would affect not just non-human
material structures but subjective and libidinal investments as well. But we have already
established that posthuman labour is not labour in the traditional sense, in that it does not
operate according to the labour theory of value and does not produce commodities
directly. So how do we characterize this form of labour?
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Posthuman labour is split into two aspects that work in tandem: unproductive
labour and constant capital. Rather than maintaining the worker for future labour, in this
case unproductive labour is the reproductive work of self-management. This is the selfreplicating labour of the worker creating themselves through the process of extraction:
the extraction of data, particularly behavioral data, for surplus value, and the activities on
various platforms that make this possible, which created a positive feedback loop that
produces the datafied subject even as it extracts from it. The worker is not creating new
value but labouring to maintain themselves so that a company like Google can extract the
value from that metadata. Marx likens this parasitic relationship to vampirism: “Capital is
dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more,
the more labour it sucks.”208 Here is Marx’s vampire of capital come to life—not simply
sucking the blood of living labour but transforming living labour not into abstract, dead
labour (commodities) but into a new army of the undead who can then only exist by
feeding on life themselves.
The transformation from dead labour into vampirism is fitting, as unproductive
labour does not itself directly create value. But there is something continually created and
preserved that capitalism extracts in order to create value, and this can be described using
Marx’s account of the way value is preserved by constant capital. Recall what Marx says
about the connection between productive labour and machines (a form of constant
capital): “While productive labour is changing the means of production into constituent
elements of a new product, [constant capital’s] value undergoes a metempsychosis. It
deserts the consumed body, to occupy the newly created one.”209 This metempsychosis,
or transmigration of the spirit into a new body upon the death of its old body, is used by
Marx to describe the way value is preserved in constant capital. Both the value that goes
into the initial creation of the machine (I will primarily use the machine iteration of
constant capital, because although the same principle applies to the other iteration— raw
materials—it is harder to see because raw materials are destroyed during their use) and
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the value of repair and maintenance is figured into the overall value of machines at
inception. Their value is preserved by “migrating” to the living labour of the worker
using them to create commodities with direct exchange value. Value moves from the
body of constant capital to the body of the worker.
Network value, however, is not produced directly by a worker. Instead, it is the
by-product, a kind of raw material, which is harvested and can only be made into value
through technological intervention. The users who produce this raw material are not
engaged in productive labour, yet they indirectly produce value simply through the
creation and maintenance of their network species-being. Going on social media, creating
“wishlists” on Amazon, using LinkedIn to network and search for jobs—all of these
tailored platforms create and maintain hyper-individualized users whose only way of
partaking of the vast pleasurable and useful offerings of digitized culture at large is
through these platforms and their smart hardware counterparts. Participation is itself a
form of creation, and of the reproduction, through refinement, of user personae. The user
becomes constant capital, a machine who does not create value but whose value is
preserved in its transmigration from the user body to the digital body, back and forth,
over and over, while new value is created by technological interfaces such as AIs and
algorithms. The user has become the vampire, feeding on its own life by feeding that life
to extractive mechanisms. Even stranger still, if users have become constant capital, and
hence, per classic Marxist theory, do not create new value but whose value is preserved
and exploited through use by digital machines, then in a way the conventional valuelabour relation is inverted entirely. By sucking not labour but life itself (in the form of
information vis-à-vis data) from both waged and non-waged activities, algorithmic AI
actually usurps the value-producing function Marx presented as exclusively human.
Furthermore, under hypersubsumption, algorithmic AI and digital platforms have now
become a requirement for the forms of life upon which they are parasitic. There is a
double reversal: a) the human user becomes constant capital, and b) machinery becomes
“living labour” as AI. Under surveillance capitalism, network value actually comes from
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machinic labour that digital programs “do” to posthumans, whose labour has now
become the work of never-ending self-reproduction into capitalist sociality.
To sum up, there are two key aspects of posthumanism as coerced labour, or what
we can simply call coerced posthumanism (because posthumanism is itself this labour).
The first is that it is unproductive and does not directly create value, but instead has
become a form of reproductive labour where reproduction and maintenance are
equivalent. At the same time what is maintained and reproduced is a new body, a new
species-being possible only through interface with certain technologies. However,
maintenance may not be the right word, because in this case the act is highly pleasurable,
and has its own eroticism through access to singular forms of networked social life. Not
only that, but willing assimilation into these new social forms is necessary for many
aspects of a fulfilling and comfortable existence, as digital avatars and network
connections are now required for many forms of employment, friendship and civic
engagement.
The second aspect of coerced posthumanism is that the posthuman has become
constant capital—a vampire who is “dead” in Marx’s sense of capital being dead, only
able to make value through feeding on abstracted living labour—because it does not
directly create value but instead feeds on its own self-reproduction in a kind of erotic
autophagia. These feedings merely maintain and refresh the posthuman body as a repair
to a machine, but exchange value is created only when the vampiric act itself is captured
and siphoned off. It is not life-activity that hypersubsumed capitalism extracts and turns
into profitable information, but the vampiric activity of constant capital maintaining and
repairing itself. It is easy to confuse this for life-activity, because in a sense this form of
being has become life. This species-being of vampires has a true sociality and its own
sensorium, like Marx’s original species-being. The distinction is that this posthuman
species-being made possible through capitalism is not truly social and not truly free,
because it is only the by-product of coercion and alienation from the means of
production. In this case, the human itself has become a means of production in the most
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literal sense—that of being constant capital—and is glad to self-alienate for the pleasures
of some form of species-being.

4.6. « Species-being »
In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx lays out the relationship between labour (not the abstract
labour-power found under capitalism) and human nature, which is what he calls
Gattungswesen or species-being: “[T]he productive life is the life of the species. It is lifeengendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is contained in
the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character.
Life itself appears only as a means to life.”210 We would be right to be suspicious of
anything claiming to be universal human nature, and there are plenty of authors who
critique Marx for his so-called “humanism.” However, in 1844, the concept of Gattungs,
or species, was very different from what we associate with the word “species” today. It
should also be noted that Wesen, or being, can be seen as either a compound or an
essence. For Marx, being is not a generality that unites many individuals but an ensemble
of social relations. Marx resolves the tension between essence as foundation and essence
as compound by saying it is human nature to be variable universality—human nature is
itself plastic, able to both give and receive form. So, how did capitalism create the notion
of human as a “species” with common attributes that have political/economic/social
valances? By instantiating the human species as a category, human rights discourse
became part of the creed of the ascendent bourgeois class.
However, the notion of species emerging through/with capitalism is also
contradictory insofar as capitalism enunciates the unity of the human species but also at
the same time imposes divisions within it. This is the situation Marx is addressing when
he refers to the four-fold alienation of the proletariat under capitalism: alienation from
one’s products, alienation from the means of production, alienation from society and
finally alienation from one’s own species-being. Under capitalism, it is alienation itself
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that is naturalized through the introduction of private property. Private property is the
antithesis to labour, as the former is external to man, whereas the latter is internal to
man’s nature: “Private property, as the material, summary expression of alienated labour,
embraces both relations—the relation of the worker to work and to the product of his
labour and to the non-worker, and the relation of the non-worker to the worker and to the
product of his labour.”211
Additionally, Marx makes the connection between private property and
government: “Alienated labour has resolved itself for us into two components which
depend on one another, or which are but different expressions of one and the same
relationship. Appropriation appears as estrangement, as alienation; and alienation appears
as appropriation, estrangement as truly becoming a citizen.”212 Under capitalism, as
material relations come to determine social relations, class antagonism begins. The sphere
of private property is thus also the sphere of civil society, which necessarily fosters
division between classes based on material relations. In other words, in order to be a
citizen one must enter into the social sphere by means of becoming part of a class, which
is done through an external relationship to one’s labour-power. Therefore, citizenship
itself is achieved through estrangement—and the moment of tacit consent is itself the
consent to entering into a particular relationship to one’s labour, namely as the labourpower of the proletariat. Of course, the bourgeois and oligarchical classes also enter into
citizenship, but it is easy to see that this is also achieved through alienation—the only
difference is the class positions each comes to occupy as a result of their material
conditions.
If private property is the root of alienation (which in turn is the root of both
citizenship and labour-power, which come about contemporaneously), then the abolition
of private property (and the shift into communism) would not only have literal
consequences for the means of production, but it would affect alienation and therefore
species-being:
211

Marx, n.p.

212

Marx, n.p.

112

The abolition [Aufhebung] of private property is therefore the complete
emancipation of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation
precisely because these senses and attributes have become, subjectively and
objectively, human. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has
become a social, human object—an object made by man for man. The senses have
therefore become directly in their practice theoreticians. They relate themselves to
the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human
relation to itself and to man, [In practice I can relate myself to a thing humanly
only if the thing relates itself humanly to the human being. – Note by Marx] and
vice versa. Need or enjoyment have consequently lost its egotistical nature, and
nature has lost its mere utility by use becoming human use. In the same way, the
senses and enjoyment of other men have become my own appropriation. Besides
these direct organs, therefore, social organs develop in the form of society; thus,
for instance, activity in direct association with others, etc., has become an organ
for expressing my own life, and a mode of appropriating human life.213

In other words, under capitalism, sensibility itself—pleasure, pain and all the nuances in
between—are still importantly present, even vital to the workings of capitalism.
However, because of private property, they are “egotistical,” and therefore incapable of
being truly “human” senses. Human in this case is not being used as a form of
universalism but rather as an expression of the complexities of social life. Under
capitalism, pleasures from living are no longer alive but calcify immediately under
alienation and extraction. It seems to be the social nature of data-driven endeavors to
provide the pleasure and acceptance that prevents these activities from being seen as
work. Thus, these user-operated platforms perform the illusion of the non-fetishized
interaction described by Marx in Capital, Vol. 1; that is, it appears that instead of
commodities meeting on the marketplace in their producers’ stead, people meet in social
interaction in a clever appropriation of species-being.
As we have seen, subjects harness their intellectual and creative capacities
through technological interfaces to perform free immaterial labour that creates network
value. These actions also result in a feedback loop of alterations made to subjectivity. If
this sounds a lot like the labourer who “acts upon external nature and changes it, and in
Karl Marx, “Private Property and Communism," in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844.
213
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this way he simultaneously changes his own nature,”214 that is because the process is
nearly identical. But if Marx is describing the activity that defines human species-being,
how does species-being connect with and differ from global coerced posthumanism? For
an answer we can return to one of Brassier’s criticisms of critical posthumanism:
“Because it is wholly immanent to the logic of capital, the counter-actualization of virtual
potencies required by Braidotti’s hope is effectively the cultivation of empowerment
within existing social relations.”215 These virtual potencies, or the changes one makes to
one’s nature, exist within the limiting sphere of capitalist value production. Because
technological interfaces in particular are the vital means of production for creating the
cornucopia of subjectivities, and because these technologies, as we have seen, are
necessarily imbricated in capitalist self-valuation (through hypersubsumption), the
subjectivities created are limited by capitalist goals. As Cote and Pybus put it: “the
subjects that you become must be compatible with the needs of contemporary capitalist
reproduction.”216 We have seen that capitalism’s goal has always been to rid itself of the
need for labour; at the same time, it is only through labour that surplus value is created.
This antagonism is immanent to the structure of capitalism itself. Yet now, through the
passage from formal, to real subsumption, and then to hypersubsumption, capitalism has
achieved its dream in an unprecedented way: free labour. The harnessing of the general
intellect into a primary force of production, and the shift of desire from the area of
consumption to production itself—or rather the superposition of consumption and
production—means that capitalism has harnessed the act of self-fashioning that defines
Marx’s species-being. As Terranova notes, “[c]apital, after all, is the unnatural
environment within which the collective intelligence materializes. The collective
dimension of networked intelligence needs to be understood historically, as part of a
specific momentum of capitalist development.”217 The difference between species-being
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and coerced posthumanism is precisely that the myriad creative and intellectual capacities
being generated arise fundamentally through and for capitalist value production, even if,
for the individual, that is not their overt motivation or end. This is the root of the
alienation and exploitation present in unwaged immaterial labour, and is therefore crucial
to understanding the contemporary posthuman within capitalism—the coerced
posthuman. The activities of self-fashioning done in the capitalist milieu cannot be
genuinely social—they are not of the species—but rather are part of Camatte’s ontology
of capitalism as self-valorizing value, which was discussed in the first chapter.

4.7. « Conclusion: the Human Eye »
This chapter has proposed that capitalism has now reached an epoch in which it has
actually generated a faux version of species-being—it has subsumed, rather than
fetishized, the social itself. The kinds of beings that inhabit this capitalist social realm are
posthumans, particularly those doing unwaged immaterial creative labour on digital
platforms in what seems to be unmediated or advanced collectivity. They do not call it
“social” media for nothing. Now we can return to Marx’s compelling account of what
happens when human senses are liberated from capitalism and returned to species-being,
and then compare this with capitalism’s pale imitation of the latter. Why are the senses—
the literal senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching, but also what Marx
calls the practical or mental senses of love, will, etc.—so important? The senses are
humans’ unmediated or objective access to the world. To return to a text I quoted in the
previous chapter, Marx remarks that “man is affirmed in the objective world not only in
the act of thinking, but with all his senses.”218 Under species-being, free of the egotistical
drive of private property, the senses not only provide access to the world, they literally
“make sense” of it according to their various functions. To explain this, Marx gives the
following example of music:
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Just as only music awakens in man the sense of music, and just as the most
beautiful music has no sense for the unmusical ear—is [no] object for it, because
my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers, therefore
can only exist for me insofar as my essential power exists for itself as a subjective
capacity because the meaning of an object for me goes only so far as my sense
goes (has only a meaning for a sense corresponding to that object)—for this
reason the senses of the social man differ from those of the non-social man
[emphasis added].219
Recall that labour (not abstract labour-power) is what might be called the interface that
makes things objective for man. This perhaps accounts for what Marx says next: “The
forming of the five senses is a labor of the entire history of the world down to the
present.”220 The humanness of human senses—human senses as affirmations of man’s
essential powers—unfolds only when man’s nature is humanized; that is, when man
labours for himself—and therefore on himself and for others—within society. Marx’s
gloss on the five senses states that, “[o]nly through the objectively unfolded richness of
man’s essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility (a musical ear, an
eye for beauty of form—in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses affirming
themselves as essential powers of man) either cultivated or brought into being.”221
It should be obvious that such an actualization of the richness of the human
sensorium cannot be achieved by posthumans under hypersubsumed capitalism. What is
important to note is that according to Marx the unfolding of the senses in their truly
humanized form is a labour that has been occurring for as long as there has been history.
Under species-being, nature becomes human nature and vice versa. The following chapter
theorizes that contemporary art can open the possibility for a radical anti-capitalist
politics, and it does so by opening paths to new sensoriums. We will define contemporary
art as returning to “aesthetics” in the classical sense given by Immanuel Kant: aesthetics
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are our sensible intuitions of the world.222 Like Marx, Kant also connects the sensible to
the subjective. Above, I mentioned that truly human senses only exist under speciesbeing, free from capitalism. In the following chapter, I look at the possibilities for the
creation of non-capitalist politics through contemporary art that opens new regimes of the
sensible.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Cambridge: Hackett
Publishing, 1987).
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5.

« Chapter Four: Contemporary Art and Politics »

I no longer love blue skies…In fact, I now prefer gray skies. The drones do not fly when
the skies are gray.223

Some of the earliest critiques of ubiquitous surveillance came from contemporary artists.
This chapter explores artistic responses to surveillance, particularly in the form of drone
art. I will begin by look at the relationship between art and politics as it developed from
the end of the nineteenth century to today. I will then put forth a theory of contemporary
art that is a synthesis of the arguments of art theorist Peter Osborne and philosopher
Jacques Rancière. I agree, following Osborne, that the type of art that truly belongs to the
category of “contemporary art” is postconceptual art.224
Below I will explain a historical progression in art history that led to Osborne’s
formulation, starting with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment; the
former refers to the transcendental aesthetic, while the latter discusses the aesthetic idea.
Osborne notes how aesthetics originally referred merely to what was sensible, and did not
refer to created artworks at all. It was only with the advent of Romanticism that art began
to be “independent,” with its own values, conventions and “thoughts.” In this section I
also refer to Kant’s sensus communis, a term from the Critique of Judgement that implies
that this common sense, which is the condition for the possibility of a universal
sensibility about art (which is seen by Kant as subjective), is fundamentally political. Not
only is it political, in that it has to do with thinking empathetically as a society, but it has
a much in common with Marx’s concept of species-being, which was important to the
previous chapter and is also vital to the discussion of art and politics here. After that I will
223 A quote

from Zubair Rehman, 13-year-old grandson of a victim of a 2012 U.S. drone strike in
Pakistan, from artist Tomas van Houtryve’s Blue Sky Days, 2013-2014, accessed December 10,
2019, https://tomasvh.com/works/blue-sky-days/.
From now on, unless otherwise stated, whenever I use the phrase “contemporary art”, it refers
specifically to Osborne’s use of the term, not to the colloquial sense of “any art made in the last
few years.”
224

118

explain Rancière’s concept of “regimes,” particularly the aesthetic regime of which we
are currently a part, as well as the vitally important process of “dissensus.” Like Osborne,
Rancière articulates a theory of art history that is markedly different from the popular
narrative of modern, postmodern and contemporary art epochs. He theorizes the return of
contemporary art to the true meaning of aesthetics as relating to the senses, and claims
that contemporary art is dissensual—it opens the possibility of new sensoriums,
previously unnoticed by society, that make way for novel political actions. Both thinkers
offer distinct, but important, takes on the relationship between art and politics, art and
history, aesthetics and the senses. I ultimately synthesize the two thinkers’ views on
contemporary art by weaving Rancière’s aesthetic regime of art together with Osborne’s
postconceptual art (which, as we will see, emphasizes the contemporaneity of art as
responding both materially and conceptually to globalized capitalism). The combination
of the two theorists’ work allows a conceptualization of art adequate to theories of
hypersubsumption. For this reason, contemporary art can respond directly to
hypersubsumed capitalism, experimenting with the distribution of the sensible under
capitalist material conditions of production. In particular, I argue that photography and its
digital successors are the primary media of contemporary art. From there it is easy to
connect art to surveillance capitalism, which will bring us into the next and final chapter,
which looks specifically at surveillance art in relation to the violent regimes of vision
discussed in chapter two.

5.1. « Art and Politics »
It is not always immediately obvious how the realms of art and politics are related. The
category of “art” itself is not a static thing—its goals, techniques, and cultural position
vary throughout history. This chapter focuses specifically on contemporary art,
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understood as a mode of postconceptual art225 created after the 1960s (or in some cases
the 1970s) that emerges contemporaneously with post-Fordist capitalism. According to
Marxist orthodoxy, art is a mode of cultural production that relates to the political, and is
rarely an obviously capitalist or anti-capitalist (communist) object, but rather something
complex and ambivalent; for example, rationalist political theorist and Marxist literary
critic Georg Lukács acknowledges that the social contradictions inherent in capitalism
can be identified through the sobering lens of bourgeois realist literature of authors such
as Balzac and Tolstoy (as opposed to the proletariat being the sole group capable of
seeing through capitalist fetishism), and the complex interplay between art, capitalism
and commodification are furtive sites of debate. Most notably, in the 1930s an argument
raged in the Frankfurt School between Lukács, Bloch, Adorno and Brecht about the
ideological status of realist versus modernist literature, the historical development of each
form, and which of these types of literature was best for producing anti-capitalist
sentiments and class consciousness. The Frankfurt School was vital in the positioning of
art as political.
This chapter is interested in the relationship between art and the political. It looks
at the ways developments in capitalism have changed the modes of engagement available
to art in its political valences, in order to discover the anti-capitalist potentialities of
different kinds of artworks. To this end, I turn to Osborne and Rancière to explicate the
situation of art today, as well as the relationship between art and politics, in order to show
why looking at contemporary visual art can be useful and relevant to a discussion of
hypersubsumption and its avatar, surveillance. I will argue, following Osborne, that not
all artworks produced now should be called “contemporary art,” though undoubtedly they
fall technically and historically under that name, and not all artworks achieve the political
function of art overall. The different artworks that will be discussed in the next chapter
225 According

to Peter Osborne, “Postconceptual art is a critical category that is constituted at the
level of the historical ontology of the artwork; it is not a traditional art-historical or art-critical
concept at the level of medium, form or style. Rather, as the critical register of the historical
destruction of the ontological significance of such categories, it provides new interpretative
conditions for analyses of individual works,” from Anywhere or Not At All: Philosophy of
Contemporary Art (New York: Verso, 2013), 48. I will return to this definition at length later in
the chapter.
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are indicative of various attempts to engage with the current political situation. The
question is which of these are most effective at engaging with the political dimension and
why do some fall short or even, in some cases, suffer the fate of being actively antirevolutionary, actually perpetuating the violent structures they purport to disrupt.

5.2. « Contemporary Art »
Peter Osborne is well known for studying contemporary art, and for focusing on the
ontology of the art object, cultural production and the influences of modernity on visual
art. In his books Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art and The
Postconceptual Condition Osborne develops his particular thesis that contemporary art is
postconceptual art—a claim that is designed to transcend style and period and refer to the
ontology of the artwork itself. I will explain this claim, as well as its consequences for art
theory, in detail later in this chapter. We can follow Osborne in distinguishing between
aesthetics and art, tracing the historical moment when the former collapsed into the latter
and thus into art works or objects for thought. The term “aesthetic” was brought to the
fore in Western philosophy by Immanuel Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason. In this
text, he refers to the “transcendental aesthetic,” which is the condition for perception, or
what he calls pure forms of intuition, or space and time, which are a priori conditions for
the operation of all human faculties—time being the inner intuition and space being the
outer. Here, the definition of aesthetics is faithful to its origin in the ancient Greek term
aisthesis, referring to sensibility or what appears to the sensible/senses. In Kant’s second
critique, The Critique of Judgment, “aesthetics” is used to refer to aesthetic judgments,
which are judgments of taste. In this second sense the aesthetic appears in a manner more
intelligible to our contemporary use of it, with designations like “beautiful,” “fine,” etc.
Kant is concerned with how we form a priori judgments of taste, since judgements of
taste seem to only come from experience; he concludes that aesthetic judgments must
refer back to some universal sense, or what he calls the sensus communis. Kant refers to
aesthetic judgments as “subjective universals” because while aesthetic judgments do not
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refer to a priori categories of the understanding (which Kant discussed in the first critique
as the conditions for universality), they are nonetheless universal, as they require a
communal agreement as their condition for possibility.
Annelies Degryse argues that Kant’s communal or shared sense is actually the
foundation for seeing humans as political beings.226 The sensus communis is an “extra
sense” or an extra mental capacity outside the ones outlined in the Critique of Pure
Reason. Moreover, this extra sense, which is only activated in a social milieu, makes us
capable of thinking from others’ perspectives. This is different from the solitary person of
Kant’s first critique, who does not need anybody else in order to reason—in other words,
a philosopher. The sensus communis, however, implies not a philosopher but a
community (it is a communal or shared sensibility), which makes it political. Because of
this, sensus communis could be seen as the condition for Marx’s species-being, if speciesbeing is a shared condition among humans that opens them to possibilities and
potentialities as a species.
In the Critique of Judgment, the importance of beauty is its ability to point to
universality, as well as its role in harmonizing the different faculties (reason, imagination,
and so on). Works of art are not conceptual and certainly not political in the traditional
sense. They are important because they point the viewer inwards, through the creation of
feelings, emotions or affects. The “sublime,” which we might in contemporary times
relate to the sensation of being moved by a work of art, is reserved not for man-made
creations but for experiences in nature and with mathematics. These overwhelm other
faculties, leading to a retreat to one’s internal consciousness, which is able to console the
overwrought senses through Reason. Kant’s viewer ultimately interacts with outside
stimuli as a way of marveling at their own capacities. Kant also introduces the “aesthetic
idea” to describe an intuition without a concept,227 or an intuition (something that begins
with the sensible) that does not fall under categories of the understanding. As Kant makes
226 Annelies

Degryse, “Sensus communis as a foundation for men as political beings: Arendt’s
reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 37(3), (2011):
345-358.
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very clear, ethical acts cannot be aesthetic, because aesthetics are sensible and ethics can
never be deduced from the sensible. Counter to many of our twenty-first-century
sensibilities, aesthetics, for Kant, are inherently not conceptual, and have no bearing on
ethical questions.
It is only with the advent of German Romanticism that art, in the way we know it
today, comes into its own through the superposition of the subject onto the work of art.
According to Osborne “this is the philosophical ground of the ‘autonomy of art’ claim—
autonomy not of a type of judgement (Kant), nor merely at the level of appearance, the
illusion of self-determination (Schiller), but of a certain kind of production of meaning in
the object, an autopoiesis, distinct from both techne and mimesis (Novalis, Friedrich
Schlegel). This is not an ‘aesthetic regime of art’ but a supra-aesthetic artistic regime of
truth.”228 Art becomes capable of generating its own truths. But as Osborne points out,
this power of art is still connected to the original function of aisthesis. For Osborne (as
well as for Rancière) art is related to the sensible. Because Osborne’s notion of
contemporary or postconceptual art fits within the schema of aesthetics and politics that
Rancière sets out, this chapter will discuss Rancière’s concepts first and then relate it to
Osborne’s description of the situation. These will serve as prologues to the analyses of
specific artworks, but they are also necessary in relating sensibility, aesthetics and politics
to earlier discussions of hypersubsumption, visuality and surveillance.

5.3. « Ideological and Sensible Regimes »
In The Politics of Aesthetics, Rancière lays out his theory, in which he claims aesthetics
can be political (a possibility not open to all aesthetics, but only certain aesthetic
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regimes).229 He explains that political art does not refer to a political program, but rather
identifies the role that art and its spectators play in the politicization of aesthetics.
According to Rancière, “[a]esthetics refers to a specific regime for identifying and
reflecting on the arts: a mode of articulation between ways of doing and making, their
corresponding forms of visibility, and possible ways of thinking about their relationships
(which presupposes a certain idea of thought’s effectivity).”230 Rancière thus holds the
Kantian distinction between aesthetics and art, only to bring art under the realm of
aesthetics as a sensible object. There exists for Rancière what he calls the “distribution of
the sensible,” which is a way of bringing certain discourses and modes of being either to
the fore or banishing them back. The prevailing distribution of the sensible is the
dominant social order of the day and politics only happens in the interstices of this
distribution as its agitation or reordering, or what he calls “dissensus.” Here it is worth
quoting Rancière at length:
The distribution of the sensible [is] the system of self-evident facts of sense
perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common
and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it. A
distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time
something common that is shared and exclusive parts. This apportionment of parts
and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and forms of activity that
determines the very manner in which something in common lends itself to
participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this
229 An

aesthetic regime is a periodizing concept instituted by Rancière. Three regimes form a
narrative of the history of visual art as it related to certain discernible social and political
movements: the ethical, the representational and the aesthetic. The ethical regime refers to a
utilitarian function of art stemming from Platonic edicts that art is a craft which mimics reality,
and thus must be severely limited due to its effects on society. This regime likens art to a
craftsman’s skill to be practiced under certain conditions to elicit certain responses. We can see
how even this early regime recognizes the political potential of art. The representational regime
grants art independent powers above mimesis. This regime corresponds to the rise of bourgeois
liberalism and individualism, and distances art from “mere labour.” Finally, the vital and novel
“aesthetic regime,” which begins at the start of the nineteenth century, is Rancière’s answer to
artistic modernism; according to him, modernism strips art of its political potency by fetishizing
novelty, discarding form and breaking with past forms of art. In other words, modern art attempts
to separate art from its history and context. The aesthetic regime, in contrast, literally brings art
back to its roots through a return of the aesthetic or sensible aspects of art—the idea that art can
affect what is seen and thought.
Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2003), 10.
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distribution….The distribution of the sensible reveals who can have a share in
what is common to the community based on what they do and on the time and
space in which this activity is performed. Having a particular ‘occupation’ thereby
determines the ability or inability to take charge of what is common to the
community; it defines what is visible or not…It is on the basis of this primary
aesthetics that it is possible to raise the question of ‘aesthetic practices’ as I
understand them, that is forms of visibility that disclose artistic practices, the
place they occupy, what they ‘do’ or ‘make’ from the standpoint of what is
common to the community. Artistic practices are ‘ways of doing and making’ that
intervene in the general distribution of ways of doing and making as well as in the
relationships they maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility.231
We can see how Rancière expands Kant’s idea of the sensus communis from solely
referring to judgments of taste to being the crux of the entire social sphere. The way
aesthetic regimes organize the sensible thus defines what is available to the common
social body. It is useful to think of this in relation to Althusser’s concept of ideology—or
“the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence”232—
though of course Rancière’s use of aesthetics has an ontological inflection. Like ideology,
however, the aesthetic regime is timeless and ahistorical, though particular distributions
of the sensible are historically determined and determining. Art works or artistic practices
reveal the current aesthetic regime by intervening in the distribution of the sensible
through their very nature as sensible or aesthetic works. Politics utilizes a field of
aesthetic possibilities and thus burgeoning political movements must find modes of
making art that are suitable to reorganizing the sensible into new forms. Art is at the
service of politics, though it is not itself political. Rancière takes poetry as an example of
the way that art accomplishes these new forms:
The words of the poet are first used as neutral tools to frame a certain sensorium.
They describe us a movement of the arms oriented towards a certain aim: reaching
a place which could be visualised on a space. But they superimpose to that
sensorium another sensorium organized around that which is specific to their own
power, sound and absence. They stage a conflict between two regimes of sense,
two sensory worlds. This is what dissensus means…The artistic ‘proposition’
conflates two regimes of sense—a regime of conjunction and a regime of
231
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disjunction. Now the community built by that dissensus stands itself in a twofold
relationship with another community, a community between human beings.233
Works of art and the artistic communities they come from simultaneously disturb the
existing distributions of the sensible and predict or begin the construction of new ones.
Unlike popular notions which frame art as polemic or programmatic, spurring the
public to a particular action by revealing hidden objects or events, or exposing the way
communities and social bodies are “really” constituted, Rancière’s concept of art is about
a reorganization of social relationships through new divisions of the sensible. That means
that certain populations or issues that were previously invisible under partitions of the
sensible found in the dominant aesthetic regime now come to the fore in what is
inevitably a conflicting relationship to existing hegemonic regimes. You cannot reshape
relations within perturbing and ultimately replacing one regime with another. Not all
artworks are dissensual, but those that are can incite revolutions. It should be noted that
to be dissensual is not that same as being radical. Even the most radical artworks do not
necessarily bring about a change in politics. As Rancière explains: “Film, Video art,
photography, installation, etc. rework the frame of our perceptions and the dynamism of
our affects. As such they may open new passages toward new forms of political
subjectivization. But none of them can avoid the aesthetic cut that separates the outcomes
from the intentions and forbids any straight way toward an ‘other side’ of the words and
the images.”234 Attempts to make art that is directly programmatic run inevitably into
art’s contingent nature as an object of spectacle, subject to reception and interpretation, as
well as the fundamental difference between art and life: the man in the film remains, at
the end of the day, a man in a film—a representation of wretchedness, perhaps, but a
representation nonetheless. Rancière insists that “[t]here is no straight way from looking
at a spectacle to understanding the state of the world, no straight way from intellectual
awareness to political action. What occurs is much more the shift from a given sensory
Jacques Rancière, “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community: Scenes from the Aesthetic
Regime of Art1,” ART&RESEARCH: A Journal of Ideas, Contexts and Methods 2, no. 1 (2008):
4-5.
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world to another sensory world which defines other capacities and incapacities, other
forms of tolerance and intolerance.”235 Art can open up the possibility of new modes of
community but does not guarantee them. What we are interested in here is not so much
exploring ideas of community, relationality, or even what is “real” versus what is “mere
representation.” Rather, it is important to see Rancière’s comments in light of
contemporary Marxism’s rejection of traditional ideas of class consciousness, which rely
heavily on revealing the “reality” of ideology and lifting the veil on the miserable
conditions of the working class. Simply showing people the truly predatory nature of
capitalism and the way they are exploited by it does not mean they will rise up against the
system, or even that they will reject it. While it is not the goal of this project to speculate
as to why that is, I here build on Rancière’s implication that artistic projects which aim to
shock (or berate an audience into taking action) are missing the point, as that is not the
political function of art. If it were, we would be in a situation akin to that of Ancient
Greece, where the representation of evil in tragic plays was a direct reflection of society
and had a clearly causal impact on the polity. Such a case occurs when aisthesis
(sensibility), mimesis (representation) and poiesis (action) are in a one-to-one correlation
with each other. But the situation of contemporary art is instead to create new conditions
which in turn create new sensoriums rife with possibilities that did not exist before.

5.4. « Contemporary, Postconceptual »
Peter Osborne also underscores the importance of distinguishing art from aesthetics in the
classical sense, particularly when discussing contemporary art. He insists upon the
conceptual nature of contemporary art as opposed to the merely aesthetic quality of art in
other periods, and sees this is as change in art’s ontology. He argues that philosophy has
never been adequate for understanding art because it always approached it from a
Kantian perspective as a separate domain of aesthetic experience (though this is also
contrary to Kant, for whom art was not pure aesthetics). It is a mistake to equate/
235
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ontologize aesthetic experience with the self-affectation of the understanding/
imagination/subject, a belief which comes from the myth that aesthetic autonomy (of
pure aesthetic judgments of taste) is the basis for the autonomy of art. Osborne reads
early German Romanticism alongside conceptual art, putting them in a constellation such
that conceptual art is the afterlife of a strand of Romanticism, and Romanticism is the
anticipation of conceptual art. He alleges that in Romanticism, the transcendental has
been ontologized through the work of art. The autonomy of the transcendental experience
of a work of art is read as enchantment. It relocates the political potential of art in its
autonomy; art’s disengagement from the conceptual is seen as its political potential. This
presupposes that art somehow escapes labour/sociality by being “natural.”
Because Osborne’s critique relies on a distinction between affects and concepts, at
first blush it seems that his ideas about art are incompatible with Rancière’s, who clearly
eschews art as generative of concepts in favor of its relationship to the aesthetic in the
true sense (i.e., what is accessible to the senses). However, we shall see that Osborne’s
positive definition of contemporary art as postconceptual art actually fits within the
greater relationship between aesthetics and politics that Rancière constructs, and
Osborne’s theories in turn augment Rancière’s ontologized aesthetics through dialectical
materialism, making a theory of art adequate to the contemporary situation as well as
relating art clearly to the stakes of post-Fordist capitalism.
According to Osborne, contemporary art is postconceptual art. What makes art
contemporary is not simply that it is created in the present; rather, such art has a specific
role as a carrier of current socio-historical realities and as such it is materially linked to
those realities. Its contemporaneity is a symptom of its particular relationship to
temporality and spatiality within both the relationship of the artwork to the world and its
relationship to itself and other artistic periods. Simply put, contemporary art is the art of
the contemporary:
It is the convergence and mutual conditioning of historical transformations in the
ontology of the artwork and the social relations of art space—a convergence and
mutual conditioning that has its roots in more general economic and
communicational processes—that makes contemporary art possible, in the
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emphatic sense of an art of contemporaneity. These convergent and mutually
conditioning transformations take the common form of processes of ‘debordering’: on one hand, the debordering of the arts as mediums—the emergence
of genuinely transcategorial practices opening up the conceptual space of a
‘generic’ art—and on the other, the de-bordering of the previously national social
spaces of art…Contemporary art is ‘post’-conceptual to the extent that it registers
the historical experience of conceptual art, as a self-conscious movement, as the
experience of the impossibility/fallacy of the absolutization of anti-aesthetic, in
conjunction with a recognition of an ineliminably conceptual aspect to all art. In
this respect, art is postconceptual to the extent to which it reflectively incorporates
the truth (which itself incorporates the untruth) of ‘conceptual art’: namely, art is
necessarily both aesthetic and conceptual.236
Osborne’s dialectical understanding of contemporary art means that such art has passed
through the merely conceptual and incorporated the conceptuality of art within itself.
According to Osborne, the other feature of contemporary art is that it has returned to a
concern with the medium while not being medium-specific. It is the self-consciousness of
art that it is beyond medium-specificity. This self-consciousness allows art to be aware of
mediums and put them to use while transcending their periodization. Moving beyond the
historical significance of the medium as being the ontological determiner of art is itself a
historical movement constituted entirely by the present or the contemporary.
Contemporary or postconceptual art is concerned with media but also incorporates an
important feature of conceptual art: “In demonstrating the radical insufficiency, or
minimal conditionality, of the aesthetic dimension of the artwork to its status as art,
conceptual art was able to bring once again to light, in a more decisive way, the necessary
conceptuality of the work which had been buried by the aesthetic ideology of formalist
modernism—a conceptuality which was always historically central to the allegorical
function of art.”237 Contemporary art is the only kind of art able to return to the
materiality and the conceptuality of art without overdetermining the artwork by either of
the two. It can only do this precisely because of its situation in the historical present,
following after modern art and the art of the avant-garde. It is vital that contemporary art
236
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be postconceptual, because conceptual art, following modernism, eschewed materiality,
dematerializing the art-object.
Aesthetics theorist Sianne Ngai points to a similar function of contemporary art,
though Ngai refers to the latter as conceptual, rather than postconceptual. In her own
dialectic movement, Ngai passes through Kantian aesthetics and Romanticism to sublated
Neo-Kantian conceptual art that harnesses aesthetics with a new attentiveness to the
effect of capitalist production on contemporary sensibilities. In Our Aesthetic Categories,
Ngai looks specifically at the “interesting” as a kind of modern version of the Kantian
sublime. Her work asks what kind of analogue can be made between the two and how
this is affected by the ubiquity of capitalism. According to her, interest is “repeatedly
staging [the] clash between conceptual knowledge and sensory perception…merely
interesting conceptual art helps us see that the aesthetic judgment ‘interesting,’ which
places us in an affective relationship to the fact of our not knowing something, encodes
an analogous clash between knowledge and feeling.”238 In this showdown between
knowledge and feeling, or concept and affect, aesthetics has already moved beyond the
merely sensible and is invested in the relationship between thought and the sensible.
Ngai uses this relationship to characterize representation, which is the relation of
a concept to its object. Art objects under contemporary capitalism are thus
representational—they are objects with attached concepts, or in other words, interesting
objects. Interest is merely the fact that an object of interest calls a person back to it.
Under Ngai’s “minor” aesthetic categories, the interesting thing about conceptual art is
the difference between a concept and its artistic perception/representation; specifically,
the interest lies in figuring the difference out. Once the interesting characteristic about an
object is understood, it is easily reproducible. Thus these “minor” categories actually
represent the merging of information and objects/commodities, art and production. Ngai’s
analysis is useful to us as a way to attend to the poverty of many objects under the banner
of “contemporary art.” Whereas Kant alluded to the idea that contemporary art
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University Press, 2015), 165.
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overcomes the incompatibility of ethics and aesthetics, Ngai shows us that for art to be
contemporary, it has to do more than make us think. But what?
In order to properly characterize contemporary art, we must attend first to its
contemporaneity. According to Osborne:
The concept of the contemporary thus projects into presence a temporal unity that
is in principle futural or horizonal and hence speculative. Finally, third,
empirically, the relational totality of the currently coeval times of human existence
remains, fundamentally socially disjunctive. There is thus no actual shared
subject-position of, or within, our present from the standpoint of which its
relational totality could be constructed as a whole, in however temporally
fragmented or dispersed or incomplete a form. Nonetheless, the idea of the
contemporary functions as if there is. That is, it functions as if the speculative
horizon of the unity of human history had been reached. In this respect, the
contemporary is a utopian idea, with both negative and positive aspects.239
The temporality of the contemporary is the transcendental condition of unity within the
spatio-historical situation of the current moment and is thus characterized by the sociohistorical. Moreover, because of globalized capitalism, what characterizes our present
most of all, according to Osborne, is transnationality, which is the “socio-spatial form of
the current temporal unity of historical experience.”240 Osborne’s theory allows for the
intertwining of the relationship between art and the present as a historical material reality.
In fact, it insists that this is inextricable from the ontology of art. Therefore, the
ontologies of particular periods of art are historically determined, and each period
surpasses the last, allowing it to retroactively analyze the movements that came before it.
Osborne believes history has been overtaken by what he calls the “memory
model,” which is reactive and retrospective, and thus robs history of its critical potential
and orientation towards the future. He argues that a critique of the present is not possible
in the memory model, because remembrance is reduced to memory, recollection and
testimony. Memory is cut off from the present through a distancing of that memory;
testimony becomes a way of keeping history at bay or keeping it on the personal level.
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This model keeps art at the affective level. Our particular moment must account for the
inescapable effects of capitalism on the social, and so contemporary art must reflect the
truths of the apotheosis of the present. That means that Osborne’s contemporary art must
come from a conceptual understanding and characterization of contemporary capitalism
—thus transnationality emerges for him as its harbinger.
However, this project has attempted to show that contemporary capitalism is
characterized by a type of subsumption known as hypersubsumption, which includes
within itself as a condition the globalized, or transnational, nature of today’s capitalism.
As we saw before, hypersubsumption focuses on the relationship between valuation and
automation through technological developments and their relationship to the social, labor
and the creation of value. Osborne’s work is useful because it folds art within a Marxist
historical materialism in which art lays bare the truth of the contemporary precisely
because it is ontologically determined by it. This means that not all art created in the
present counts as contemporary art. The contemporary is a concept that constitutes a
particular relationship between space and time: “The coming together of different times
that constitute the contemporary, and the relations between the social spaces in which
these times are embedded and articulated, are the two main axes along which the
historical meaning of art is to be plotted.”241
This can be situated as an extension of or elaboration on Frederic Jameson’s
notion of postmodernity as the flattening of time into space through post-Fordist
capitalism.242 Jameson also looks at art—particularly architecture, painting and literature
—as the bearer of the historical situation he labels postmodernity. While Jameson looks
at specific examples of works within various media as archetypal products of
postmodernity, shaped by and shaping the aesthetic and social movement, Osborne goes
on to discuss what kind of art and which medium (and its derivatives) is the best bearer of
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contemporaneity, meaning that the medium provides a horizon of conceptual unity to the
socio-historical landscape.
According to Osborne, this medium is photography and its direct role in
developing the digital into the ubiquitous medium in which we are bathed today. He
remarks on the true relationship between digital images and capitalism, eschewing the
popular trope of photography as “realism”:
Via the multiplicity of visualizations, digitalization draws attention to the
essentially de-realized character of the image. It is this de-realized image—
supported in each instance by specific material processes—that strangely
‘corresponds’ to the ontological status of the value-form…De- (and therefore
potentially re-) realized images can be infinitely exchanged. This is the social
meaning of the ontology of the digital image, of which photography is now but
one—albeit crucial—kind. In the infinite field of visualizations of the digital
image, the infinity of exchange made possible by the abstraction of exchange
value from use value finds its equivalent visual form.243
The importance of digital imagery as the defining medium of capitalism’s contemporary
turn means that, in the parlance of Rancière (though he does not designate particular
media within the current moment), the photographic image is most suited to creating
works of art that foster dissensus, and therefore carry the potential for a true politics.
Where the two theorists intersect is in ideas about art mimicking life; for Rancière, there
was a historical moment where art did imitate life—he refers to this as the ethical regime
of art, exemplified by Plato’s idea of art, particularly poetry, in Plato's Republic. Here, art
is a craft that imitates life, and as such is both powerful and deceptive, because it has
enormous political sway with the masses, and thus must be tightly controlled. Art in this
regime is mimetic, and attempts to create a direct concordance between the sensible and
the actionable—between art and politics. This means art in this regime is also highly
polemical: “Art is presumed to be effective politically because it displays the marks of
domination, or parodies mainstream icons, or even because it leaves the spaces reserved
for it and becomes a social practice…The logic of mimesis consists in conferring on the
artwork the power of the effects that it is supposed to elicit on the behavior of
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spectators.”244 In other words, nothing is lost in translation between an artist’s intention
and the artwork’s effect on spectators, because the artist is mimicking, to the best of their
ability, reality. This includes not only re-creating objects with the greatest verisimilitude
but also describing the actions of heroes, political figures, etc. Audiences see ontological
truth reflected back at them in the work of art, and works of the greatest veracity have the
greatest moral and political worth.
For Osborne, the ontology of digital imagery, the digitized descendant of film
photography, has what he referred to in the above quote as social meaning.245 Digital
imagery in particular is a sort of artistic reflection of the capitalist value form: digital
images are infinitely reproducible and exchangeable (thanks to the internet). This means
they are actually further and further abstracted from that which they were the images of—
what characterizes the digital image ontologically is its abstract exchangeability, which
echoes capital’s all-important abstraction, exchange value. Here we can see that both
Osborne and Rancière believe that art (or what the latter calls artistic regimes) take place
within the broader context of society, and are intimately linked to elements of the social
reality in which they take place. Art is indicative and reflective of not only the values of
its society, but also of what makes up that society in general and how it comes to value
certain things. For Rancière, this is generally true of all artistic regimes, and he explains
how the ethical regime gave way to the representative and then to the aesthetic or
expressive (which is where we are now). The ethical regime reflected the Greek
aristocracy imposing their values and views on the polity—an inherently anti-democratic
situation. Similarly, Osborne’s definition of contemporary art insists on artwork that is
not only made within the contemporary social milieu but embodies that milieu best.
Osborne’s analysis of the digital image largely reflects Rancière’s ethical regime of art:
digital images are best at mimicking ontological truth, meaning the truth of capitalist
domination. Rancière even makes a similar claim in his caustic lament on cinema, which

Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, trans. Steve Corcoran, (New York:
Bloomsbury, 2010), 171.
244

245

Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, 131.

134

he refers to in the prologue of his book Film Fables as a “thwarted fable,”246 because it
still remains caught in the trappings of ethical and representational regimes.
Of course, photography, and its digital incarnations, cannot be said to be purely
liberatory or progressive, mimetic or expressive. The incredible digital artist Hito Steyerl
examines the complexities of the digital in her seminal essay “In Defense of the Poor
Image.” Steyerl discusses what she calls “poor images,” or images in film and media that
have lost their resolution and are less than discernible from having many artifacts or from
being copied and shared over and over: “Focus is identified as a class position, a position
of ease and privilege, while being out of focus lowers one’s value as an image.”247
Steyerl claims that neoliberal policies purposefully made experimental projects
prohibitively expensive or too marginal for popular media, which restructured the
aesthetics of image-based media to put it more in line with commodification and
capitalist goals of consumption, and thus relegated experimental media, or media that did
not fit a certain pristine aesthetic, to the darkness of the archive. Clarity, verisimilitude or
what Steyerl refers to as “high resolution” in images is inherently conservative, as it
idolizes male genius, high/low culture distinctions, authenticity, and of course is only
available to those with the economic means to procure the best equipment.
The desire for clearer images is not a new goal by any means. In fact, it follows
naturally from the image as embedded in the history of martial visual endeavors:
reconnaissance photography, mapmaking and drone targeting are all fields where the
ultimate clarity of the image is the goal. In a move similar to Rancière’s deployment of
the concept of dissensus, Steyerl argues that the material conditions of images are a
reflection of the social nexus that created them: “Their situation reveals much more than
the content or appearance of the images themselves: it also reveals the conditions of their
marginalization, the constellation of social forces leading to their online circulation as
poor images.”248 However, Steyerl’s focus on the circulation of poor images (popular
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images, as she later calls them), rather than artworks (which are rarified if only by falling
under the category of art), in contemporary media—particularly online—means that she
grapples with the dilemma that other authors and artists I have mentioned also find
themselves in. Platforms both enable creative participation but are also sites of extreme
commodification, exploitation and inadvertent production by users of content for huge
corporations. Steyerl is aware of this ambivalence, but unlike Osborne chooses to
characterize digital images as dematerialized. She then analyzes this condition as a
function of conceptual art.249 This is where Steyerl and Osborne critically diverge: for
Osborne, contemporary art is postconceptual, meaning there is a return to materiality
without medium-specificity, which is a tactic that works against the progression into
dematerialization and semioticization, or as I would call it, the state of pure abstraction
that exists within hypersubsumption. Now we have come to yet another feature of
hypersubsumption: all sides of the exchange circuit have fallen into total abstraction.
Real abstraction means abstract categories function concretely, ruling society where
social relationships used to. Rather than masking social interactions, real abstraction
means that abstract forces themselves act on the world.
Osborne and Rancière both point to the photographic and its descendants—film
and digital media—as harbingers of politically potent art, which could bring about a new
aesthetic regime. It is fruitful to compare Osborne’s modes of relating to history and
materiality, as well as Rancière’s notion of disparate sensoriums, with Walter Benjamin’s
famous treatise on photography and modernity, The Work of Art in the Age of Its
Technological Reproducibility as well as his essay collection, Illuminations. In The Work
of Art, Benjamin ponders the situation of modernity, with the rising ubiquity of
technology, and the role that the seemingly endless production and reproduction of
cultural objects, particularly visual objects, has on the socio-political sphere. He is
interested in questions of pre-modernity and the shifts in ideology that came about as a
Steyerl is correct in the claim that “the dematerialized art object turns out to be perfectly
adapted to the semioticization of capital, and thus to the conceptual turn of capitalism” (Steyerl,
“Poor Image,” 5). Indeed, there are dematerialized art objects deployed by artists today, some of
which will be discussed later in this chapter. However, I argue that these art objects are not
actually contemporary art—they are just art that is being made in the present.
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result of the introduction of specific technologies, such as the camera. With the advent of
better and faster photographic techniques, photography begins to rely on its
reproducibility and thus its commerciality. This change in the mode of production is
accompanied by a change in the social disposition, and inaugurates what Benjamin calls
the “optical unconscious,” or the condition of “unconsciously penetrated space.”250 This
new mode of looking or gazing is a type of possession built on penetration, which
destroys the distance created by the “aura” in an attempt to bring an object into ourselves.
The viewer wants to penetrate the world, but she is also penetrated by it. Benjamin
compares the cameraman with the surgeon, who, closing the distance between patient and
doctor bit by bit, penetrates into the patient’s body and roots around in her organs—
reality is permeated with the mechanical.
Benjamin introduces the concept of the “aura,” or the singularity of a photo that
attests to its reality. Benjamin claims that the ritualistic value of the work of art has its
last gasp in portrait photography, which generates a genuine aura through its connection
to the human face and gaze. This early auratic quality of photography is similar to Roland
Barthes’ formulation of the punctum,251 or the prick of the photo that connects the viewer
through time to the existential reality of the presence in the photo. Aura, as singular
appearance of distance, through its commodification in photography and film incites the
drive to destroy it, and this destruction is the bringing of the Other wholly into the self.
Benjamin refers to the “decay” of the aura, indicative of its connection to life, vitality,
and a material that is not merely destroyed, but like a body, dies away. What is left behind
is mere phantasmagoria: “To pry an object from its shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark
of a perception whose ‘sense of the universal equality of things’ has increased to such a
degree that it extracts it even from a unique object by means of reproduction.”252 This
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principle of life originates, as Benjamin claims, in the art object's embeddedness in the
fabric of history, which is itself alive.
The aura is the intimate connection between ritual and history, or art and the
social world. To commodify the object, via reproduction, produces a dead reified thing in
which all social relations are obscured as it becomes an object of “intrinsic” value. In
Work of Art Benjamin discusses the need to destroy the modern photographic aura, as it
has now become the commodity fetish. Benjamin’s modern aura seems in line with
Osborne’s notion of the contemporaneity of contemporary art—it describes art that would
have addressed the socio-historical conditions of his time.
The aura both captures and is captured by Fordist capitalism, which was
punctuated by advances in visual technology, as well as the mass introduction of
automation into work. Benjamin was also concerned with the way the production of
artworks, or the process by which they are created, impacted their effects on ideology. In
Illuminations, he claims that “process reproduction can bring out those aspects of the
original that are unattainable to the naked eye… can capture images which escape natural
vision. Technical production can put the copy of the original into situations which would
be out of reach for the original itself.”253 Like Rancière, Benjamin acknowledges that the
very modes of perception change through history.
Bringing together Osborne and Rancière, we can say that the potential for
dissensus is what defines the contemporaneity of contemporary art, as dissensus is what
paves the way for a response to the dominant modes of sensation of the time. Responding
to a socio-historical situation, dissensual art is spatial, creating a fissure in hegemonic
modes of sensibility, opening space for new regimes of sense. It is no coincidence that the
emphasis on the visual mechanized image (photography and digital image media) by
contemporary artists and scholars aligns with the theoretical importance placed on
visuality, its relationship to capitalism, and its current martial, omni-occipital inflection
by the thinkers discussed in the previous chapter.
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In the essay “Go Away Closer: Photography, Intermediality, Unevenness,” in
Capitalism and the Camera: Essays on Photography and Extraction, Kajri Jain discusses
the relationship between capitalism and postcolonial spaces, through a treatment of
photography as it exists in specific cultural spaces, such as the Indian bazaar. Unlike
Osborne, Jain claims that contemporary Western photography is trapped in the paradigms
of modernity, with its medium-specificity (though Osborne would agree with that
characterization of modernity). The issue with this is that “a medium-specific view, we
might say, treats photography and other media as akin to raw materials in industrial massmanufacture, each with its own identifiable, exploitable properties. This view is
embedded in a modernist conception of capitalism; what’s more, it replicates capitalism’s
approach to the world.”254 Jain claims that photography is not caught up in the historical
time of transformation, shifts and ruptures, as dictated by Western notions of capitalism;
rather, the relationship between photography and various sensory milieus is uneven and
they cannot be easily distinguished from each other.
However, as with the chaotic space of the bazaar, it does not mean that there is no
internal order at work. Jain also stresses the importance of challenging the Eurocentric
view that senses are separate from each other or ordered with any kind of primacy given
to one over another. He refers to this as aesthetic-moral ordering, which in turn
impoverishes the way media like photography are capable of interacting with varying
spaces, and reminds us that the presumed realist or documentary function of photography
is not universal but a product of Western naturalism. To consider the indexical function of
a photograph based merely on its material reproduction of a thing is to reduce the
capaciousness of its temporal and spatial possibilities, as they are related fundamentally
to the socio-historical formations that are being photographed. Jain would object to this
chapter’s focus on the visual, because he claims that an image works on levels beyond
simply the visual and its accompanying sensorium is not reducible to the visual. For
example, he posits ‘livingness,’ rather than realism, as occurring in photographs of
Kajri Jain, “Go Away Closer: Photography, Intermediality, Unevenness,” in Capitalism and the
Camera: Essays on Photography and Extraction, eds. Kevin Coleman and Daniel James (New
York: Verso, 2021), 91.
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religious icons sold at the bazaar. Perhaps, to use Benjamin or art theorist Boris Groys’
vernacular,255 the photographic image has the future potential to inhabit an aura. Rather
than preserving the museum as a privileged space, where singularity and sovereignty (of
the audience) holds court, Jain looks at the reproduced image as egalitarian in that it
provided a way for so-called ‘untouchables’ (from Hindu caste systems) to engage with
religion through purchasable icons: “This democratization of the iconic image through
mass reproduction meant that the desires it embodied also lent themselves to identitarian
political mobilizations.”256 However, this is not to say that mechanical reproduction and
identitarian politics are always good, of course. It cuts both ways, as this is also an easy
way to produce dangerous nationalisms. While Jain seems to follow Rancière’s insistence
on art creating new sensoriums, he presents a postcolonial challenge to the primacy of
visualness. I would argue that I choose this primacy, like Osborne, precisely because the
ocular is the hegemonic mode of contemporary capitalism and therefore what must be
studied.

In Boris Groys’ essay “Entering the Flow: Museum between Archive and Gesamtkunstwerk,”
(e-flux 15 (2013), n.p.), Groys claims that for a long time the function of art and art institutions
was to resist the flow of time and material destruction through preservation, either of artworks or
of ideas, events, bygone eras, etc. Contemporary art attempts to “bring art into the flow of time,”
meaning to bring art into the present as precarious and durational. But does this also mean art
must look to the future? Unlike Osborne, Groys’ futurity of the art object seems to refer only to
the decay of its materiality and the passing of its historical moment. Thus this cannot live up to
our definition of contemporary. Groys is concerned with the effects of the internet on the way art
is created and interpreted—he positions the internet as the inheritor of the media-cataclysm that
photography and cinema caused when they were invented. Groys claims that the difference
between curated museum shows and a film, concert or play, is that the curated show 1. captures
the artistic event within the space-time of the museum and 2. allows for audience participation in
the event. This conception is distinct from Rancière’s dissensus, as Groys presumes art actually
creates a new sensorium that the audience temporarily inhabits and reflects upon, whereas under
Rancière’s schema, only the condition for the possibility of new sensoriums are created. This
distinction is vital because the former assumes that “the audience” is homogenous in that they
have equal access to the art event, simply because they participate in the space-time of the
museum. Dissensus, however, is predicated precisely on the notion of difference. Groys
concludes, in a farcical nod to Benjamin, that the internet produces “auras without products.” But
documentation gives a sense of false security, because it is often equated with truth. As the
discussion of Trevor Paglen’s art work will demonstrate, the transparency of the production
process does not necessarily result in the truth of the artwork, therefore it is not useful to rely on
the discourse of obscuring/bringing to light that Groys uses; rather we will focus on the
production itself and not the history or documentation of that production.
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Though neither Osborne or Rancière focus specifically on the important critiques
and fissures in capitalism exposed by authors like Kajri Jain— or instance the nonsmoothness in the fabric of capitalism itself as it globalizes—they, like the many other
theorists and thinkers discussed in this chapter, still focus on the relationship of art to
capitalism, touching specifically on photography and the digital image as a mediumspecific technological rupture in art, and look to the effects that visuality has on different
sensoriums (whether to enrich or impoverish them), as well as the value that new
sensoriums have for anti-capitalist struggles.
The next chapter looks at specific works of art made by artists working today,
scrutinizing them under the schema of contemporary art that we arrived at by combining
aspects of Rancière and Osborne’s theories. As I explained in the introduction, I will be
examining examples of “artveillance,” to use Brighenti’s term for artistic responses to
surveillance. I divide the contemporary works of artveillance into three types: countersurveillance, camouflage and counter-production. The three are linked by the use of the
very techniques and technologies of surveillance that they attempt to disrupt or critique.
The following chapter questions which tactics of anti-surveillance, anti-capitalist
artworks are most effective under conditions of hypersubsumption and its effects on
technological production, culture and subjectivity. To avoid confusion, I focus on
contemporary objects that are universally recognized and positioned as artworks,
understood as such by both their creators and audiences, both academic and lay. I
interrogate the various ways artveillance understands itself in relationship to capitalism
vis-à-vis the techniques used in its production as a technological object, the impact
artveillance seeks to have (if any) as a counter-politics, and how effective its various
strategies are.
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6 « Chapter Five: Analyzing Artveillance »
6.1 « Introduction »
Many artists are responding to contemporary social conditions under capitalist
hypersubsumption with anti-surveillant art, particularly to drones, but also to surveillance
and militarization. I will here evaluate the works’ strategies in relation to the standards of
contemporary art set forth in the previous chapter, reading them as art against
hypersubsumption, and showing the importance of art as an anti-capitalist political
strategy. I will also discuss the dangers of art that makes use of surveillance technology
failing to be contemporary.
Counter-surveillance, the first category of artwork that I will examine here,
includes sousveillance or “watching from beneath,” and describes works that either
attempt to redirect the surveillant gaze back toward its hegemonic source, or reveal the
gaze to the unknowing audience—often at the expense of subjecting the audience to
surveillance as a means to an end. Camouflage, as the name suggests, is concerned with
hiding from surveillance. I look at various works at ranging from elaborate face makeup
to bizarre masks that obscure the entire head. Camouflage is the category that relates
most closely to the military; as I also allude to later, the U.S. Navy directly employed
artists to come up with painting techniques for camouflaging their fleets on the seas.257
Counter-production is perhaps the most difficult to define category, because the name
does not intuitively suggest a specific action or intervention. I largely use counterproduction to refer to the anti-drone and military surveillance photography of
experimental geographer Trevor Paglen. As we will see, his works are what I consider
closest to the dialectical sublation of material and concept that Osborne refers to as
postconceptual art.

Javier Pes, “Dazzle Camouflage Helped Allied Warships win WWI. Now, Artists are Paying
Tribute to the Cubist-inspired Designs,” artnet, April 24, 2018.
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6.2 « Counter-surveillance »
Researcher Kirsty Robertson writes: “The prevailing artistic response to surveillance has
been what Steve Mann calls sousveillance, the ‘shooting back,’ or turning of surveillance
against itself, in projects that in their aiming of cameras at cameras, seek to draw
attention to the ability of an ephemeral controlling power to see, invade, record, and
make use of footage for political ends (Mann, 2002).”258 Sousveillance, literally meaning
“looking from below,” is deliberately opposed to surveillance, the God-like gaze from
above that emanates from those with dominant economic and political power. Robertson
goes on to pinpoint the central question of importance with regards to sousveillance as an
artistic and political strategy: “It would seem that the work of Steve Mann, Bill Brown,
and the Surveillance Camera Players, Denis Beaubois, and others is involved in
recapturing the gaze and, as often as not, of resituating it in a series of prosthetic eyes—
cameras, glasses, and lenses that attempt to return the gaze to a re-empowered viewer.
Given the relative privilege of those able to engage in projects that take on surveillance I
wonder at the focus on the gaze—do such projects contest the power of surveillance or
simply replicate it?”259 Robertson’s response is to focus on non-visual surveillance and its
relationship to the surveilled body as potential site of fruitful resistance. I however want
to “stay with the trouble”260 put forth in her question, using the query as a framework for
examining countersurveillant art and its efficacy as dissensual, contemporary and
counter-hegemonic.
What characterizes counter-surveillant art and how does it differ from other works
that attempt to undermine ubiquitous surveillance? When first considered, countersurveillant art falls neatly in line with Rancière’s concept of new aesthetic regimes that
perturb the prevailing order of the seen and unseen, because the primary modus operandi
Kirsty Robertson, “Try to Walk With the Sound of My Footsteps: The Surveillant Body in
Contemporary Art,” The Communication Review 11, no. 1 (2008): 25.
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of this type of art is based on the play of concealing and revealing, ostensibly
empowering the “watched” class by enabling them to look back at those in power,
seeking to control the gaze, rather than subverting it. Often this tactic resembles a certain
strain of scientific Marxism which, following a certain dedication to the commodity
fetish section in Capital, seeks to develop “class consciousness” through a bullish
unveiling of the workings of power and the poor conditions of the lower classes. It rests
on a confidence that by demonstrating that the wool has been pulled over the eyes of an
entire class, or country, or population, that group will attain class consciousness and rise
up against conditions of oppression and inequality. In keeping with this idea, some
current artistic circles utilize the very objects/strategies they attempt to critique—
dataveillance, predicative marketing, military and consumer drones—as a détournement
that attempts to hijack, hack and repurpose in order to illuminate a set of truths about the
world.
Among those artists working with countersurveillance, James Bridle, pioneer of
the New Aesthetic, is one of the most famous, prolific and accessible. Most famous for
their Dronestagram, According to Bridle’s website,261 Dronestagram was a series of
filtered photographs of the landscapes of U.S. drone strikes as close to their true locations
as was possible. These images were obtained from Google Maps Satellite after Bridle
researched drone strikes using Wikipedia, media reports and reports from local
governments. These images were then filtered by the popular photo sharing site
Instagram (owned by Facebook), and syndicated on Tumblr and Twitter. Each post is
accompanied by a short description of the drone strike it refers to.
The result is a series of God’s eye images of often barren, neutral-colored
landscapes that populate a feed and enable the account’s followers to scroll through a
seemingly endless barrage of similar images. None of the images actually depict the
carnage or ensuing wreckage that is the aftermath a drone strike. Instagram’s platform
allows one to open an image and simply click on a set of forward and back arrows that

James Bridle, Dronestagram: Drone’s Eye View, http://booktwo.org/notebook/dronestagramdrones-eye-view/ (accessed December 15, 2019).
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flank each image. If one goes through the images quickly, they almost look like a single
picture. Each photo, meanwhile, has hundreds of “likes” and the account boasts almost
22,000 followers. Bridle describes the goals of their projects as follows:
The drone, for me, stands in part for the network itself: an invisible, inherently
connected technology allowing sight and action at a distance. Us and the digital,
acting together, a medium and an exchange. But the non-human components of
the network are not moral actors, and the same technology that permits civilian
technological wonder, the wide-eyed futurism of the New Aesthetic and the
unevenly distributed joy of living now, also produces an obscurantist ‘security’
culture, ubiquitous surveillance, and robotic killing machines. This is a result of
the network’s inherent illegibility, its tendency towards seamlessness and
invisibility, from code to ‘the cloud’. Those who cannot perceive the network
cannot act effectively within it, and are powerless. The job, then, is to make such
things visible.262
According to Bridle, “Many [drone strikes] are in outlying areas and the information on
exact locations is scarce; where a precise location is not given, the view should be within
a few kilometers in most cases. Instagram does not allow you to select a location on a
map, only a place name, so unfortunately the images are geotagged to my current
location. Nevertheless: the landscapes and the places and their names are real.”263 Bridle,
as a white Westerner, becomes the referent for all the atrocities he aggregates on social
media as artworks. The proximity of the artist to the artworks transforms them not from
intractable and disturbing events to illuminated ones, but from inaccessible to
“interesting” objects of contemplation.
The stupefying effect of scrolling and the disconnect between the captions and the
images exacerbate the gulf between signifier and signified and threaten to make the
images a meaningless stream of distraction. It is no accident that the God’s-eye view of
Google Maps Satellite mimics that of the drone; the satellite is like the shadow of the
drone, arriving just after it to document its wake. It is difficult therefore not to see the
satellite feed as yet another imperial eye, ironically—or perhaps circularly—being turned
James Bridle, Under the Shadow of the Drone, http://booktwo.org/notebook/drone-shadows/,
accessed December 20, 2019.
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on the Middle East by a British citizen, who points to tragedy from a distance much like
the drone operator who is criticized by civilians, victims and peers alike for killing from a
distance. What is the impact of this distance and the uses of the technologies and
platforms Bridle puts to work in service of “making such things visible?” They are trying
to bring to light the atrocities committed by the U.S. through drones, yet is uncritically
using technology that replicates this gaze almost in its entirety, arguably eliminating only
the kill shot. But as we saw last chapter, drones represent not only repressive violence but
the martial gaze, which is an attitude or stance within a constellation of technological
objects. The drone, after all, initially was only for reconnaissance, like its predecessor, the
recon airplane. Similarly, Google Satellite performs its own kind of reconnaissance, and
Bridle becomes an unwitting soldier, spying on tragic violence without bringing it into
focus. I am not suggesting that Bridle’s project would be better served by showing
images of war torn buildings and bodies; rather, I am pointing out that the use of Google
Satellite, a technology embroiled in the imperial mapping of the world as a geocartographic goal in the service of global capitalist domination, points to Bridle’s
asymmetric power as a First World artistic voyeur.
Dronestagram is not strictly documentary in style. It arrives after the event,
trailing in its wake, attempting to pin down what exactly happened and where. This is
because the events in question are often clandestine or difficult to access. Once they are
finally reported on, the event itself and evidence of its aftermath are no longer visible.
This creates a dichotomy between Dronestagram’s captions—short, clinical descriptions
of drone strikes—and the images themselves. Both are somewhat sanitized, the latter
being devoid of the wreckage one would expect to find after a strike. Though they are
meant to show the detachment in official government reports, the descriptions, with their
cold tone, actually tend to reinforce the absence of the drone strike in the photos,
enhancing their surreal nature and further aestheticizing the events. Through
aestheticization, Dronestagram makes the drone war seem further from home and the
U.S. citizen; its aesthetic dimension in the form of the Instagram feed facilitates the easy
commodification of the GWOT through its quick consumption on social media. Whereas
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before, drone strikes seemed distant and secretive, Bridle’s work attempts to bring the
routinization and profusion of strikes to the public’s attention by harnessing the banality
of Instagram’s platform to satirize the ordinariness of violence and the American people’s
ability to scroll through war as they scroll through advertisements. But the work could
just as well have the opposite effect, helping to further distance viewers from the actuality
of drone strikes.
Bridle is the main architect of the New Aesthetic, which sets the agenda for their
work. The New Aesthetic was defined at a panel during popular music festival South by
Southwest, and refined by Bridle in a Tumblr manifesto:
Just as my drone works are not about the objects themselves, but about the
systems—technological, spatial, legal and political—which permit, shape and
produce them, and about the wider implications of seeing and not seeing such
technological, systematic, operations; so the New Aesthetic is concerned with
everything that is not visible in these images and quotes, but that is inseparable
from them, and without which they would not exist…the New Aesthetic project is
undertaken within its own medium: it is an attempt to “write” critically about the
network in the vernacular of the network itself: in a tumblr, in blog posts, in
YouTube videos of lectures, tweeted reports and messages, reblogs, likes, and
comments…the New Aesthetic reproduces the structure and disposition of the
network itself, as a form of critique.264
Bridle goes on to declare that those who do not understand technology are doomed to
have politics “done to them.” Though the New Aesthetic claims to utilize network
technologies in order to critique them, the connection between technology and politics
oftentimes results in a conflation of the two. A mere deployment of technology by an
artist or activist is not in itself a critique, nor is it an inherently political action. As we
have seen with Rancière, and to a lesser extent, Osborne, there is no such thing as an
inherently political action.

James Bridle The New Aesthetics and Its Politics, http://www.pilproject.net/docs/the-newaesthetic-and-its-politics.pdf/, accessed January 2, 2019.
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Bridle is also the artist behind the projects Drone Shadow265 and Watching the
Watchers.266 Both rely on the conspiratorial idea that power operates in the shadows and
is fundamentally invisible; the job of the artist is to make power and its networks visible.
Under this schema, visibility is equated with knowledge, which is then equated with
political efficacy/engagement.267 Bridle states it plainly in his explanation of Watching
the Watchers: “Watching the Watchers is an ongoing series of images taken from
publicly-available digital satellite maps, of unmanned aircraft around the world, at
Drone Shadow is a project that consists of creating life-sized, white outlines of drones
reminiscent of crime scene outlines. These “shadows” lurk not in the war-torn “over there” but in
the very countries deploying them.
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Watching the Watchers is a growing collection of images of military unmanned aerial vehicles
(drones) as captured in publicly available satellite imagery. Initialized in 2013, the collection had
grown to 78 images as of April 2017.
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Of course, Bridle is not the only one who insists on the play of concealing and revealing as a
primary goal. Another prominent artist who uses the tools of violence in an attempt to rehab them
is Tomas van Houtryve, most famous for his work Blue Sky Days. Van Houtryve travels around
the U.S.—a country which unilaterally dispenses deadly drones to other countries while itself
remaining unscathed—with a camera attached to a small hobby drone. Mimicking the style of
military drone photography (the images are actually very similar to Bridle’s Dronestagram), van
Houtryve photographs locals that would in other circumstances be targets for drone strikes—
large gatherings of people, parties, etc. A group of white Americans doing yoga in the park, for
example, may look from a distance like a group of worshippers engaged in prayer. This ambiguity
is at the center of van Houtryve’s work, and is its strongest aspect. Curator Neils Van Tomme
describes the work as follows: “Blue Sky Days problematizes the effect of the vertical perspective
and the necropolitical logic to which it invites. In contemporary warfare, the digital drone image
is no longer treated as a passive representation, but as an active entity, being part of a process.
Blue Sky Days as a series of static photographic images emphasizes ambiguity and undecidability,
which contrasts the visuality of certainty employed by synthetic vision systems. Van Houtryve
uses a strategy of anthropomorphism, a strategy that raises awareness for the fact that agency is
distributed by human and nonhuman forces. His series humanizes the other, encourages empathy
for the people living under the drone, which contrast the current of anthropophobia in synthetic
imagery.” (Niels Van Tomme, Visibility Machines, exh. cat (Baltimore, Maryland: Center for Art,
Design and Visual Culture, 2014). Blue Sky Days attempts to contrast the ambiguity of reality
with the sterile algorithmic decision-making of drones in a potentially dissensual series that
works to create a rift between the commonly accepted sensorium of drone logic and the situation
“on the ground.” However, because this project still relies on the drone to take photographs, it
also reproduces the unseen, unsolicited surveillant eye that takes one’s image without permission.
This is not an issue of privacy (at least not most importantly); rather, it is about the fact that van
Houtryve’s project could not exist without reproducing this logic. In order to “reveal” the shared
vulnerability of everybody under the network and elicit the empathy Neils describes, Blue Sky
Days must turn a predatory eye on the subjects of its photographs, making its viewers complicit
in their own exploitation and forcing empathy for themselves (which is not strictly empathy) as
they realize their exploitation. Though the project is ostensibly about humanizing and
complicating the machinic gaze as well as its targets, it cannot accomplish this except through the
martial gaze.
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training bases in the US desert and secret installations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
elsewhere. These military technologies, designed to operate without being seen—
visually, politically, or morally—are nevertheless accessible to the gaze of contemporary,
civilian networks. By rendering them visible, we render their operation and politics
legible, and thus open to intervention.”268 But simply seeing the network (which arguably
may not even be achieved here) does not mean that those “on the ground” have any more
control over its systems of production or its technological agents (e.g., the military
drone).
The problem with sousveillance, as Robertson explains, is that it quickly becomes
co-veillance, where the “co” refers not to the watched watching the watchers but to a
complicity of a certain class possessing real economic, technological and social power
watching those excluded from society. As we saw with Dronestagram, one way this is
accomplished is via the uncritical “reappropriation” of capitalist technologies for socalled artistic or revolutionary purposes. But simply re-aiming the martial gaze does not
defang it, nor distance it from its origins in military networks of control. The entire
visible/invisible dialogue stops at the step of revealing. This differs from the creation of
dissensus, which is not political in itself but is the beginning of politics; it structurally
shifts the aesthetic regime, opening new possibilities, but it is not those possibilities in
itself. An artistic practice that relies on games of ideological peek-a-boo may not be
effective at disrupting systems of violence. On the contrary, such works often perpetuate
the asymmetries of power that capitalism relies upon. In other words, the ontological
underpinnings of these artworks are not enough to overcome their own condition of
hypersubsumption, and instead become part of its genealogy of exploitation and violence.
Sousveillance also does not account for the fact that as Robertson argues,
“surveillance has always been more than a visual technology, nor for the fact that the bulk
of surveillance increasingly takes place out of sight, moving into the worlds of data and

James Bridle, “Watching the Watchers,” Multiple mounted colour prints, 2014, Open Data
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biometrics.”269 She further explains: “What I find problematic is the uncritical acceptance
of the gaze as something that needs to be reclaimed and controlled. This acceptance is
often coupled with a general denial, on the part of many, though not all, artists, of the
ambiguous comfort offered by surveillance—the feeling of safety (no matter how offbase) that comes through the sense that someone is watching in the dark tunnels and unlit
streets of the city.”270 This feeling of comfort or pleasure is what I alluded to in previous
chapters as the necessity of participation in the digital sphere to gain access to social
capital, often at the expense of marginalized populations. Recall that under the
banopticon model, what are seen as the pleasures of today’s capitalism are only possible
through the exclusion of certain populations via sophisticated surveillance methods. In
today’s transnational (to use Osborne’s term) world, where geopolitical and geographical
boundaries often mean very little and state sovereignty has yet to come to terms with (let
alone legislate) the complex web of private corporations that reach across, through and
between lawful boundaries, surveillance creates social boundaries through systems of
control. These are in turn strengthened through governmental controls on citizenship and
access to the commons. The comfort that “someone is watching in the dark tunnels”
extends only to those in the lighted glow of the majority, and the populations Robertson
mentions suffer for it necessarily—they are often seen as the shadowy horrors in the dark
tunnels. As art critic Bruce Sterling— a man with often times less than sterling political
commitments— says, “[t]he British cops have boatloads of surveillance cams, heaps of
’em. Better cams all the time. That cop network isn’t going to magically become an art
connoisseur. The aesthetics of surveillance cams are not value-free. Because aesthetics
are not value-free.”271 Sterling was one of the first thinkers to systematically review the
New Aesthetic movement and offer a substantial critique of it. While the New Aesthetic
may seem like somewhat of a straw-man here, according to its own intense assertions it
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represents a particular strand of contemporary thought and series of metaphysical
commitments that weaves from object-oriented ontology to actor-network theory to the
Chthulucene. Even if the movement itself does not have an articulate theoretical
commitment, its lack thereof is itself a commitment to spectacular bricolage. In
Osborne’s parlance, the New Aesthetic returns to a concern with the medium of the art
object while hiding an incoherent conceptual commitment in a series of glitches.

6.3 « Camouflage: Hide, Dazzle, Obscure »
Within its desire to reveal the hidden, Bridle’s work also incorporates the necessary
antithesis: hiding from sight, or camouflage. It is easy to see why camouflage art has
risen to prominence as global surveillance has increased. An earlier chapter used
Bousquet to trace the parallel development of aerial reconnaissance and the varied
techniques of military camouflage that arose to combat it. These techniques included
blending in with the environment, using barriers to hide from sight, and dazzle
camouflage, which relies on visual tricks to make the contours of an object more difficult
to discern in its environment. As Hanna Rose Shell defines it, camouflage “cannot be
reprinted or packaged. It is a way of seeing, being, moving, and working in the world. It
is a form of cultivated subjectivity. As such, it is an individuated form of self-awareness
that is also part of a network of institutional practices. Camouflage unfolds across time
and space, across disciplinary and discursive boundaries, as an adaptive logic of escape
from photographic representation.”272 It is a form of effacement, an erasure of being, with
all of its photologocentric connotations. Shell points out that the artist Pablo Picasso,
upon seeing a tank painted in all kinds of blocky shapes and colors, remarked that
camouflage was cubism.273 It is interesting to note the claim that, because it must be
explicitly cultivated as a form of being-in-the-world, camouflage cannot be pre-packaged
—or implicitly, commodified and sold. Shell of course cannot mean this literally, since
Hanna Rose Shell, Hide and Seek: Camouflage, Photography, and the Media of
Reconnaissance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012), 19.
272

273

Shell, 19.

151

the military’s use of camouflage was bought and then prefabricated through the labour of
scientists and artists. Shell proposes three ways of categorizing the material development
of camouflage in history, culminating with what she calls “dynamic” camouflage, which
seeks to hide from the near-instantaneous mobile surveillance devices of today.
This section will discuss the works of two artists who both respond to state
surveillance by producing artifacts that hide or obscure their bearers. One artist uncovers
the blind spots in the infrastructure of digital surveillance and reacts with works that
exploit these blind spots, while the other attempts to turn the “working” aspects of
surveillance against it in a way that exposes the problematic aspects of so-called
“objective” machinic vision while simultaneously hiding from it. Artist Adam Harvey is
most famous for Stealth Wear and CV Dazzle, both of which seek to use self-applied
external techniques of clothing and/or make-up and hair to confuse or hide from optical
surveillance. Stealth Wear, which was inspired by CV Dazzle, cloaks its wearers in
oversized silver garments ranging from just covering the chest to as long as the waist.
Each item of clothing also includes a hood-like portion which covers the head. Ostensibly
inspired by “traditional Islamic dress” (according to Harvey’s website), each outfit is
made from silver-coated fabric designed specifically to reflect heat in order to avoid the
thermal surveillance common in aerial drones. The clothing is what he calls “privacy
wear,” meant to be a subversion of the militarized eye. However, this project is also a
fashion line, and Harvey’s site advertises the Dazzle hoodie, burqa and hijab using
pictures of athletic, attractive models posing provocatively, with their images duplicated
under heat vision in order to demonstrate how they become “invisible.” The hoodie is
modeled by a man of unknown ethnicity (seen only in profile—his face is not visible at
all) covered in intricate tattoos and a white woman sporting heavy black eyeliner, which
is also on the eyes of the ostensibly Muslim woman modeling both the burqa and the
hijab. The garments that cover more of the body still manage to reflect a Western vision
of sexuality, while at the same time painting the East as “exotic” and feminized. Of the
wearers of the hoodie, which displays their shapely torsos and muscled abs, only the
woman’s face is visible, and her eyeliner, mirrored by the Muslim woman’s, harkens back
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to the traditional kohl liner used in Middle Eastern, African, and Indian cultures (the latter
in particular uses kohl to drive away the evil eye).
Though the idea is to use traditional Muslim dress to hide from the very predatory
technologies that hunt for individuals wearing those items, the photographs could just as
easily be stills from a high fashion runway presenting political “privacy” wear—which is
clearly Harvey’s intent. For a time, Stealth Wear could be purchased at the Privacy Gift
Shop, a site operated by Harvey, starting at $300 and climbing to almost $600 for the
hoodie, while the burqa retailed at $2200 (all prices in USD). Privacy Gift Shop is
currently on hiatus, and Stealth Wear is sold out, which begs the question: who is buying
this clothing? Harvey’s site advises that homemade alternatives could use mylar, which
would be much hotter and less effective than his fabric, which has silver woven into it for
maximum flexibility and heat diffusion. It is no wonder this project came on the heels of
the successful CV Dazzle—such a project is not affordable for every artist, particularly
with such a stylish and aestheticized execution. Additionally, though inspired by Islamic
religious garb, the average citizen in Pakistan or Yemen, for example (the most common
targets for U.S. drone strikes), is clearly not the target consumer for Stealth Wear, with its
sleekly swathed models and enormous price tags. By exploiting traditional clothing of a
war-torn region to create a high concept, costly fashion line in the U.S., Harvey’s project
inadvertently lays bare the relationship between Western consumption and the destruction
of bodies “over there.” In other words, Harvey’s project achieves camouflage from
drones for the people who are already safe from their martial gaze, specifically by
extracting the practices of bodies most vulnerable to such attacks, subjecting the latter to
a double predation—the everyday buzzing of military drones and the opportunistic gaze
of the artist’s “inspiration.”
The earlier project, CV Dazzle, which takes its name and technique from the
dazzle camouflage of WWII, uses the strategic application of makeup and faux hair in
vivid colors and patterns to confuse facial recognition algorithms. Since these algorithms
are trained to recognize certain patterns of light and dark in order to distinguish features
like noses, cheekbones, etc., the makeup works by changing facial symmetry via a new

153

configuration of light and dark. The play of light and dark is reminiscent of Baroque
painting, which famously used formal techniques of tenebrism, or “dramatic
illumination,” and chiaroscuro—strong contrasts between light and dark—to dramatize
the moral and ethical content of paintings. It could be said that facial recognition
algorithms operate in a similar fashion, deciding the “goodness” of a person (social
sorting) based on the play of light and dark on their countenance; Harvey’s camouflage is
its own Baroque drama, using bright swathes of blue, blocky whites and blacks, and neon
shocks of hair to make its actors appear to the human eye like edgy, bizarre works of
living art. In Harvey’s world, Baroque battles Baroque, and the result is certainly
aesthetically spectacular.
CV Dazzle was covered by The Atlantic (among other publications), which
featured the gently made-up face of a blue-eyed man, blonde hair falling pleasingly into
his eyes in a haphazard, relaxed manner, making him appear like a fashionable surfer
artiste.274 The Atlantic refers to Adam Harvey as an “artist, designer, and entrepreneur,”
and goes on to describe the project as follows: “CV dazzle is ostentatious and kind of radlooking, in a joyful, dystopic way. The first time I saw it, three years ago, I found it
charismatic and captivating. Here was a technology that confounded computers with light
and color…”275 which makes one wonder: is this a work of art, a political technique, a
fashion statement or a marketing technique? The reference to joy, light and color makes
evading facial recognition seem frivolous, exciting and even fun, like a craft project one
can pick up and put down experimentally, without any real stakes. Unlike Stealth Wear,
CV Dazzle offers its techniques free of charge on open source software, and is even
working on a toolkit where the success of somebody’s camouflage techniques would be
tested against actual facial recognition software.
The CV Dazzle website reads like a fashion show, advertising the camouflage
“look book,” which features pictures of thin models (again white or Eastern, this time
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East Asian) in successful makeup, and offers “style tips for reclaiming privacy,” referring
to those applying the makeup as “stylists”— a luxury typically afforded only to the
wealthy and famous, who can afford to hire somebody else to dress and beautify them.
These tips discourage users from wearing masks to keep from being recognized, because
masks are illegal in some cities. Instead the user is encouraged to exploit facial
recognition software’s reliance on facial symmetry and dark and light tones—to disrupt
the symmetry with makeup, cut the planes of the nose with wild hair pieces or loud
accessories. Because facial recognition distinguishes skin tone, use light colors on dark
skin and dark colors on light skin.
Though it is open source, the website nonetheless features an “All content ©
Adam Harvey” logo. While the open source software and apparently universally
accessible makeup tips gesture toward a commitment to democratic values, the
trademarking of content reminds us that Harvey’s work is equal parts art and branding.
Stealth Wear sells for hundreds or thousands of dollars and the process for creating each
piece is virtually impossible to replicate. Stealth Wear is literally commodified and sold,
again under the banner of Harvey’s personal brand, effacing the labor that went into the
line’s production. Harvey’s work is indeed contemporary, though not in the sense of
future-oriented utopianism espoused by Rancière or the dialectical synthesis of material
and content favored by Osborne. Rather, Harvey is an example of the way speculating on
art de-fetishizes the art commodity, but only through the fetishization of the artist—the
labor of the artist is entirely transparent and the artist as brand is now what is being sold.
These works encapsulate contemporary neoliberal capitalism’s interest in the promise of
individuality through aesthetics, social participation, and the reclamation of privacy; the
latter concern dominates popular surveillance discourse. Surveillance scholar Torin
Monahan sums up the relationship between camouflage and neoliberal values in the
following way:
Anti-surveillance camouflage enacts a play of surveillance avoidance. It frames
the enemy either as state and corporate actors invading one’s privacy or as
malicious individuals seeking to violate helpless others through voyeuristic
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transgressions. The gaze is always unwanted; it always individuates; it always
objectifies. In this narrative, there is little room to engage the problems of
categorical suspicion that undergird marginalizing surveillance because the unit of
analysis is the individual, not the group. There is little room to explore complex
amalgams of desired surveillance, extractive systems, and hidden effects. The
provocation is one of the enlightened, bourgeois subject asserting his or her right
to be left alone, which is a claim that by its very implied utterance already reveals
the relative privilege of the one making it.276
As this critique points out, this artistic approach to camouflage misunderstands power as
a set of top-down repressive actors against whom the free individual must defend their
rights—particularly the right to their bodily autonomy and privacy. But as we saw with
Foucault, and more recently in Deleuze, power is a diffuse network whose most
impressive mechanism is the interplay or feedback loop between the auto-performance of
surveillance and the invisible systems of control that function through a relationship to
inconceivably quick network technology in the service of late capitalism.
Harvey’s work is exemplary of Deleuze’s dividual; he posits the surveillant gaze
as an unwanted, unilateral Big Brother, while his clothes and makeup offer a way for the
singular subject to assert their right to privacy precisely through their individuality—they
can apply their own personal makeup and style their hair and Stealth Wear in unique
ways. “The individual conceived through these technologies of power is a dividual, a
social entity that can be segmented into traits to be controlled selectively in each relevant
dimension that is currently examined and which—most importantly—can be calculated in
an aggregate way.”277 Stealth Wear in particular, because of its limiting price point, is an
extreme case that reveals, as Monahan says, the privilege of those claiming privacy. CV
Dazzle, meanwhile, makes suggestions about hiding one’s face based on the principles of
supposedly “bad” facial recognition software, which equates faciality with a universal
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(ableist) symmetry, and privileges certain skin tones and textures as the most legible.278
As Monahan puts it, “it would seem, then, that systems of oppression and discrimination
—racism, sexism, classism, ableism, etc.—are preserved or at least not directly contested
by anti-surveillance artistic experiments.”279 Turning to hyper-visibility as an antihegemonic tactic is also not necessarily an antithesis to the logic of surveillance
capitalism, itself born from the condition of the hypersubsumption of modes of
production to the logic of information-based capitalism. As Marx explains in the 1844
Manuscripts, “the capitalist mode of production—which now first appears as a mode of
production sui generis (in its own right)—creates a change in the shape of material
production. On the other hand, this change in the material shape forms the basis for the
development of the capital-relation, whose adequate shape therefore only corresponds to
a particular level of development of the material forces of production. We have examined
the way in which the worker’s relation of dependence in production itself is thereby given
a new shape.”280 Though he is referring to the change from formal to real subsumption, in
our case we can extend the statement to hypersubsumption, or to how the prominent
contemporary modes of production—namely those that rely on value extraction through
social sorting and consumer tracking, facilitated by surveillance as martial gaze—affect
not only the production-consumption cycle and shape what is produced and desired, but
also the perceptions of what is “within” or “outside” capitalism.
Capitalism is more sophisticated than a simple dichotomy between the visible and
the hidden. On the contrary, as Jasper Bernes explains in his discussion of logistics and
cognitive mapping: “Logistics is capital’s own project of cognitive mapping. Hence, the
prominence of “visibility” among the watchwords of the logistics industry. To manage a
“Given that biometric systems already “fail” at a greater rate for racial minorities, effectively
nominating those populations for increased scrutiny, what might be the effects of someone
marked as Other openly and intentionally challenging state surveillance systems? Could this lead
to anything but intensified observation, search, and intervention?” Monahan, “Right to Hide,”165.
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supply chain means to render it transparent…the more transparent and ‘user-friendly’ the
computerised processes are, the more opaque the total process they control becomes. His
conclusion should trouble any simplistic conception of the powers of visibility or the
‘cognitive map’ as such.”281 Surveillance is a function of the extension of logistics under
hypersubsumption; what was once for the military a way to track the material supply
chain has expanded through lightning-fast informational technologies and absorbed or
reshaped not only the production process but consumption and consumers as nodes in the
supply chain that must be monitored and quantified.
As I said earlier, the process of banoptic social sorting is meant to facilitate
friction-free participation in social goods for desirable consumers. We can see how
visibility, instead of fighting against the black-box of top-down power, is actually a vital
part of the operation of capitalism. Not only that, but the making-visible of surveillance,
as a part of the operation of logistics, does not necessarily provide any epistemological
clarity or greater understanding, and does nothing to undo the asymmetrical relationship
of power and control afforded the network of forces who benefit from the global roving
eye.
Another approach to anti-surveillance art that operates through a logic of
camouflage is artist and theorist Zach Blas. Blas’ work actually begins from the premise
that the universal principles underlying facial recognition technology are biased, and
moreover that their universality is based on average features that, when taken all together,
do not and cannot equate to any real human being. Facial Weaponization Suite is a series
of machine-fabricated masks, which Blas describes on his website as follows:
Facial Weaponization Suite protests against biometric facial recognition–and the
inequalities these technologies propagate–by making “collective masks” in
workshops that are modeled from the aggregated facial data of participants,
resulting in amorphous masks that cannot be detected as human faces by
biometric facial recognition technologies. The masks are used for public
interventions and performances. One mask, the Fag Face Mask, generated from
the biometric facial data of many queer men’s faces, is a response to scientific
studies that link determining sexual orientation through rapid facial recognition
281
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techniques. Another mask explores a tripartite conception of blackness: the
inability of biometric technologies to detect dark skin as racist, the favoring of
black in militant aesthetics, and black as that which informatically obfuscates. A
third mask engages feminism’s relations to concealment and imperceptibility,
taking veil legislation in France as a troubling site that oppressively
forces visibility. A fourth mask considers biometrics’ deployment as a security
technology at the Mexico-US border and the nationalist violence it instigates.
These masks intersect with social movements’ use of masking as an opaque tool
of collective transformation that refuses dominant forms of political
representation.282
The masks themselves are uncanny, arresting, and obviously unwieldy—that is, they do
not have apertures for the wearer to see, hear, or even breathe, and are meant, as Blas
says, for strategic performances and short-term use. That is, they are strictly “art.” Fag
Face, a Pepto-Bismol pink monstrosity, has all the unnatural angles of Lovecraftian
geometry or a tormented face of the David Lynch variety. Each mask is a set of strange
curves that build and twist upon each other and thus give off the silhouette of a precarious
upside-down pyramid. This is fitting, as the masks are eerily reminiscent of nineteenth
century death masks—but only in the context of the works being placed on the shoulders.
Death masks, popular in Europe from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, were
plaster casts taken of the faces of the recently deceased. Unlike other funeral masks,
European death masks were not meant to be placed on the deceased’s face for burial. On
the contrary, these masks were meant for the living, used as funeral effigies or—because
they predated photography—as models for sculptors and painters. As with Blas’ masks,
which are addressed to the eyes of facial recognition, death masks were also aimed at a
particular gaze—that of the living who were left behind. And this gaze, in turn, was the
condition of possibility for such masks, which could only be made after the Gorgon
stare283 of the living fixed the deceased as “dead.” Thus death masks can be placed within
the lineage of the martial gaze outlined by Bousquet. They predate photography but
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prefigure the relationship between violence, visuality and annihilation that photography
would eventually usher in.
Blas’ masks also harken back to death masks in their strange structures: according
to Wikipedia, “it is sometimes possible to identify portraits that have been painted from
death masks, because of the characteristic slight distortions of the features caused by the
weight of the plaster during the making of the mould.”284 With the advent of the
nineteenth century and its turn to scientific rationalism, death masks were used by
scientists to study physiognomy. Death masks taken from famous dead people and
notorious criminals became part of early developments in phrenology and contributed to
racist ideas about morality as biologically encoded behavior that differed along racial
lines, thus allowing the newly biopolitical governments of the West to discriminate
against certain populations.
This is itself a direct precursor to both the social sorting of banopticism as well as
the system that made possible the creation of Facial Weaponization Suite in the first
place; the type of algorithmic analysis and prediction performed by facial recognition,
which (falsely) claims to differentiate a queer face from a heterosexual one, is a direct
descendent of the scientific tradition that linked behavior to so-called biological
difference. Thus the nineteenth century death mask can be seen as a form of social sorting
and biopolitics, while Blas’ masks could be said to themselves be a type of death mask—
monuments to the contemporary relationship between destruction and droning, or the
specific type of visualization that manifests under the surveillant gaze.
However, these masks are also only symbolic heads, recognizable as masks only
through the relation to the rest of the body. Left to its own devices, the masks in Facial
Weaponization Suite would not immediately read as masks, or have any overt relationship
to faciality. Not only do the masks offer no sensory pathways for the wearer, there are
also no overt facial markers for the viewer—either the human audience or the facial
recognition machine. Of course, this is the entire point—that a mask like Fag Face,
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which is taken from real biometric data based on facial scans of various queer men and
then aggregated and averaged, does not produce any recognizably human face—not even
to the machine that scans for these precise markers. There is no average queer citizen, no
universal queerness, and since this impossible universal is built from a collection of
particulars, there must also be some calculation error in recognizing the particular as
well.
The concept of informatic opacity, which Blas uses to describe his work, is an
amalgam of Alex Galloway and Eugene Thacker’s informatic invisibility285 and Édouard
Glissant’s concept of opacity.286 For Blas, security, including the watchful eye of
surveillance and droning, strives to make subjects as transparent as possible, primarily
through various technological interfaces. While Harvey’s art exploits rigid technological
infrastructure in order to seek out its blind spots for the purposes of hiding in them, Blas’
work posits severing the relationally that is an inherent tenet in the operation of security
“in order for security to secure, it must first relate…I would argue that security may
operate as an independent entity but its automated independence exists not as an entity
whose structure is made to be falsely independent in favour of discursive relationships,
but instead resembles a discrete anonymous entity, as headless as it is blind.”287 In this
case, surveillance, by way of facial recognition, stands in for the security apparatus. Is it
true, then, that Blas’ project depends on a relation between the surveillant eye and those
in hiding from it? If so, what is the status of the human in this relation with the surveillant
gaze—could it be anything other than as prey is to predator?
According to Blas, “informatic opacity, then, is best understood as a prized
method of contra-internet aesthetics…This demands an inexhaustible openness, as
something not fully known but sensed—a longing, the fantasy of a future. Thus, the
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promise of contra-internet aesthetics is a utopian horizon.”288 Blas’ statement, with its
references to futurity and utopianism, has the ring of both Rancière and Osborne. It seems
that the fantastic future he is referring to is one that operates according to a counterhegemonic sensual regime through a reorganization of spatio-temporal logics. Monahan
also comments on Blas’ work: “Rather than simply substitute one bizarre collective
representation for an alienating singular one, the Facial Weaponization Suite aspires to
erase identity markers altogether. It denies the legitimacy of a market of discrete
identities and the systems that would reduce people to them.”289 True to Glissant’s own
work, Blas’ use of opacity attempts to severe relationality by denying legible
representation. Glissant’s work is a plea to the parties in a relation to leave the object of
their stares alone—to allow them to be opaque and thus to deny subjectivity by
disallowing relationality as that which, like the surveillant gaze, fixes each member in
place and opens them up to violence. Glissant writes: “the right to opacity that is not
enclosure within an impenetrable autarchy but subsistence within an irreducible
singularity. Opacities can coexist and converge, weaving fabrics…give up this obsession
with discovering what lies at the bottom of natures…the opaque is not the obscure,
though it is possible for it to be so and be accepted as such. It is that which cannot be
reduced, which is the most perennial guarantee of participation and confluence.”290 By
insisting on the Other’s right to opacity, a true relationality is made possible. For Glissant,
“[to] disindividuate relation is to relate the theory to the lived experience of every form of
humanity in its singularity. This means returning to the opacities, which produce every
exception, are propelled by every divergence, and live through becoming involved not
with projects but with the reflected density of existences.”291 Glissant’s work focuses on
poetics as an aesthetic form of novelty that allows for ruptures in relation and ushers in
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opacity. Though this chapter is focused neither on poetics nor on relation per se, there is
an obvious resonance between Glissant’s ideas of new communities based on singularity
and divergence through the aesthetic sensorium and Rancière’s dissensus, in which art
creates ruptures in the hegemonic order of sensation which in turn allow for political
action that allows new communities of sense to be part of the social order (while
remaking that order by their very existence).
In order to achieve opacity in Facial Weaponization Suite, however, Blas turns to
an oversaturation of subjectivity/individual identity in order to overload facial recognition
and render the masked person illegible to its systems. Unlike Glissant’s focus on deinvidualizing, the masks cannot help but be an individualistic solution to the problem of
facial recognition. Not unlike Harvey’s work, Facial Weaponization Suite posits itself as
symbolic, artistic and political—in other words, available to those whose situation allows
for the leisure of a symbolic solution—those not in the crosshairs. For Monahan, Blas’
work “frames surveillance from enemies as an inevitable, natural state of affairs that
demands creative adaptation on the part of the would-be prey. It is a framing that—in
neoliberal and social Darwinian fashion—responsibilizes avoidance of undesired scrutiny
and implies that those who cannot evade the predator deserve targeting and are unfit for
survival.”292 In creating masks that utilize algorithmic data from facial recognition,
however, Blas’ work inadvertently legitimizes the categories (queer, Black, woman, etc.)
that the work seeks to critique. Monahan sums up the issue and offers the following
potential solution in his paper:
In accepting scientific claims about queerness and the body, Blas might be
unwittingly affirming the validity of constructed truths about measurable
biological difference. In essence, the Facial Weaponization Suite says that the
identity markers ascribed to us by institutions, including the institution of
mainstream science, are accurate, so only by erasing and evading (not debunking)
them can we obtain freedom…The hegemony of militaristic framings bounds
what is viewed as possible and practical, positioning resistance problematically as
threatening to the nation state and deserving of criminalization. Perhaps, taking a
cue from Jacques Derrida, a better goal might be to defuse, instead of combat, the
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violence of binary logics. Such a discursive move could inspire a greater tolerance
for ambiguous identities and the messiness of social worlds.293
Monahan’s critique is aimed at the reactive nature of Blas’ work. By using facial
recognition technology, even if it is hacked or otherwise augmented, Blas must rely on
the existence of the martial gaze and then inflict that gaze on others. Though Blas’ masks
are literally meant to conceal, they actually operate under the same logic of revealing/
concealing as Bridle’s work. They reveal the hidden networks of surveillance and facial
recognition at work, and usefully make explicit the relationship between biometric
surveillance in the West and its deadlier counterpart in other parts of the world. But we
are left wondering—what then?

6.4 « Counter-production: Beyond the Visible »
This final section focuses on the work of geographer and photographer Trevor Paglen,
particularly two series titled Limit Telephotography and Untitled (Drones). Although the
former does not deal explicitly with drones, it does speak to surveillance and the concern
with invisibility/bringing to light, as well as militarized spaces and the public sensorium.
The two series can be studied side by side as parallel critiques of contemporary modes of
looking.
Untitled is a series of long-distance photographs of aerial drones in flight, high in
the sky, against various dynamic and color-saturated skies. Each individual work is called
Untitled (_____), in which the blank is filled by the name of the drone being
photographed (Predator, e.g.). In addition to the photographs of the distant sky, Reaper
Drone is a blurry photograph of the title’s namesake on a classified U.S. military base,
captured from two miles away. The images of drones in the sky present the drone as a
tiny, barely identifiable speck against a vast atmospheric landscape; in fact, Paglen, who
has formal training as a geographer as well as an artist, has commented that his body of
work explores landscape in multiple ways: “one is thinking about landscape just as a
293
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form, another is about the sky as a kind of landscape.”294 Like the work of Ansel Adams,
Paglen’s photographs of drones in flight do evoke wonder at the vastness and beauty of
the sky. This connection to early American landscape photography, as well as other art
historical references, is intentional:
Ideologically and technologically, today’s military and reconnaissance spacecraft
are directly descended from the men who once roamed America’s deserts and
mountains photographing blank spots on maps…The patriarchs of western
photography—Carleton Watkins, Edward Muybridge, Timothy O’Sullivan, and
others—all played a part in asserting control over the landscapes they drew into
their cameras. Watkins got his start in the mountains here shooting for-hire photos
used to resolve land disputes and documenting mining interests before famously
photographing Yosemite for the benefit of people who would never see it
firsthand. Muybridge, likewise, spent time making a living from photographs of
Yosemite’s granite cliffs and forested valleys, but he also worked for the United
States Army, documenting the military assault on the Modoc…Harold Eugene
‘Doc’ Edgerton, whose strobe cameras picked up where Muybridge’s research left
off, developed high-speed cameras that were first installed in reconnaissance
aircraft and then improved to photograph nuclear explosions—dissecting,
nanosecond by nanosecond, mushroom clouds at the Nevada Test Site. Edgerton
soon realized that triggering a camera to record nuclear blasts wasn’t that different
from triggering the blasts themselves; his company, EG&G, became a major
military contractor by turning his photographic triggers into detonators.295
Here, Paglen expresses the relationship between so-called “blank spots on the map”
(which is also the name of a monograph he published) and the frontier ideology of
manifest destiny, which can be seen at work in early photographers’ desire to capture, and
thus tame, “empty” landscapes and non-human animals (among others). These early
photographers were often explicitly employed by military or private militarized interests
and developed pioneering photographic techniques on behalf of military research. These
art historical references demonstrate the relationships between historical and
contemporary modes of seeing as responses to socio-historical circumstances. Paglen
views his own work in this constellation as follows:
Helen Soitas, “Trevor Paglen, Machines Visions,” The Art Newspaper (June 2018), n.p.
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/feature/trevor-paglen-machine-visions/.
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My own surveying and photographing of ‘the other night sky’296 is yet another
iteration of the frontier photographers’ tradition of visualizing and ordering blank
spots on maps…If, as was the case with the landscape photographers of the past,
the production of symbolic order goes hand in hand with the exertion of control—
if, that is, we can only control things by first naming or imaging them—then
developing a lexicon of the other night sky might be a step toward reclaiming the
violence flowing through it. But this is not a passive exercise. As I photograph the
other night sky, the other night sky photographs back.297
But how does Paglen work to avoid or subvert the controlling, imperialist functions of
photography under that kind of ideology? And if it is revealing “blank spots,” he has said
that this also results, paradoxically, in a kind of problem-solving process for the
government and NGOs whose satellites patrol the skies. For instance, in response to
Paglen’s work, these titans merely move their celestial bodies into other, once-againsecret orbits.
Returning to the drone photographs, the distance from which the photographs are
taken invokes a kind of vertigo in the viewer—an awe at the span of sky and the drone’s
seemingly insignificant image captured against it. As Jayne Wilkinson eloquently puts it:
“With a small but powerful presence, drones look back at us; they activate the space
between viewer and viewed with an eyeless vision and a geographically indeterminate
location. Such indeterminacy is manifest in Paglen’s visual strategy, the flat, all-over,
abstract fields of color he employs in the drone series. With no horizon line to orient us
towards either earth or sky, we are thrust into a vividly atmospheric space. As viewers we
neither look up to the drone, nor down to the earth, confusing our sense of spatial
orientation.”298 However, the photographs also rely on the public’s existing knowledge of
This refers to The Other Night Sky, another of Paglen’s works that photographed the hundreds
of secret satellites that orbit the Earth’s sky every night like stars from an alternate universe. The
sky itself no longer holds the promise of infinite freedom and unknowability. Instead, it is shown
to be dotted with manmade structures that are always watching, in some cases with a lethal gaze.
Instead of wondering at unseen galaxies, the viewer is left with the vague dread of the invisible
presence of hundreds of machines traversing the sky.
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what drones are, as well as the symbolic place they hold in the public imagination. Under
those conditions, the distance and size of the drone in the sky is inverted, where the awe
at the violent power and technological unknowability dwarfs that of nature’s sky. In other
words, these photographs reveal the expanse of the drone in the imagination as yet
another vast, untraversed landscape. “Perhaps this is why the question of aesthetic
representation persists in Paglen’s work, because with striking and sublime images he
paradoxically makes clear that the sky can no longer act as a projection of our desire for
limitless freedom. To gaze upwards is not to look continually out to the heavens but to
realize the paradox of humanity’s complete intervention into the natural world.”299 In the
bright field of abstract color, where a viewer is groundless, unmoored and without a
referent, the figure of the drone suddenly appears and conjures with it all the force and
power of electromagnetic telecommunications, a global flow of information and the everpresent question: is it armed?
Reaper Drone works differently, because it is a close up of a drone on the ground,
surrounded by distorted lights from vehicles and the suggestions of military personnel.
The hulking, larger-than-life presence confronts one with the thought that even if it were
in focus, the inner workings of the drone, and by extension the military-industrial
complex, would still be vague outlines produced through a combination of secrecy and
tacit public consent. Unlike the fields of color in the other works, this image is dominated
by both the grey concrete of the surrounding space and the grey body of the Reaper,
suggesting that in our digital age, death comes not on flapping black wings but strapped
to a buzzing, grey metallic shadow moving faster than any fleshy muscles would allow—
the horrible and awesome apotheosis of man’s domination over nature, Kant’s sublime
come to roost. Reaper Drone is a literal manifestation of the way secrecy warps vision—
the public is only able to view drones on military bases from enormous distances, never
without technological prostheses, and these images are neither clear or distinct. So what
are we to make of them? Paglen’s references to art history serve as an interrogation of the
function of representation in contemporary art, asking whether the simple act of
299Wilkinson,
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photographing a person or object in focus allows a transparent understanding of who or
what that object or person is, as well as the social milieu they arose from. The drone
photographs’ swirling masses of colors and the indecipherability of the image without a
guiding title or curator’s note could be compared to Impressionism’s challenge to the
conventions of realism or the indictment of pictorial figuration found in abstract painting.
In Limit Telephotography, Paglen once again turns his lens on secret military
installations in the Nevada desert. This time, however, the photographs contain no
discernible people or objects. Paglen was forbidden by U.S. law to get close enough to
the bases to take any documentary photographs in the traditional sense. As with the drone
series (as well as The Other Night Sky, which used a modified version of this), he had to
devise a way to take pictures from distant locations on public land, sometimes as far as
forty miles away. He turned to existing techniques for viewing celestial bodies and
created his own telephoto lens based on the long distance lenses used in
astrophotography. Like heavenly bodies, these military installations are impossible to see
clearly with the naked eye, and like the stars and planets, they seem inaccessible and
otherworldly. The resulting images challenge the premises of documentary photography.
Instead of verifying that which they document, these images are blurry, garbled by the
static of dust and debris as well as the phenomena of atmospheric distortion that happens
when taking photographs through vast distances—the air literally warps the image,
placing us face-to-face with the material conditions that all photography implicitly
encounters. The pictures are illegible by themselves—they reveal nothing about the
functioning of the military, neither do they disclose any clandestine operations. It is
remarkable that the images are distorted only by the desert air. No other presence, animal
or vegetal, flits along the lens or leaves its shadow on the photographs. It is as if the bases
themselves are “blank spots on the map”— seemingly unoccupied territory, revealed
through Paglen’s camera but not captured by it. The military, after all, goes on about its
daily business even as its picture is being taken.300
It is worth noting that Paglen has been deterred or detained while working, even though he
does so from public land. See Jonah Weiner, “Prying Eyes,” The New Yorker, October 15, 2012,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/10/22/prying-eyes/).
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The very name, Limit Telephotography, gestures at the material limitations of
producing photographs of secret sites at such vast distances, but also refers to the
epistemological and representational limits at work in each image. Though Paglen’s
photographs are ostensibly images of military bases, they do not use the same play of
revealing and concealing as Harvey and Bridle, because the photographs are not
discernibly “of” anything. The images produced are as mysterious as that which they
claim to photograph, and the only way one “knows” that the pictures are of this or that
base, for example, is through cues given by the object label, explanatory placard, or when
Paglen himself explains it. But why should viewers believe him? In fact, this belief
depends—not unlike the public acceptance of the government’s right to secrecy and
surveillance—on ceding authority to Paglen as author and artist, which itself reveals the
hegemonic inclinations of so-called fine arts and academic discourse. As Gary Kafer
explains:
Paglen registers his work as an ‘experimental geography.’ Such a practice
rearticulates the documentation of material space along alternative perceptual
systems, while also gesturing to a spatial understanding of knowledge production.
In this way, Paglen’s Limit Telephotography series attempts to understand how
political effects can be located at the site of production, rather than purely in the
image. At the same time, as a relational aesthetic, limit-telephotography
reconsiders how documentation can contribute to political agency at the site of
encounter with the image. Understanding how collaborative art practice can
function as a form of documentation relieves the image from political
responsibility, and gestures outwards to the ways in which limit-telephotography
can mobilize different processes of civic engagement against the black world…It
is Paglen’s project to make visible precisely these locations that resist visibility
and in fact require invisibility to maintain standard operating procedures. Through
his limit-telephotography, Paglen not only gestures to the limits of trying to make
these sites visible, but also to the limits of translating their presence into forms of
knowledge which can then circulate in public discourse.301
In line with the proclamation that the sky is a kind of landscape, experimental geography
takes spatial production and cultural production to be inseparable, and turns the question
of art into a question of what kind of social space produced this art, and what kind of
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space does a given work of art in turn produce? Moreover, Paglen claims that his art
practice is explicitly experimenting with creating different forms of space, leading more
than one theorist to situate his practice within a Rancièrian paradigm. As Kafer argues:
“We might then approach the resistive potential of experimental geography ‘not in terms
of their production of new images, objects, or experiences, but in terms of their
production of potentially new spatial-political configurations.’…while it cannot be
assumed that such creative interventions generate critical or radical results, they can
produce the potential to represent the ways in which discourses shaping social and
political life might be reproduced, changed, or disrupted.”302
While Paglen’s own understanding of his work refers to “relational
photography”303 and is self-professedly indebted to Adorno’s negative dialectics, the
connection to Rancière is clear in Paglen’s concern for the relationship between the
technical production of art and its ability to produce new spatial relations, which are
themselves the space of the work’s consumption—this is what leads the above theorists to
say that Paglen is concerned not with a political didactics or documentary per se, but with
the productive tension between modes of vision and regimes of truth. Relational
photography, with its explicit attempts to frame the complex interplay between discourse
and praxis, attempts to open a caesura, a pause, between belief and sight, truth and
visuality—a new, dissensual space where the viewer may question the prevailing sensual
organization. Then—or more accurately, there—as Rancière claims, is the space within
which democratic politics happens. The inquiries made possible by the images in Limit
Telephotography or the Untitled drone series only symbolically disrupt the surveillance
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systems they capture. What viewers of these works instead interrogate are the social
systems and relations of power that produced these spaces in the first place, as well as the
relationship between aesthetics and power that allow such powerful systems to operate
invisibly. As Kafer says, “[i]t is then not the case that Paglen’s images contain the radical
potential to subvert the discourses of secrecy operative in the black world, but rather that
his practice of limit-telephotography produces the very political spaces from which these
aesthetic objects may emerge.”304 He makes an explicit connection between dissensus
and the spaces produced by Paglen’s experimental geography, which are productive not
simply of critical discourse or as modes of resistance in themselves, but are rather spaces
of potential— the “experimental” in experimental geography—for new aesthetic regimes.
This also means that Paglen’s art will not necessarily succeed in producing these.
However, because the final artistic product cannot come clearly into view, his work is
focused on the process of art production as well as the continual process of its reception,
rather than the congealment of ideas and process into the art object (which would be the
very definition of commodification).
Some have referred to Paglen’s work (and that of his contemporary, Harun
Farocki)305 as works of “semi-opacity”—works that reveal networks of control through a
kind of analog hacking of their blind spots, using the blind spots of the system to produce
semi-legible objects meant to mimic and thus reveal the fantasy of total transparency and
control that many secretive surveillance structures rely on. Rafael Dernbach, a proponent
of this narrative, describes this process as a “detourning” of control images, and claims
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Harun Farocki was a German filmmaker whose work often focused on surveillance and
droning, and frequently made in the documentary style. Farocki’s work was often shown in the
same exhibits as Paglen’s, as both were interested in the operations of the military-industrial
complex. He also coined the term “operational images,” which Grégoire Chamayou summarizes
as follows: “Harun Farocki tells us that the technology of military vision produces not so much
representations as ‘operative images,’ images that do not represent an object, but instead are part
of an operation.’ Here, vision is a sighting: it serves not to represent objects but to act upon them,
to target them. The function of the eye is that of a weapon. The link between the two is the image
on the screen, which is not so much a figurative representation as an operative function.”
Gregoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press,
2015), 114.
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“By embracing hacking, ‘the penetration of systems of rationality that seem infallible’,
they adapt their activist strategies to oppose modulating systems of control: not through
plain resistance or counter-surveillance, but through the creation of navigational tools that
enable us to see the procedures and limits of control systems.”306
I will talk more about detournement near the end of this chapter, but for now I
want to focus on the techniques of hacking and visuality Dernbach attributes to Paglen.
Though the intent is to celebrate Paglen’s work, these claims misunderstand the nuanced
distinction between his work and that of other artists who rely on the interplay between
vision and invisibility. I would argue that Paglen’s work precisely does not rely on
hacking or on the blind spots of surveillance systems, because while his use of these
systems is instrumental to creating his works, it does not define them. The so-called
“blind spots” that he supposedly utilizes in the works I have mentioned are the public
spaces that even immense government apparatuses cannot forbid him from accessing,
both in the horizontal (Limit Telephotography) and vertical (Untitled drone series) planes.
With the assistance of careful curation, what Paglen’s work does is open the spatial
interplays of the world and render surveillance in 3D, bringing our attention to it
specifically as a system of world building through control of the production of the
sensible qua control of space. But attention is not the same thing as knowledge—the
systems themselves remain opaque to varying degrees. This work is not a form of
activism, and it certainly provides no useful “tools” for viewers’ resistance. It is debatable
whether it relies on hacking, which Dernbach frames (using Wark’s definition) as the
penetration of systems of rationality that seem infallible.307 However, the reference to
penetration provides a useful place to offer a distinction: while Paglen’s work does
Rafael Dernbach, “Hacking the Vision Machine: Farocki’s and Paglen’s detourning of control
images,” Revista Teknokultura, 11, no. 2 (2014): 389.
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operate through the weaknesses of the seemingly omnipotent behemoth that is
government surveillance, it is unclear whether his images penetrate this system. The term
penetration conjures a piercing insight, a visual paradigm that sees beneath or through a
form of obfuscation, much like Descartes’ meditations are meant to see through
appearances to produce clear and distinct ideas. In Paglen’s work, the material production
of the images—Paglen’s position as far enough outside these systems that he is deemed
safe by them, so that his affecting them seems laughable—as well as the condition of the
images themselves, are not revealing but hazy, obscure, strange and unreadable. They do
not produce counter-hegemonic discourses or new, penetrating truths, and as such they
avoid (for the most part) the reification of commodities—they avoid being “set to work.”
Paglen’s work is patently not an aesthetic intervention. Of course, that is not to say that
Paglen’s art is devoid of any relationship to capitalism or politics, but rather that the
relationship is placed in the realm of discourse. As Kafer writes, while “…these devices
identify the political potentials of Paglen’s experimental geography, they also nullify such
effects by situating the vital dissensual properties of limit-telephotography within a
consensual critical discourse—that is to say, such images are political because they are
proclaimed to be so.”308 Though his work largely tends to engage in a praxis critical of
capitalism on the production side, the consumption of his work as art and the precise need
for symbols and referents to make the works legible enough to be put on public display
also weaken the radicalness of each project through its necessary positioning as “political
art.” Within the Rancièrian paradigm of dissensus, art must be separate from the social,
and art itself must not be political in order to activate political potential: “…the more [art]
goes out into the streets and professes to be engaging in a form of social intervention, the
more it anticipates and mimics its own effects. Art thus risks becoming a parody of its
alleged efficacy.”309 Paglen’s Limit Telephotography thereby reveals the limits of art as
political.
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While Paglen’s work is decidedly concerned with the spatial, it is also important
to examine its relationship to the temporal as contemporary art, which reveals itself not as
a movement or genus but a condition of analysis of socio-historical formations and the
responses to them. Osborne claims that contemporary art is postconceptual art, meaning
(1) the contemporary is a speculative horizon for the future unity of different times and
(2) art is a bearer of contemporaneity because of its social and material constitution,
which makes it (3) a self-reflexive (dialectical) process of production/consumption. As a
theorist who works to articulate the relationship between contemporary capitalism and
art, Marina Vishmidt challenges the efficacy of looking to the future to open new
possibilities. She proposes a “speculative ontology of art,” under which contemporary art
as speculative practice claims to expand social or conceptual possibilities, performs a
radical break between form and material, and produces “speculative subjectivities”
through artists engaging in self-described identitarian artistic practices, which are often
future-oriented.310 Under this system, art, like high frequency trading (HFT), which
Vishmidt aptly uses as the apotheosis of speculative capitalism, mediates the future.
According to Vishmidt, these practices ultimately end up closing potential horizons. Like
Osborne’s definition of contemporary art, Vishmidt’s version also engages with the
future, and like Rancière’s dissensus, it is interested in alternative social forms. However,
under my union of the theories of Rancière and Osborne, contemporary art is only
oriented towards the future, it does not actually mediate it. It opens the possibility of new
social forms, rather than actually instantiating these forms itself. The rupture between
form and material, or concept and object, also experiences a dialectical overcoming by
becoming postconceptual. As quoted above, Osborne explains that “[c]ontemporary art is
‘post’-conceptual to the extent that it registers the historical experience of conceptual art,
as a self-conscious movement, as the experience of the impossibility/fallacy of the
absolutization of anti-aesthetic, in conjunction with a recognition of an ineliminably
conceptual aspect to all art. In this respect, art is postconceptual to the extent to which it
Marina Vishmidt, “Speculation in a Sense: Aesthetics and Real Abstraction,” In The Mind But
Not From There: Real Abstraction and Contemporary Art, ed. Gean Moreno (London: Verso,
2019), 171-73.
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reflectively incorporates the truth (which itself incorporates the untruth) of ‘conceptual
art’: namely, art is necessarily both aesthetic and conceptual.”311 What is vital to see here
is that images with distinct content, produced by an identifiable artist (e.g., Paglen) are
not didactic, programmatic or avant-garde (in the traditional sense). Rather they envision
the idea of new sensoriums (or aesthetics according to Kant and Ngai) that could then
lead to new political engagements and social formations.
The temporality of art is also contingent on its relationship to heterogenous social
spaces (or, to use Rancière’s words, different regimes of sense), and defines itself along
both of these axes. It smashes into the barrier between art and the social or political, at
the apex of its self-reflection, as an exploration of both its materiality (the risk of being
“merely” aesthetic) and the conceptual horizons (an attempt to be completely allegorical)
that make art susceptible to becoming parodic of itself. Osborne makes explicit that
contemporary art as postconceptual art is the art that most closely mimics the situation of
contemporary capitalism, which is for him the ultimate form of the union of disjunctive
social spaces and immaterial materiality, which he sees as realized in contemporary
digital photography. Digital photography is a multiplication of visualizations that frees
image-centered art (photography) from being medium-centered. According to Osborne,
within the digital image or digital photograph, empirically or referential reality—once the
crux of photography’s claim to “realism” via its indexical properties—is no longer
significant. The place of photography has been displaced, and what is important is its
infinite reproducibility and the easy exchangeability of one image with another.312 This
exchangeability is part of what relates digital art to contemporaneity, because its structure
most closely mimics the post-Fordist situation of infinite exchangeability. When Osborne
refers to this unmooring of a digital image from a so-called privileged original, he calls it
a “visible copy” of an invisible original.313 While this comment is not explored further in
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It is difficult not to be reminded of Bridle’s Dronestagram, with its infinite stream of
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Osborne’s work, it is borne out in Paglen’s Limit Telephotography. The images produced
by Paglen are the visible traces of the largely undetectable U.S. surveillance network.
Both the physical inscrutability of the photos due to effects of the landscape on longrange photography and the lack of transparency of each image with regard to exactly
what it is without reference to some curated guiding text is indicative of the collapse of
the empirical and symbolic certainty of both the systems being photographed and the
photographs themselves. In a kind of mimicking of the structure of the commodity
fetish,314 what the images are “of” is big surveillance’s inability to disappear completely
—there will always be huge military installations, server farms, satellites and the money
trails that link them all; they will always take up space.
Limit Telephotography is also notable for its experimental use of the latest and
(according to Osborne) most influential technological innovations—digital photography
and imaging—as its medium, “since it is the peculiar generality of the photographic
image that laid the ground for the destruction of medium-specificity in the visual arts and
the inauguration of a ‘post-medium’ or ‘transmedia’ condition.”315 Photography is a
unifying structure that transcends specific media in its ontological valences, and this
unity “derives from a chain of relations between technologies that is sustained as a
distributive unity by their common cultural functions. In this sense, a distributive unity is
a pragmatic unity. It is a condition of this commonality of function that the types of
images produced share a certain de-materialized generality that transcends their
technologically particular material forms and acts as a kind of relay between them.”316
This sort of “unity” is precisely what defines the contemporary for Osborne, and we can
Marx’s description of the commodity fetish in chapter one of Capital, Vol. 1 seems bleak, as
the emergence of the commodity under capitalism obscures the labor relations belying each
object and thus turns use value into exchange value and starts the whole loathsome circuit of
exchangeability. However, in a classical dialectic move, the commodity is also the object that
breaks down under analysis into its truth as a fetishization and reification, precisely because of
the nature of its materiality. Though the Cloud conjures images of a fluffy, ethereal pool of
infinite space, this name only covers the infrastructures actually required to operate these data
repositories, from enormous server farms to huge dams for cooling the servers…and of course, as
we have seen before, information itself is material.
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see now how technological development plays a vital role in the production of
contemporaneity as both a unifying function and a mirror of disparate social landscapes.
Paglen’s work, therefore, not only operates along the spatial axes of an experimental
landscape, it is actually spatio-temporal in its role as contemporary art. Contemporary art
provides a distributive or speculative horizon of unity of socio-historical aesthetic forms
through its material and conceptual arms, and frames the current historical time as
transmedial, fractured and infinitely exchangeable under an inescapable diffuse unity.
This reflection of the contemporary through the aesthetic in contemporary art therefore
reveals the hegemonic regimes of sense, and in doing so, creates the possibility for the
emergence of new ones.

6.5 « Technological Subsumption and Art »
As has often been noted, post-Fordist capitalism is adept at subsuming symbols and
techniques of resistance, either by putting them to work through commodification or by
using often-lauded “hacks” as unwaged debugging of its own systems. Indeed, under
hypersubsumption, any finished work or supposedly closed system is a priori part of the
capitalist productive system through its genesis in it, though in reality it may take a
certain amount of time to achieve this potentiality. Both Harvey’s and Blas’ work is open,
to differing degrees (Harvey explicitly puts his artistic wares on the market at very high
prices and obfuscates their production through his own brand name) to becoming part of
capitalism’s own project, helping it see more clearly. What is particularly nefarious and
ironic about hypersubsumption is that projects are themselves blind to the hegemonic
structures they are helping to reproduce. We saw this with a work as sophisticated as
Blas’, which relies on the resistant structures of queerness and opacity but ultimately
reaffirmed neoliberal identitarian structures precisely in its attempts to undermine their
strategies. Bernes offers a useful summary when he writes that “there is no reason to
assume from the start…that all existing means of production must have some use beyond
capital, and that all technological innovation must have, almost categorically, a
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progressive dimension which is recuperable through a process of ‘determinate negation.’”
317

Hypersubsumption, as the process by which capitalism co-opts labor before it
even happens, reifies all forms of productive labor into commodified entities. It does so
particularly through a parasitic relationship with technological advances, which
capitalism had already placed under its valorization model with real subsumption.
Hypersubsumption, however, takes place as information technology becomes inextricably
linked with the production of subjectivity, when the technological prosthesis is one’s
being-in-the-world. Because of this ontological valence, hypersubsumption means that
pre-subjective, pre-individuated structures are already capitalist structures of value
production, so any subjectivity generated from these positions will exist for the purposes
of generating value. Examples of this are both a social esteem of capitalist values like
“productivity,” branding, promotion and wealth, and more importantly, the ability of
post-Fordist capitalism to now extract value from every process without moving through
the stage of use value to the labor that produced it. In other words, this kind of valuation
no longer extracts the labor that once belonged to another person—now work belongs to
capitalism from the start.318
The difficulty, then, of critiquing capitalism and its reliance on surveillance (as
one example) through a model of counter-production is escaping the capitalist lineage of
commodities—or rather, the capitalist foundations of production that turn produced
objects into value-generating objects and valorize the production process itself. It makes
317
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Marx presciently explains in section 489, “Mystification of Capital, etc.” of Chapter 2 of
“Results of the Direct Production Process,” from Chapter 6 of Capital, Vol. I, “the social character
of the conditions of labour—which includes among other things their form as machinery, and
fixed capital in all its forms—appears as something entirely autonomous, which exists
independently of the worker as a mode of capital’s existence, and therefore also as something
arranged by the capitalists independently of the workers. Like the social character of their own
labour, only even more so, the social character the conditions of production acquire as communal
conditions of production of combined labour appears as capitalist as a character possessed by
those conditions of production as such, independently of the workers.” Under advanced
capitalism, the worker has become subsumed under the means of production. Where before it was
merely naturalized as part of capitalist production, under advanced capitalism—saturated with
machines—labour-power itself is now a function of capitalism.
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a certain amount of sense to use the latest technology—the same ones being used in
capitalist military and telecommunications systems—to turn these objects to new uses.
Under the auspices of a hypersubsumptive capitalism, however, it is not merely that
objects and subjects are subsumed or commodified. As Jeremy Crampton notes,
contemporary thinking about the drone must focus “not so much on drones as objects, but
as [socio-technical] assemblages of the vertical.”319 Droning is the defining feature of the
social-factory under hypersubsumption. It is, in a literal way, an ontology—a way of
being that has emerged under contemporary capitalism. Artists like Harvey and Blas, who
experiment with drones and other such technologies, are at the forefront of attempts to
co-opt the technologies themselves. Mike Neary, discussing the work of McKenzie Wark,
points out some of the issues with such practices:
McKenzie Wark (2003; 2013) considers drone culture as a new form of political
administration or ‘vectoral power’. For Wark, vectoral power means merging
commodity-space (where everything is proximate in the world market) with
strategic-space (where everything is relative to the battlefield borders that enclose
it), bringing them both under the control of the communication vector. He
describes this new arrangement as ‘third nature’, through which the tensions of
second nature—alienation, class struggle and the planner-state—are resolved in
the form of new conflicts and collusions that emerge as yet more chaotic violent
spaces.320
The attempt to “fight fire with fire” ultimately results in the creation of new violent
spaces.
These artists are also participating in orthodox Marxism’s sacred doctrine: the
seizing of the capitalist means of production by the proletariat. Under traditional
dialectical materialism, this move leads to revolution. With today’s capitalism, it becomes
difficult to decipher what constitutes the means of production; the boundaries between
consumer and producer are blurred (in the figure of the prosumer), as are the identitarian
categories of worker, bourgeoise, capitalist, etc., in most of the world. The
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aestheticization of politics by means of a hegemonic sensorium complicates things even
further: it is no longer a matter of seizing the means of production (which nowadays can
only tentatively be identified as “technology”), but rather “hacking” or detourning321
them.
Detournement presents an object anew via a swerve from both the historicalmaterial origins of an object and its conceptual meaning; the arrangement of these same
two considerations makes up postconceptual art. Under droning (the prevailing mode of
life that has emerged through the imbrication of aesthetic gazing and militarized
capitalism) the process of detournement in art, or co-opting technology for recuperative
purposes, is therefore the process of creating a genuine postconceptual art. We now see
why it is important to evaluate Bias and Harvey’s work against the criterion of
contemporary art laid out earlier in the chapter. Successful detournement of a control
technology, for example, is equivalent to the dissensual potential of contemporary or
postconceptual art. Furthermore, this is achieved not through a finished product but by
the continual process of an analytic of concept and material that provides a critique of
socio-historical forms and culminating in a privileged form of contemporaneity. By
focusing on production and consumption as processes that inform the art object (thereby
turning it into something whose meaning and form is always shifting and changing),
Paglen’s work is not a constellation of objects and techniques being used in novel ways—
instead the works are merely components of the larger production process. Rather he is
concerned with the aesthetic (in the Kantian sense) possibilities that emerge through the
creation of social landscapes and the conditions for the possibility of politics, as opposed

Detournement, or “diversion,” refers to a method of creating an artwork by subverting an
original work through a farcical copy. Coined by Guy Debord, it was a favorite tactic of the 1960s
French Situationists. According to Urban Dictionary, which surprisingly provides a concise and
cogent definition, “In the [Situationist International’s] own words ‘there is no Situationist art,
only Situationist uses of art.’ Detournement is distinct from ‘theft’ plagiarism, which only
subverts the source of the material and post-modern ‘ironic quotation’ plagiarism which only
subverts the meaning of the material, the source becoming the meaning.” (Sonic,
“Detournement,” Urban Dictionary, accessed January 16, 2020. https://
www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Detournement./)
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to providing a series of experiments with possible revolutionary tactics by means of
reified “art works.”
Of course, this is not to say that artists like Blas or Harvey ultimately “fail” at
their work, nor that Paglen’s creations avoid being ensnared in the minefield of capitalist
value production altogether. There is no “outside” of capitalism after all; to return to a
metaphor I used above, artistic responses to this problem must instead be asymptotic to
an escape velocity—running ever closer to it without achieving it, for they are earthbound by the chains of the materials they use and the social milieu they emerge from,
which with the advent of hypersubsumption, are inescapably capitalist. The importance of
the contemporaneity of contemporary art is precisely its future orientation; this is also
what connects contemporary art with the speculative function of surveillance, and the
cybernetic control of the future that distinguishes it from previous modes of biopolitical
control (which could not act on the future so insidiously or effectively). Both surveillance
mechanisms and contemporary art have recognized the way in which technological
development is essential to facilitating the future-orientation of surveillance. Art is the
privileged vanguard of contemporaneity and thus allows us a peek at the speculative
horizon of a more utopian (communist) future. This “peek” is actually a chasm, a tear in
space that reveals vistas of a multiplicity of sensoriums that are not only spatial but
temporal, since they exist in the democratic future.
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7 « Conclusion »
7.1 « Hypersubsumption Overview »
The common thread connecting the fields of inquiry in this dissertation has been
hypersubsumption. In the introduction, I stated that I would use Marx’s concept of
subsumption to categorize contemporary capitalism in a manner that accounted for its
emphasis on technology, subjectivity and creating value from unwaged digital labour.
Through each chapter, new features of hypersubsumption were revealed. Though
hypersubsumption is too complex to define in a single-sentence, we can now review these
defining features in order to put together a final, comprehensive definition of
hypersubsumption that brings together the focus of each chapter.
In the first chapter, I argued that tracing Marx’s concept of subsumption would be
a fruitful way to characterize the features of contemporary post-Fordist capitalism. As we
can recall, subsumption as a whole refers to the relationship between labour and
capitalism, and production and capitalism. Under formal subsumption, which is the initial
form of capitalist takeover (after primitive accumulation), capitalism takes hold of
existing modes of production and expands the working day to create absolute surplus
value. We then move to real subsumption, during which capitalism actually changes the
means of production themselves to make their primary directive the production of surplus
value. This is the point where capitalism begins to affect not just the immediate present,
but the future, primarily by shaping new technologies for its own purposes of selfvalorization. At this juncture I posited that a new kind of subsumption has now taken
hold, corresponding to the advent of network technologies and what Lazzarato calls
“immaterial labour.”
The first chapter emphasized that hypersubsumption is a necessary consequence
of and logical outgrowth of previous forms of subsumption. While formal subsumption
generally affected labour-power, and real subsumption was concerned with production,
hypersubsumption works on living labour itself. Through a specific return to
individualism facilitated by technology, it capitalizes on unproductive labour and
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consumption, and realizes capital’s long-standing dream of ridding itself of labour.
Furthermore, capitalist production has become fundamental to the production of
subjectivities, where the phases of consumption and production have merged. This also
means that hypersubsumption invokes a state of pure abstraction, wherein abstract
concepts, masquerading as real social interactions, shape and create society.
In the second chapter, we saw how surveillance capitalism is fundamental to
hypersubsumption; with the advent of digital technologies, immaterial waged and
unwaged labour has become the prevailing means of surplus value creation for
contemporary capitalism. This form of value is referred to as network value. In order to
extract this value, contemporary capitalism relies on a series of vast surveillance and
capture technologies, born from military research. The expansion of surveillance has
created a state of near-total exposure, corresponding to what Alliez, Lazzarato, and
separately, Virilio, refer to as a state of total war,322 which has become vital to capitalist
valorization.
In the third chapter we saw the effects of this condition on workers themselves.
Hypersubsumption was shown to be specifically linked to information technologies and
to the integration of these technologies with the production of subjectivity. As immaterial
labour became the dominant form of class exploitation, a new relationship emerges
between individuals and technology, productive and unproductive labour, and living
labour. I referred to this emergent matrix as coerced posthumanism, and argued that
posthumanism is not a subjective position itself but a form of technologically mediated
labour that generates network value (which is extracted by surveillance capitalism)

“The two world wars are responsible for realizing, for the first time, ‘total’ subordination (or
“real subsumption”) of society and its ‘productive forces’ to the war economy through the
organization and planning of production, labor and technology, science and consumption, at a
hitherto unheard-of scale. Implicating the entire population in ‘production’ was accompanied by
the constitution of processes of mass subjectivation through the management of communications
techniques and opinion creation.” (Alliez and Lazzarato, Wars and Capital, 21). The authors
stress the role of the State (with a capital S) in the ontological constitution of capitalism.
According to them, it is the distribution of the State’s monopoly on “legitimate force” that gives
capitalism the ability to extend itself across the globe. Paul Virilio refers to the current state of
globalized capital as one of “total war” in Speed and Politics, trans. Mark Polizzotti (Los
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2006).
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through the self-creation of individuals as variants of constant capital— aka machines.
Hypersubsumption, therefore, occurs with the total domination and inversion of
humanity’s species-being through technology. It takes the future-directedness of real
subsumption and applies it to individuation itself, controlling not just the means of
production but the potentialities of social life itself.
The fourth and fifth chapters focused on contemporary art and its encounters with
contemporary capitalism under hypersubsumption. Both surveillance capitalism and
contemporary art share a speculative orientation toward the future. Surveillance
capitalism attempts to control the future through cybernetic algorithms and digital
platforms, molding it into a series of predictable behaviors that can be monetized.
Through a combination of the aesthetic theories of Peter Osborne and Jacques Rancière,
we arrived at a theory of contemporary art that described it as art that opens new
sensoriums through the radical act of dissensus, a disruption of the senses that changes
heretofore normalized perceptions of social space. At its best, dissensus makes visible
previously invisible sensoriums and opens them as spaces for potential political action.
These newly open sensory spaces are necessarily future-oriented and utopic (in the
classical definition of the word as “other space”), because they produce both the time and
the space for new communities to emerge in society. This redistribution of the sensible
itself is what we might call politics.

7.2 « Critiques of Dissensus »
Here, we need to revisit the third chapter’s concern with posthumanism. Included in that
chapter was Ray Brassier’s critique of Rosi Braidotti’s critical posthumanism, and one of
Brassier’s claims was that Braidotti’s reliance on posthumanism rescuing or revealing a
“missing people” is born of capitalist neoliberalism, under which they are already
acknowledged as “excluded”: “The counter-actualization of virtual potencies required by
Braidotti’s hope is effectively the cultivation of empowerment within existing social
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relations.”323 In actualizing the virtual potencies of excluded peoples, Braidotti reifies
existing social relations. So how does Rancière’s dissensus, which claims to make visible
excluded subjectivities, differ from Braidotti’s project? In many ways, it does not:
On the one hand, the ‘community of sense’ woven by artistic practice is, in the
present, a new set of vibrations of the human community; on the other hand, it is a
monument that stands as a mediation or a substitute for a people to come. The
paradoxical relation between the ‘apart’ and the ‘together’ is also a paradoxical
relation between the present and the future. The art work is the people to come
and it is the monument of its expectation, the monument of its absence. The
artistic ‘dissensual community’ has a double body: it is a combination of means
for producing an effect out of itself: creating a new community between human
beings, a new political people. And it is the anticipated reality of that people. The
tension between ‘being apart’ and ‘being together’ is tied up with another tension
between two statuses of artistic practice: as a means for producing an effect, and
as the reality of that effect.324
Rancière even explicitly refers to Deleuze’s “missing people” in this section. Without
augmentation by Osborne’s explicit concerns with capitalism and the relationship
between art and capitalism’s dialectical movements through history, Rancière’s thesis
does indeed seem to fall victim to the rhetoric of concealing and revealing that I criticized
so heavily in the fifth chapter. However, an important distinction that can perhaps save
the dissensual thesis is Rancière’s emphasis that it does not merely reveal marginalized or
“missing” communities that have been somehow “hidden” or “invisible” within the
current fabric of society; rather, since it is a function of art creation, dissensus does not
act on communities directly—it acts on the senses and the sensible:
[Dissensus] is a multiplication of connections and disconnections that reframe the
relation between bodies, the world where they live and the way in which they are
‘equipped’ for fitting it. It is a multiplicity of folds and gaps in the fabric of
common experience that change the cartography of the perceptible, the thinkable
and the feasible. As such, it allows for new modes of political construction of
common objects and new possibilities of collective enunciation.325
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Dissensus does not frame any communities. It is selective disorientation that disturbs the
familiar fabric of our external intuition and creates gaps that refer to the possibilities of
our internal intuition—a.k.a. time. It is neither programmatic nor rhetorical, and it is
certainly not victorious because it has not done anything but rather undone or unravelled
something.
Perhaps it is a stretch to save dissensus this way. There are many things to be
rightly critical or suspicious of in this theory. What makes this idea worthwhile, useful
and adequate (albeit with some modifications and tampering) for this project is
Rancière’s explicit acknowledgement that dissensus is only potentially radical. As he
makes clear, there is no reason an experience of sensory disorientation and clash between
heterogenous sensible regimes would create any awareness, let alone action, because art
cannot be deployed in such a straightforwardly tactical manner. The bottom line is you
cannot control what an artwork “says,” “does” or “means.” This is precisely the problem
with most of the artworks described in chapter five, which focus too much either on
didactics or on the finished work of art and its message, rather than on art’s material and
social conditions of production and the disjuncture between what an artwork or artist
intends and how their work is received. At its best, Rancière’s concept mobilizes
precisely this unknown and uncontrollable element—he has this in common with Paglen.

7.3 « Posthuman Inversion »
When we looked at the effects of hypersubsumption on labour, consumption and
production in chapter three, we saw that they have produced a new type of capitalist
subjectivity: coerced posthumanism. Contrary to twentieth century ideas about the
explicit force behind ideological repression, or the straightforward needs-driven selling of
one’s labour on the so-called “free market,” capitalist subjectivity today offers itself
willingly, if not always happily, to the algorithmic wasteland. As Terranova notes about
unwaged digital activities:
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“These activities fall outside the concept of ‘abstract labor,’ which Marx defined as the
provision of time for the production of value regardless of the useful qualities of the
product. They witness an investment of desire into production of the kind cultural
theorists have mainly theorized in relation to consumption.”326 The activities users
perform in their free time on digital platforms have enormous real benefits; they provide
sociality, a sense of identity, convenience, and access to a type of unique digital
citizenship, the absence of which can ironically create a profound sense of alienation. It
appears that instead of commodities meeting on the marketplace in their producers’ stead,
it is actually people meeting in social interaction. This appears to be the society imagined
in species-being discourse. However, as was discussed in the third chapter, this is not the
case. In reality this is the domination of the general intellect by capital: “The collective
dimension of networked intelligence needs to be understood historically, as part of a
specific momentum of capitalist development.”327 In other words, this type of activity is
immanent to capitalism—it is made possible through capitalist technology and will only
be sustained by it.
This bastardized form of species-being also brings about strange consequences for
the subjectivities within it. As I mentioned earlier, I call the form of subjectivity that
involves individuals and collectives doing unwaged digital labour coerced posthumanism.
The above discussion of pleasure and society explored the coercion aspect of coerced
posthumanism. However, this dissertation also posited a queer reversal of roles between
humans and machines in the creation of value. Before, humans were considered variable
capital and were the only source of creating value directly, while machines were constant
capital, which could be used over and over through its lifespan, with proper maintenance,
and transferred its “value” through being used by living labour. Now, however, it seems
the relationship has shifted with the site of value extraction.
Network value is created largely through the unwaged activity of users over time.
This is the cybernetic aspect of surveillance capitalism—cybernetic control attempts to
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predict and then control future behavior, which is only possible after studying a repeated
set of data. That means enough users must log in time and time again and create a
consistent, trackable profiles. Art theorist Etan Ilfeld makes even more specific
observations about the relationship between cybernetics and digital art in general:
The key relation between third-wave cybernetics and digital art is exemplified in
the conceptualization and practice of emergence, which has opened new horizons
and modes of art production. Howard Rheingold correlates the emergence of an
on-line ‘collective intelligence’ as analogous to the behavior of swarm systems
where agents residing on one scale produce higher-level behavior and patterns.
Emergence may also occur when a recursive feedback loop evolves within a
system in such as a way as to lead to previously unforeseeable phenomena.
Emergence provides an indeterminate and noninstrumentally playful evolution,
allowing for a creative freedom.328
Ilfeld’s references to “emergence” and new modes of art production are remarkably
similar to chapter four and five’s discussion of contemporary art vis-à-vis dissensus, and
counter-production in art. Emergence seems to be an analogue of contemporaneity or
future-orientedness. And non-instrumentalized modes of production, with or without an
emphasis on play, are at the heart of Trevor Paglen’s works as discussed in chapter five. A
non-instrumentalized mode of art production means that an artwork is not attempting to
say or mean something in particular—it is rooted neither in the mimetic nor
representational regimes of aesthetics. Ilfeld also remarks that “new media art employs
third-wave cybernetic discourse and champions notions of emergence, virtualization, deauthorization, gift economies and digitization.”329 New media art here works as a stand-in
for artveillance, since artveillance is considered new media. Here we see an echo of
chapter five’s champions of the virtues of hacking—Rafael Dernbach claims that antisurveillance artworks created by artists like Trevor Paglen and Harun Farocki “are
fighting the phantasm of the objective, totalizing ‘vision machine’ with its own
principles.”330 He claims that Paglen’s works mimic and detourn the image surveillance
Etan J. Ilfeld, “Contemporary Art and Cybernetics: Waves of Cybernetic Discourse within
Conceptual, Video and New Media Art,” LEONARDO 45, no. 1 (2012): 62.
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techniques they seek to expose and undermine through the naturally occurring blind spots
in these digital systems. Dernbach’s brilliant observation is that rather than claiming that
Paglen’s works oppose control images with control images (which would just be a
straightforward re-inscription of scopic violence through the art object), Paglen’s work is
deliberately opaque, which challenges the totalizing hegemonic transparency claim by
militarized surveillance. While I agree with this observation of the distinction between
Paglen’s work in Limit Telephotography and something like James Bridle’s
Dronestagram series, my argument from chapter five is adamant that a detournment of
control images through control technologies is impossible, and neither is it what Paglen is
attempting. While it can be argued that the disturbance in the normal sensible regimes
constituted by dissensus is akin to the crafty utilization of blind spots in hacking, there is
a world of difference between opening a rupture or disturbance and using an existing one
for another agenda. The issue with exploiting blind spots in a system, as hackers know, is
that eventually the system will take advantage of this free de-bugging to shore up the
system. Dissensus, however, does not work within any specific system or toward any
specific end, so while it might be more difficult to always harness the political power of
new sensoriums, it is also much harder to exploit them.
To return to the relationship between digital platforms and coerced
posthumanism, users who do not commit to a platform, product or form of selfpresentation are valuable to capitalism as well, since they provide a field of exclusion for
algorithmic targeting. It is also important that such network value can only be extracted
by algorithmic technologies. This extraction occurs at the point where platform and user
meet—the moments when users are creating and sustaining their subjectivities within the
networked world. Network value comes from feeding on this information while
simultaneously sustaining the source of that information; the machines are now
maintaining the humans.

7.4 « Posthumanism and Human Senses»
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Earlier chapters in this dissertation have referred to Marx’s elaboration on the
emancipation of the human senses from egoism, which comes through a disavowal of
private property and presumably the return of species-being in a non-capitalist world.
According to him, emancipated senses are a vital part of man’s essential powers which
shape and are shaped by human reality. The human nature of the senses comes about
when humans are…humanized: “The objectification of the human essence, both in its
theoretical and practical aspects, is required to make man’s sense human, as well as to
create the human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of human and natural
substance.”331 It may seem tautological, but actually the implications of this complex
section of the 1844 Manuscripts are that there can exist non-humanized senses (or
perhaps dehumanized). After all, Marx obviously is not suggesting that bereft of speciesbeing, humans can no longer see, hear, think, etc. What he is saying is that without
species-being, human senses are no longer humanized—their objective relationship to
their reality is not immanent to their essential powers to shape that objective reality.
Under capitalism, the senses have become abstract, or what he calls “restricted.” Marx
uses the example of eating for somebody who has been denied adequate sustenance: “The
sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted sense. For the starving man,
it is not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract existence as food.”332
This is the case under hypersubsumption, where species-being has been twisted, through
the complete domination of the general intellect through telecommunications technology,
into only what is useful for valorization. The senses that therefore exist for coerced
posthumans are—as one might expect—not human. They are posthuman.

7.5 « Looking Backwards and Forwards »
An important question comes to mind when thinking of coerced posthumanism together
with artworks that play with the traditional distribution of the senses: does one need to
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emancipate the senses in order to produce truly contemporary art (under the standards we
have set forth in the previous chapters)? Or does art, through dissensus, open the
possibility for new sensoriums? If so, are these new sensoriums full of emancipated
senses? Perhaps the senses at work within new sensoriums would be post-posthuman, just
as they would be correspondingly post-capitalist. Answering these questions would open
new paths of inquiry outside the scope of this project, but it is important to acknowledge
the consequences of connecting coerced posthumanism, species-being and counterproduction art in the manner that I have done here.
While I have explored multiple layers of analysis in this project and brought
together discussion from different fields, it all serves the ultimate goal of scrutinizing the
tactics, techniques and efficacy of surveillance art in the milieu of contemporary
capitalism. It was necessary to characterize today’s capitalism in a way that would relate
explicitly to surveillance throughout the dissertation, which not only brought forth the
concept of hypersubsumption but also allowed a detailed examination of surveillance’s
role in value production. This brought us to network value, a by-product of immaterial
unwaged labour which was discussed in chapter one and then elaborated on throughout
the dissertation. Next, we had to examine the labourers producing network value and
found that they would not be considered labourers under strict Marxist definitions, but
were doing unwaged unproductive work directly on their subjectivities. These working
subjectivities were deemed coerced posthumans. Finally, the last two chapters were able
to articulate a theory of contemporary art that sufficiently addressed its production under
the conditions of contemporary capitalism with the structure previously described.
Focusing specifically on surveillance art appropriately manifested the themes the rest of
the dissertation is concerned with, and thus allowed the conclusions about artveillance to
apply to hypersubsumed capitalism. By combining dissensus with Osborne’s notions of
contemporaneity and embedded historicity, we also created a schema of what constitutes
contemporary art as a standard against which to judge specific works of art.
We discovered that some artveillance was not anticapitalist (Harvey), while other
works attempted but failed to turn capitalist surveillance systems against themselves. The
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play of revealing and concealing was not sufficient to provide an active critique of
capitalism, while hiding through camouflage seemed like a tacit acceptance of the present
system—or at the very least a stagnant retreat. Only works that grappled nonprogrammatically and explicitly with the hegemonic sensoriums of the capitalist present
could potentially achieve the kind of dissensual meeting of heterogenous regimes of
sense that open the potentiality for a future politics.
In a world ravaged by climate catastrophe, extreme wealth inequality, sexism,
racism—the list is unending—it can be difficult to accept that no work of art can tell us
what to do, how to get out of the here and now. The future is fraught with fear and
danger, and capitalism seems to thrive in crises, so there is no reason it should stop
creating them anytime soon.333 Writing this dissertation provided a revelation that I
suppose I knew before but had not really internalized: the reason capitalism seems so
totalizing and impossible to escape is because it closes off possibilities, especially in
today’s world of the social factory, etc. That is the situation I was trying to articulate in
the first three chapters, as I described the specific and intentional methods capitalism uses
today, as well as the effects these methods have on human subjectivity. The other
epiphany I had was quieter, more subtle, and perhaps obvious to everybody else: if
capitalism forecloses the future through rigid cybernetic control of the possible, then first
we need to figure out how to create possibilities. Like Socrates’ famous torpedo fish,334
counter-production art disorients and disrupts, only instead of only disrupting
consciousness, it disrupts the entire network of the sensible. After all, as Marx said,
human senses are not just the usual five but also thinking, feeling, enjoying…and even
though we do not see it, perhaps we feel, through the jagged edges of our torn
sensibilities, the flutter of other possible futures.

For a detailed analysis of the way capitalism actually creates a pattern of crises that then
strengthen, rather than disrupt it, see Katerina Kolozova’s discussion of the 2008 financial crisis
in Toward a Radical Metaphysics of Socialism: Marx and Laruelle (Brooklyn: Punctum Books,
2015).
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